Workplace Investigations
Contributing Editors
Workplace investigations are growing in number, size and complexity. Employers are under greater scrutiny as of the importance of ESG rises. Regulated industries such as finance, healthcare and legal face additional hurdles, but public scrutiny of businesses and how they treat their people across the board has never been higher. Conducting a fair and thorough workplace investigation is therefore critical to the optimal operation, governance and legal exposure of every business.
IEL’s Guide to Workplace Investigations examines key issues that organisations need to consider as they initiate, conduct and conclude investigations in 29 major jurisdictions around the world.
Learn more about the response taken in specific countries or build your own report to compare approaches taken around the world.
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06. Can co-workers be compelled to act as witnesses? What legal protections do employees have when acting as witnesses in an investigation?
06. Can co-workers be compelled to act as witnesses? What legal protections do employees have when acting as witnesses in an investigation?
South Korea
South Korea
- at Kim & Chang
- at Kim & Chang
- at Kim & Chang
- at Kim & Chang
While there are no laws to compel co-workers to act as witnesses, the company may have internal policies (eg, rules of employment, code of conduct) that require employees to cooperate with company actions such as a workplace investigation. That said, it would be difficult to enforce such policies even if the employee refuses to cooperate (eg, taking disciplinary action against an employee who refuses to act as a witness).
There may be instances when the company is required to provide certain legal protection to employees acting as witnesses in an investigation. For example, if a whistleblower falling under the WPA is required to act as a witness, they would be entitled to legal protections as discussed in question 1. The company may also have internal policies that provide protection to employees acting as witnesses in an investigation.
Sweden
Sweden
- at Mannheimer Swartling
- at Mannheimer Swartling
- at Mannheimer Swartling
In general, yes, employees in Sweden have a far-reaching duty of loyalty toward their employers. This includes, among other things, a duty to truthfully answer an employer’s questions and to inform the employer of events that may be of interest to the employer. An employee’s obligation to assist is, however, more limited when assistance would entail self-incrimination.
A person acting as a witness under an investigation governed by the Swedish Whistleblowing Act will be protected by confidentiality. Personal data and details that could reveal the identity of a witness may not be disclosed without authorisation.
Switzerland
Switzerland
- at Bär & Karrer
- at Bär & Karrer
Due to the employee's duty of loyalty towards the employer and the employer's right to give instructions to its employees, employees generally must take part in an ongoing investigation and comply with any summons for questioning if the employer demands this (article 321d, Swiss Code of Obligations). If the employees refuse to participate, they generally are in breach of their statutory duties, which may lead to measures such as a termination of employment.
The question of whether employees may refuse to testify if they would have to incriminate themselves is disputed in legal doctrine.[1] However, according to legal doctrine, a right to refuse to testify exists if criminal conduct regarding the questioned employee or a relative (article 168 et seq, Swiss Criminal Procedure Code) is involved, and it cannot be ruled out that the investigation documentation may later end up with the prosecuting authorities (ie, where employees have a right to refuse to testify in criminal proceedings, they cannot be forced to incriminate themselves by answering questions in an internal investigation).[2]
[1] Nicolas Facincani/Reto Sutter, Interne Untersuchungen: Rechte und Pflichten von Arbeitgebern und Angestellten, published on hrtoday.ch, last visited on 17 June 2022.
[2] Same opinion: Nicolas Facincani/Reto Sutter, Interne Untersuchungen: Rechte und Pflichten von Arbeitgebern und Angestellten, published on hrtoday.ch, last visited on 17 June 2022.
12. Can the identity of the complainant, witnesses or sources of information for the investigation be kept confidential?
12. Can the identity of the complainant, witnesses or sources of information for the investigation be kept confidential?
South Korea
South Korea
- at Kim & Chang
- at Kim & Chang
- at Kim & Chang
- at Kim & Chang
As discussed in question 1, if the whistleblower falls under the WPA, the whistleblower’s identity should be kept confidential. Even if the WPA does not apply, the company may wish to keep the identity of the whistleblower and other key witnesses confidential to the greatest extent possible.
Sweden
Sweden
- at Mannheimer Swartling
- at Mannheimer Swartling
- at Mannheimer Swartling
If the Swedish Whistleblowing Act applies, their identity must be kept confidential under the duty of confidentiality. If the Swedish Whistleblowing Act does not apply, their identity can to a large extent be kept confidential.
It can also be noted that a workplace investigation carried out in the public sector will often (eventually) become an official document, which means that the document can be requested by the public. There are, however, provisions on secrecy that may restrict the right to gain access to official documents. These provisions are found in the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400).
Switzerland
Switzerland
- at Bär & Karrer
- at Bär & Karrer
As mentioned under Question 10, the employer’s duty of care (article 328, Swiss Code of Obligations) also entails the employer’s duty to respect and protect the personality (including confidentiality and privacy) and integrity of employees (article 328 paragraph 1, Swiss Code of Obligations) and to take appropriate measures to protect them.
However, in combination with the right to be heard and the right to be informed regarding an investigation, the accused also has the right that incriminating evidence is presented to them throughout the investigation and that they can comment on it. For instance, this right includes disclosure of the persons accusing them and their concrete statements. Anonymisation or redaction of such statements is permissible if the interests of the persons incriminating the accused or the interests of the employer override the accused’ interests to be presented with the relevant documents or statements (see question 11; see also article 9 paragraphs 1 and 4, Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection). However, a careful assessment of interests is required, and these must be limited to what is necessary. In principle, a person accusing another person must take responsibility for their information and accept criticism from the person implicated by the information provided.[1]
[1] Roger Rudolph, Interne Untersuchungen: Spannungsfelder aus arbeitsrechtlicher Sicht, SJZ 114/2018, p. 390.
25. Who can (or must) the investigation findings be disclosed to? Does that include regulators/police? Can the interview records be kept private, or are they at risk of disclosure?
25. Who can (or must) the investigation findings be disclosed to? Does that include regulators/police? Can the interview records be kept private, or are they at risk of disclosure?
South Korea
South Korea
- at Kim & Chang
- at Kim & Chang
- at Kim & Chang
- at Kim & Chang
There is generally no obligation to report violations to the Korean authorities, subject to limited exceptions (eg, financial institutions are required to report certain types of wrongdoing to the financial regulator; if there was a leak of an industrial technology developed through a national research and development project or a national core technology, this leak should be reported to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy and the National Intelligence Service). However, even in the absence of a self-reporting obligation, the company may consider strategically deciding to make a voluntary report. For example, there have been instances where the police or prosecutors’ investigations were conducted in a more limited manner where the company filed a voluntary report and cooperated with the investigation. Also, for certain types of violations (eg, cartel activities), self-reporting to the relevant authority may entitle the company to leniency provided under the law.
In certain instances, the company may also consider reporting violations to the relevant foreign authorities, in addition to, or instead of, the Korean authorities. For example, if the company found potential violations of US law such as sanctions law or the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, the company may want to self-report these violations to the relevant authorities such as the Office of Foreign Assets Control, or the US Department of Justice.
Sweden
Sweden
- at Mannheimer Swartling
- at Mannheimer Swartling
- at Mannheimer Swartling
Findings may have to be handed over to the police or the regulator – there is no separate legal protection for material in employer investigations related to authorities. If the investigation has been carried out by a law firm, see question 14 on attorney-client privilege.
Switzerland
Switzerland
- at Bär & Karrer
- at Bär & Karrer
The employer is generally not required to disclose the final report, or the data obtained in connection with the investigation. In particular, the employer is not obliged to file a criminal complaint with the police or the public prosecutor's office.
Exceptions may arise, for example, from data protection law (see question 22) or a duty to release records may arise in a subsequent state proceeding.
Data voluntarily submitted in a proceeding in connection with the internal investigation shall be considered private opinion or party assertion.[1] If the company refuses to hand over the documents upon request, coercive measures may be used under certain circumstances.[2]
[1] Oliver Thormann, Sicht der Strafverfolger – Chancen und Risiken, in: Flavio Romerio/Claudio Bazzani (Hrsg.), Interne und regulatorische Untersuchungen, Zürich/Basel/Genf 2016, p. 123.
[2] Oliver Thormann, Sicht der Strafverfolger – Chancen und Risiken, in: Flavio Romerio/Claudio Bazzani (Hrsg.), Interne und regulatorische Untersuchungen, Zürich/Basel/Genf 2016, p. 102 et seq.