Employment in Financial Services

Specific rules apply to personnel whose professional activities have a significant impact on the company's risk profile (article 92, 2. Directive 2013/36/EU; article 67, Act of 25 April 2014), including:

• all members of the legal administrative body and senior management;
• staff members with supervisory responsibility for control functions or business units;
• employees who received significant remuneration during the previous year (ie, 500,000 EUR or more and equal to or greater than the average remuneration of members of the legal administrative body and senior management) and the employee performs the professional activity in a critical business unit and the nature of the activity is such that it has a significant impact on the risk profile of the business unit concerned.

Variable remuneration is capped at 50% of the fixed remuneration or 50,000 EUR, without exceeding the fixed remuneration, whichever is higher (article 1, Annex II, Act of 25 April 2014). Moreover, it is forbidden to have a guaranteed variable remuneration (article 5). 40% of variable remuneration is delayed for four to five years, with a minimum of five years for members of the legal administrative body and senior management. When the variable remuneration is very high, the percentage of the delayed variable remuneration is 60% (article 7).

The total variable remuneration will be significantly reduced if the company generates a reduced or negative financial return. This applies to variable remuneration not yet earned, variable remuneration earned but not yet paid, and variable remuneration that has already been paid. It occurs through malus or clawback schemes, in particular when the person has participated in practices that have resulted in significant losses, has not respected the “fit and proper” duties or has set up a specific mechanism for tax fraud (article 8).

A termination indemnity is considered a variable remuneration, except for a legal indemnity in lieu of notice or a non-compete indemnity (based on the calculation provided by the Employment Contracts Act). Furthermore, a termination indemnity higher than 12 months, or 18 months for a motivated decision from the remuneration committee, can only be granted subject to the approval of the first ordinary general meeting following the termination (articles 12 and 12/1).

For companies that benefit from government intervention, there is in principle no variable remuneration, except for the person recruited after the public intervention to carry on the restructuring. Moreover, the termination indemnity is capped at nine months, unless the legal indemnity in lieu of notice (based on seniority) is higher (articles 16 and 17).

The Collective Labour Agreement establishes several rules for employees in the sector.

There is a determination, through collective negotiation, of:

• percentage of salary increase;
• minimum wage for employees who begin their activities in the sector;
• minimum wage for employees after 90 days’ tenure;
• additional pay for length of service;
• additional overtime;
• night additional pay;
• additional pay for unhealthy or dangerous work;
• function bonus;
• cash bonus;
• gratuity for check clearing;
• meal assistance;
• food assistance;
• daycare and nanny assistance;
• funeral assistance;
• transportation vouchers; and
• assistance with night-time travel.

Under French law, several mechanisms regulate the compensation of employees in the financial services sector to limit risk-taking.

Concerning guaranteed variable remuneration (welcome bonus, recruitment bonus, etc) for new staff, establishments are not allowed to guarantee this beyond the first year of employment; it is said to be "exceptional" and can only be granted if the financial base is sufficiently sound and solid.

In addition, European Directive 2013/36 EU, UCITS V, of 26 June 2013 introduced a "clawback" mechanism that the legislature has transposed into French law. Thus, article L.511-84 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that "the total amount of variable remuneration may, in whole or in part, be reduced or give rise to restitution when the person concerned has failed to comply with the rules laid down by the institution with regard to risk-taking, in particular because of his responsibility for actions that have led to significant losses for the institution or in the event of failure to comply with the obligations of good repute and competence".

In addition and following the above-mentioned Directive 2013/36/EU (article 94) concerning the deferral of remuneration, the payment of variable remuneration should be made in part immediately and in part on a deferred basis.

Institutions are encouraged to implement a deferral schedule, that properly aligns staff compensation with the institution's business, economic cycle, and risk profile, so that a sufficient portion of variable compensation can be adjusted to results through ex-post risk adjustments.

This schedule consists of the portion of variable compensation deferred, the length of the deferral period and the speed ofvesting of the deferred compensation.

In the event of poor or negative performance by the institutions, leading to a reduction in the total amount of variable compensation, the payment of variable compensation may be subject to specific arrangements implemented by the institutions, as referred to in Directive 2013/36/EU.

In addition, article L.511-84-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code specifies that the variable portion that may be reduced or even recovered as a penalty is excluded from the calculation of several indemnities in the event of dismissal, including the legal indemnity for dismissal.

Finally, following Law No. 2013-672 of 26 July 2013 on the separation and regulation of banking activities, the variable remuneration of managers and traders is capped, and cannot exceed the fixed part. In addition, a "say on pay" mechanism has been implemented (ie, the general meeting of shareholders must be consulted on the remuneration paid to executives and traders).

Yes, there are specific sets of rules on remuneration in the financial services sector, varying in detail per sub-sector. Rules are particularly strict for material risk-takers of significant institutions in light of the increased risk profile of their activities for the entire organisation.

Variable and fixed remuneration must have an appropriate ratio to each other. For financial institutions, the ratio is appropriate if the variable remuneration both complies with an upper limit of 100% of the fixed remuneration (up to 200% maximum based on a shareholders’ resolution) and provides an effective behavioural incentive. Further, variable remuneration may need to be spread over deferral periods. Depending on the sector, remuneration may have to be made subject to malus, holdback or clawback provisions in case specific risks materialise or the employee is found guilty of misconduct. Further, certain remuneration elements must be granted in instruments instead of cash payments, with restrictions around this element again varying by sub-sector.

There are no specific mandatory rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees in Hong Kong.

The HKMA has issued a Supervisory Policy Manual CG-5 “Guideline on a Sound Remuneration System”. This focuses on providing a broad idea and introducing basic principles of how remuneration policies should be designed and implemented in the authorised institution, to encourage employee behaviour that supports the risk management framework, corporate values and long-term financial soundness of the authorised institution.

Under the Guideline, the elements of a sound remuneration system are as follows:

Governance

• Remuneration policy should be in line with objectives, business strategies and the long-term goals of the authorised institution.
• The remuneration arrangement for employees whose activities could have a material impact on the authorised institution’s risk profile and financial soundness should support, but not undermine, the overall risk management approach.
• The Board of an authorised institution is ultimately responsible for overseeing the formulation and implementation of the remuneration policy.
• The establishment of a Board remuneration committee would assist the Board in discharging its responsibility for the design and operation of the authorised institution’s remuneration system.
• Risk control personnel should have appropriate authority and involvement in the process of design and implementation of the authorised institution’s remuneration policy.

Structure of remuneration

• Balance of fixed and variable remuneration should be determined with regard to the seniority, role, responsibilities and activities of their employees and the need to promote behaviour among employees that support the authorised institution’s risk-management framework and long-term financial soundness.
• Variable remuneration should be paid in such a manner as to align an employee’s incentive awards with long-term value creation and the time horizons of risk.
• Guaranteed minimum bonus to senior management or key personnel should be subject to the approval of the Board (or the Board’s remuneration committee with the necessary delegated authority).

Measurement of performance for variable remuneration

• The award of variable remuneration should depend on the fulfilment of certain pre-determined and assessable performance criteria, which include both financial and non-financial factors.
• Size and allocation of variable remuneration should take into account the current and potential risks associated with the activities of employees, as well as the performance (overall performance of the relevant business units and the authorised institution as a whole as well as the contribution of individual employees to such performance).
• Judgement and common sense may be required during the process to arrive at a fair and appropriate remuneration decision. The rationale for the exercise of judgment and the outcomes should be recorded in writing.

Alignment of remuneration pay-outs to the time horizon of risks

• Deferment of variable remuneration is appropriate when the risks taken by the employee in question are harder to measure or will be realised over a longer timeframe.
• The award of deferred remuneration should be subject to a minimum vesting period and pre-defined vesting conditions in respect of future performance.
• Authorised institutions should seek undertakings from employees not to engage in personal hedging strategies or remuneration and liability-related insurance to hedge their exposures in respect of the unvested portion of their deferred remuneration.

Remuneration disclosure

• Authorised institutions should make remuneration disclosures at least annually. The disclosure should include the qualitative and quantitative information that the HKMA has set out in its annual remuneration disclosure.

There are certain rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees, such as those in the banking, mutual fund or asset management, and insurance industries.

The central bank of India, the RBI, deals with the compensation policy for all private-sector banks and foreign banks operating in India by requiring them to formulate their own compensation policy and annually reviewing it. Banks are not allowed to employ or continue the employment of any person whose remuneration is excessive in the RBI’s opinion. For instance, the RBI lays down guidelines on the compensation of “Whole Time Directors (“WTD”) / Chief Executive Officers / Material Risk Takers and Control Function Staff”[1], elaborate guidelines encompassing the governance of compensation and its alignment with prudent risk-taking, policies for risk control and compliance staff, the identification of “material risk takers”, and disclosure and engagement by stakeholders. It even envisages deferred payments being subjected to malus or clawback arrangements if there was negative performance. For variable pay, it mandates banks to incorporate malus or clawback mechanisms and suggests they specify periods of malus or clawback application to cover at least deferral and retention periods.[2] It is pertinent to highlight that private sector and foreign banks in India must obtain regulatory approval[3] for the grant of remuneration to WTDs or CEOs.

The RBI also prescribes guidelines around compensation for key managerial personnel (KMP) and senior management in non-banking financial companies (NBFCs)[4]:

• NBFCs are mandated to form “Nomination and Remuneration Committees” (NRCs) as per Section 178 of the Companies Act, 2013, which will then be entrusted with framing, reviewing and implementing the compensation policy to be approved by the board of the company.
• The compensation must align with the risk related to the decision-making process. The compensation package can comprise both fixed and variable pay and may also be a mix of cash, equity or other forms, in line with projected risk factors.
• A bonus has no bearing on the performance of the individual. The bonus is guaranteed based on the fulfilment of certain criteria as may be specified in the compensation policy. A guaranteed bonus should neither be considered part of fixed pay nor variable pay and the same is not payable to KMP and senior management. However, a guaranteed bonus can be paid to new employees as part of a sign-on bonus whereby potential employees can be incentivised to join NBFCs.
• "Deferred compensation may be subject to malus/clawback arrangements."  The compensation policy concerning malus or clawback must mandatorily apply for the period equal to at least the deferred retention period. 

Despite the aforementioned guidelines being applicable from 1 April 2023, NBFCs must immediately begin aligning their internal procedures to comply with the mandatory guidelines above to assist the transition. Existing remuneration policies being followed by the NBFCs should be reviewed to make the necessary changes to be compliant with the above-mentioned policies.

When it comes to regulations on an “employee stock option plan” (ESOP) for financial services employees, regulators may impose industry-specific guidelines. For instance, as per the SEBI (Share Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021[5], the employee stock option scheme should be drafted in a manner that no such employee violates SEBI (Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 and SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to the Securities Market) Regulations, 1995. ESOPs issued to managerial staff and for non-cash consideration shall be treated as part of managerial remuneration. In another development, the RBI has directed that ESOPs should be at a fair value, shooting up costs and creating the cascading effect of replacing ESOPs with deferred bonus payments for senior managerial personnel.

There are prescriptive, sector-specific requirements, which apply to the remuneration of specified categories of employees or directors, and which apply in the asset management, investment services, banking, and insurance sectors.

Employers in these sectors are tasked with ensuring that the remuneration paid to material risk takers (individuals whose professional activities have a material impact on an RFSP's risk profile) or identified staff align with the RFSP risk profile.

There are detailed rules with technical guidance (emanating from EU law) specific to each sector, but at a high level they (to differing degrees) set out rules on; variable remuneration composition, ratios or other metrics to compare variable to fixed remuneration to ensure it is appropriate; malus requirements, which would allow the RFSP to cancel or reduce the employee's variable remuneration before it is paid out; and clawback provisions which allow RFSPs to recover variable remuneration after it has been awarded. It is important to ensure that employees' contracts of employment acknowledge that any variable remuneration will be subject to all regulatory restrictions and rules and may be clawed back in certain circumstances.

The CBI's 2014 Guidelines on Variable Remuneration Arrangements for Sales Staff also emphasise the importance of remuneration structures to have sufficient deterrents built into them (such as malus and clawback mechanisms) to avoid incentivising undesirable/risky behaviours from sales staff in the banking, insurance and investment services sectors.

There are no prescribed rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees and any remuneration, bonuses or clawback will be a matter of contract between the financial services employee and the financial institution. Inevitably, this will reflect what is typical in the market for experienced, qualified, financial services personnel performing the role for which they are applying or are currently carrying out.

Brokerage houses must implement a compensation system under the general provisions set forth by the CNBV. This system must include all compensation provided and must contain the responsibilities of the boards that implement the compensation schemes, ordinary and extraordinary compensation policies, and periodic reviews of payment policies. The board of directors must incorporate a special committee for compensation.

Under article 9 of the general provisions applicable to brokerage houses, account management fees may be paid to stock proxies provided that they comply entirely with the applicable laws in the exercise of their duties. Stock operators must not execute operations with the public or receive any remuneration or account management fees, except if, with the proxy’s authorisation, they execute orders of institutional investors in the brokerage house’s reception and allocation system.

Brokerage houses must not pay fees, commissions, and other remuneration of third parties that act as promoters, sellers, associates, independent commissioners, investment advisors or any similar roles. This also applies to proxies of the investor client without being proxies of the brokerage house, or those who have a conflict of interest to receive fees, commissions, or any other remuneration from the investor client.

If there is a critical event, such as a control measure, the CNBV may order the brokerage house to suspend the payment of extraordinary compensation and bonuses to the general manager and senior officers. This includes preventing the granting of new compensation until the matter is properly resolved. This should be included in employment contracts, to avoid labour-related disputes should the extraordinary measure of the CNBV is enacted.

Remuneration policy

Under Dutch law, financial services companies must implement an internal remuneration policy. Financial services companies must explain in the management report the relationship between the remuneration policy and the social function of the company.

Variable remuneration

The variable remuneration that a financial services company awards to an employee amounts to a maximum of 20% of that person's fixed annual remuneration. There are a (very) limited number of exceptions to this maximum.

Five-year statutory retention period for shares and other financial instruments

Financial services employees whose fixed remuneration consists of shares or related instruments may only sell them after five years.

Adjustment or recovery of bonuses (claw-back)

Adjustment or recovery of bonuses is mandatory if a financial services employee has failed to meet appropriate standards of competence and proper conduct or has been responsible for conduct that led to a significant deterioration in the company's position.

Severance payments

Paying out severance payments by financial services companies is not allowed if the employee leaves voluntarily or if there are seriously culpable acts or omissions in the performance of the function. Severance payments for directors (or other policymakers) may not exceed more than 100 per cent of their fixed annual salary.

Disclosure requirements may apply depending on the employee’s role. For example, with some exemptions, financial advisors are required to disclose to the client the remuneration that they receive or will receive for making any recommendations in respect of a particular investment product, or executing a purchase or sale contract relating to a designated investment product on their clients’ behalf.

MAS’ Guidelines on Corporate Governance (applicable to designated financial holding companies, banks, and some insurers) also requires the FI’s board of directors to have a formal and transparent procedure for developing policies on and fixing the remuneration of directors, executives, and key management personnel. A separate remuneration committee made up of non-executive directors must be established to make the relevant recommendations. MAS expects compliance with these guidelines in a manner commensurate with the size, nature of activities and risk profile of the FI. Diverging from the guidelines is acceptable to the extent that FIs explicitly state and explain how their practices are consistent with the policy intent of the relevant principle.

Companies listed on the Singapore stock exchange have similar requirements under MAS’ Code of Corporate Governance, and these also exist in subsidiary legislation applicable to the FI. As for all other non-exempt companies, director and employee remuneration will ordinarily have to be disclosed through publicly available financial statements, under applicable accounting standards.

Apart from the above, there are no strict limits on compensation or requirements to impose deferral, malus or clawback provisions. Employers may include such provisions in their contracts, but should be aware that the enforcement of such provisions may be subject to challenge.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

Both the DFSA General Rulebook and FSRA General Rulebook contain Best Practice Guidance for remuneration structure and strategies of authorised entities. In particular, the guidance identifies that the governing body of an authorised entity ought to consider the risk to which the firm could be exposed to as a result of the conduct or behaviour of its employees, and to consider the ratio and balance between fixed and variable remuneration components, the nature of the duties and functions performed by the relevant employees, the assessment criteria against which performance based components of remuneration are to be awarded, and the integrity and objectivity of any performance assessment against that criteria.

The remuneration of financial services employees working at certain firms (such as banks, building societies, asset managers and investment firms) is heavily regulated. The relevant rules can be found in various FCA “Remuneration Codes” (each Code tailored to different firms) and also (for dual-regulated firms) in specific remuneration parts of the PRA Rulebook and directly applicable retained EU law.

The remuneration rules are complex and their application is dependent on each firm. The key principle of the rules, however, is that firms subject to them must ensure that their remuneration policies and practices are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.

Some elements of the rules apply to all staff, whereas others apply only to material risk-takers within a particular firm.

By way of a snapshot, the rules generally cover such matters as:

• the appropriate ratio between fixed pay and variable pay, to ensure that fixed pay is a sufficiently high proportion of total remuneration to allow for the possibility of paying no variable pay;
• the amount of any discretionary bonus pool, which should be based on profit, adjusted for current and future risks, and take into account the cost and quantity of the capital and liquidity required;
• performance-related bonuses, which should be assessed based on a variety of factors, including the performance of the individual, the relevant business unit and the overall results of the firm;
• restrictions on guaranteed variable pay and payments on termination of employment; and
• malus and clawback requirements.

Overtime

Financial services employees in the United States are commonly classified as administrative employees exempt from both minimum wage and overtime laws. To qualify for this administrative exception under the Fair Labor Standard Acts (FLSA) and often, applicable state law, an employee must:

• be compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate at least equal to the minimum required threshold (at the time of writing set at $684 a week or $35,568 annually); and
• have a primary duty:
  • that is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers; and
  • includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment on significant matters.

Examples of employees qualifying for the administrative exemption are those whose duties include:

• collecting and analysing information regarding the customer’s income, assets, investments or debts;
• determining which financial products best meet a customer’s needs;
• advising customers regarding the pros and cons of various financial products; and
• marketing, servicing, or promoting financial products.

An employee whose sole duty is selling financial products does not qualify for the administrative exemption. United States courts are split on whether financial advisors are exempt.

Many states have a higher minimum annual salary threshold for the administrative exemption, including California ($1,240 a week, as of 1 January 2023) and New York ($1,125 a week for New York City and Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester counties and $990 a week for the remainder of the state. The remainder of the State increased to $1,064.25 a week on 31 December 2022).

California has an administrative exemption test, which also requires the employee to customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgement, in addition to being primarily engaged in administrative duties. Employees that do not qualify as non-exempt under one of the exemptions must receive overtime pay under California law.

FLSA also exempts “highly compensated” employees. To qualify for this exemption, an employee must earn at least $107,432 in total annual compensation (not including discretionary bonuses), must perform office or non-manual work as part of their primary duty, and must customarily perform one or more exempt duties of an administrative, executive, or professional employee.

Bonuses

Discretionary bonuses can be for any amount and can be determined on quantitative factors (eg, employer profits) or subjective factors (eg, known performance indicators, performance, merit) and employers may condition an employee’s eligibility to receive a bonus on their active employment at the time when bonuses are paid.

Guaranteed bonuses are typically non-discretionary and set at a fixed number or percentage (eg, a percentage of the employee’s annual base salary or the employer’s profits). A guaranteed bonus (unlike a discretionary one) creates a contractual obligation and will be considered wages. Once a payment is considered a “wage,” employers generally cannot withhold, recover or claw back the bonus from an employee.

California requires non-discretionary bonuses to be included in a non-exempt employee’s regular rate for overtime calculation.

Certain compensation plans include “forgivable loans,” conditioning an employee’s obligation to repay on their continued employment with the new employer for a time. If the employee leaves or is fired for certain reasons before the full loan amount is forgiven, the unforgiven share, with interest, can become due and payable.

California generally prohibits employers from deducting any outstanding loan balances from an employee’s final paycheck without express permission in contemporaneous writing signed by the employee, both at the time the loan or advance was given and at separation.

Similarly, New York has extremely nuanced rules related to permissible deductions for employee benefits, which are limited (eg, authorised deductions and deductions for the benefit of the employee).

There are no specific rules for the financial services sector, except that they cannot have an effect that does not respect the caps for remuneration (see question 7).

Yes, restrictive covenants are possible for financial service employees. However, restrictions on work in other companies in the sector (non-competition) must be paid for less than 24 months. These criteria are not provided for by law, but were constructed by Brazilian courts when adjudicating on this issue.

Three specific clauses are potentially relevant to employees in the financial services sector.

Firstly, regarding the confidentiality clause, employees in the financial services sector are bound to respect professional and banking secrecy.

More specifically, article 25 of Section III of Chapter 4 of Title II of Book 1 of the national collective agreement for financial companies of 22 November 1968, provides that all staff members are bound by professional secrecy within the company and towards third parties. Employees may not knowingly pass on to another company information specific to their employer or previous employer.

Article 24 of Chapter 3 of Title III of the national collective bargaining agreement for bank employees of 10 January 2000 codifies the absolute respect of professional secrecy.

Article 44 of Chapter 2 of Title IV of the national collective bargaining agreement for the financial markets of 11 June 2010 states that the employee must comply specifically with the rules of conduct regarding professional secrecy, both within the company and concerning third parties.

Confidentiality clauses can also be concluded between the employee and his or her employer, to reinforce the obligation of confidentiality.

In principle, a confidentiality clause allows for the protection of certain information exchanged during the contract and can be enforced after the termination of the employment contract if it is not perpetual. In this case, it is quite conceivable to contractualise such an obligation for employees in the financial services sector because of their functions, which by their very nature require discretion.

The law already states that anyone who uses or discloses confidential information obtained in the course of negotiations without authorisation is liable. Case law has addressed the issue of confidentiality clauses by ruling that an employee not executing this clause after his or her departure makes him or her liable for the resulting damage, without the employer having to prove gross negligence. The clause may be accompanied by a pecuniary sanction, which may be altered by the judge if it is lenient or excessive.

This clause in no way imposes a non-compete obligation and, therefore, does not entitle the employee to financial compensation.

In practice, it is complex to ensure compliance with this clause; however, the more specific the clause, the more effective it is.

Secondly, a non-compete clause allows an employer to limit an employee's professional activity at the end of an employment contract to prevent that employee from working for a competing company.

Despite the specificity of the activities of the financial sector, it seems that the common law of noncompetition clauses applies.

Thus, such a clause may be provided for by a collective agreement, in which case it is a conventional non-compete obligation. To be enforceable, the employee must have been informed of the existence of the applicable collective agreement. In this case, article 35 of Chapter I of Title IV of the national collective bargaining agreement for financial markets of 11 June 2010 provides for a non-compete obligation.

The non-compete clause is, in the majority of cases, contractual (ie, present in the employee’s employment contract). To be valid, this clause must meet various cumulative conditions to be compatible with the principle of freedom to work.

It must be essential to the protection of the legitimate interests of the company, limited in time and space, take into account the specificities of the employee's job, and include an obligation for the employer to pay the employee meaningful financial compensation. All these conditions are cumulative, and the employer cannot unilaterally extend the scope of the clause, otherwise it is null and void. Given the specificity of the activity of companies in the financial services sector, the condition of protection of the legitimate interests of the company would be met. However, taking into account the specificities of the employee's job may undermine such a clause if it is proven that his or her training and experience would prevent him or her from finding a job. The company's interest in imposing a noncompete clause must therefore be demonstrated.

The judge may restrict the application of the non-compete clause by limiting its effect in time, space or other terms when it does not allow the employee to engage in an activity consistent with his or her training and experience. However, the scope of application of the clause cannot be reduced by the judge if only the nullity of the clause has been invoked by the employee. If the non-compete clause is not enforced, the employer may take summary proceedings against the former employee who does not respect it, and also against the employee's new employer if they were hired with full knowledge of the facts, or if they continue to be employed after learning of the clause.

The employer may waive the clause if this is explicit and results from an unequivocal will. In the specific case of contractual termination, the employer who wishes to waive the clause must do so no later than the termination date set in the agreement.

Finally, concerning the non-solicitation clause, such a clause can be concluded between two companies through a commercial contract. These companies mutually prohibit each other from hiring their respective employees. Therefore, this clause is distinct from a non-compete clause and does not meet its conditions of validity. However, it must be proportionate to the legitimate interests to be protected given the purpose of the contract.

Post-contractual non-compete obligations will typically only be binding when a severance payment is agreed upon that amounts to at least 50% of the pro-rated annual remuneration that the employee received before the obligation comes into force). It is advisable to regularly review for which roles such arrangements are agreed upon as they can be costly, and a unilateral waiver does not automatically eliminate the obligation to pay compensation, only if sufficient advance notice is given.

In the financial services sector, the severance payment for non-competition covenants is considered variable remuneration and subject to the same regulatory compensation rules (for example, section 5 paragraph 6 sentence 1 IVV, section 6 paragraph 4 No. 2 Investment Firm Remuneration Ordinance). However, severance payments do not have to be factored into the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration according to section 25a paragraph 5 sentences 2 to 5 KWG if, subject to section 74 paragraph 2 of the German Commercial Code, the payments do not exceed the total fixed remuneration originally owed.

There are no particular rules that apply concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector. The rules concerning post-termination restrictive covenants are governed by common law principles in which they will only be enforced if the restriction is necessary for the protection of the employer’s legitimate business interest and is reasonable in scope and duration.

Post-termination non-competes are not enforceable, as they are treated as a restraint of trade. Courts have given prevalence to the livelihood of the employee over the employer’s interests. However, a reasonable non-solicit restriction may be enforceable in India.[1]

Employees in financial services are also bound by post-employment (for both resignation and retirement) obligations.[2] RBI employees[3] who cease to be in service should not accept or undertake “commercial employment”[4] for one year from the date on which they cease to be in service without the prior approval of the concerned authority. For SEBI employees[5], the cooling-off period is also one year. “Commercial employment”[6] broadly includes employment in any company or setting up their own practice without having professional qualifications and relying only on official experience. Such engagement may bestow an unfair advantage upon clients by virtue of the ex-employees’ prior experience at the organisation. The grant of prior approval by the concerned authority is dependent on whether there is any ensuing conflict of interest from such engagement.

No there are no bespoke rules that apply. Post termination restrictions in Ireland are void as being in restraint of trade unless it can be shown that the restrictions are necessary to protect an employer's legitimate proprietary interest and they are proportionate and reasonable in their scope and duration to achieve that protection[i].

[i] Law as of 15 April 2024

The IoM FSA does not regulate the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector. Post-termination restrictive covenants will be a matter of contract and will typically include non-compete, non-solicitation and non-dealing restrictions. These are subject to the same common law rules on interpretation and enforceability as in any other sector. Restraint of trade provisions are, in principle, contrary to public policy as a result of which it is for the employer to justify the length and scope of the restrictive covenant and show that it goes no further than necessary to protect its legitimate business interests. If a restraint is considered to be excessive, the courts will not generally rewrite or modify it to make it enforceable and, therefore, the whole of a defective covenant could fall away or be of no effect.

There are no particular rules or legal provisions concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants. Nevertheless, it is common practice to execute termination agreements with officers and general managers whereby non-disclosure, non-compete and non-solicitation provisions are set forth by the parties. The use of non-compete and non-solicitation provisions in termination agreements is only recommended for very specific employees and must be negotiated when the employment is terminated.

Plain non-compete and non-solicitation provisions binding employees after termination are not enforceable under Mexican law, because the Mexican Constitution grants individuals the right to perform any job, industry, commerce or work as long it is legal and not prohibited by a judicial or governmental decision.

Post-employment non-compete obligations, which are treated as an exception, must be agreed upon in connection to specific activities that may be deemed unfair competition, and may be enforced with economic compensation.

The period of enforceability must be proportional to:

• the number of years of employment;
• the level of information and importance of the position;
• the economic compensation; and
• the scope of the non-compete obligations.

Unfair competition and solicitation – either for business, or to induce other individuals to leave the company, while the employment contract between an individual and employer is in effect – may be considered misconduct. This misconduct is a cause of termination without notice for the company, and therefore it is feasible to enforce it.

The terms and conditions must be specifically addressed in writing, within the employment termination agreement, making express reference to the importance of the information, potential competition, activities that may be deemed unfair competition, intellectual property, and commercial advantages. The compensation paid is usually similar to or above the income of the employee while he or she was active with the company. Clawback and damages payments for breach of contract are standard practices.

There are no particular rules that apply concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for financial services employees.

Singapore law in relation to post-termination restrictive covenants is of general application and not specific to the financial services sector. Such restraints are prima facie void, but may be valid and enforceable if they are reasonable (both in the interests of the parties and the public), and if they go no further than what is necessary to protect a party’s legitimate proprietary interest.

The Singapore Courts have recognised that an employer has legitimate proprietary interests in its trade connections (commonly protected by restraints against the solicitation of clients or customers); the maintenance of a stable, trained workforce (commonly protected by restraints against the poaching of employees); and its confidential information and trade secrets (commonly protected by confidentiality restraints). This is not a closed list.

Non-competition clauses are however relatively more difficult to enforce as compared to other restrictive covenants, and they may not be enforceable at all under Singapore law as it presently stands if an employer’s legitimate proprietary interests are already covered by other restraints. Even then, it may still be possible for the employer to obtain an ex parte interim injunction for non-competition though.

Guidelines on restrictive covenants are also expected to be released in the second half of 2024, which will look to shape norms and provide employers and employees with guidance regarding the inclusion and enforcement of restrictive covenants in employment contracts. 

There are no particular rules that apply concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector in Switzerland. Rather, general post-contractual non-compete regulations come into play: the parties of an employment contract may agree on a non-compete clause, which must be included in the employment contract in writing to be valid. For the non-compete clause to be relevant, it must be sufficiently limited in terms of time, place and subject matter. Normally, the duration of a post-termination non-compete clause is no more than one year; however, the statutorily permissible duration is three years.

As a prerequisite for a contractual non-compete clause to be binding, access to sensitive data is required. The employee must either have access to customer data or manufacturing or business secrets. However, access alone is not enough. There must also be the possibility of harming the employer using this knowledge.

If a relationship between the customer and the employee or employer is personal (which is, for example, the case for lawyers or doctors), a post-termination non-compete clause is not applicable according to the Federal Supreme Court.

If there is an excessive non-compete clause, this can be restricted by a judge. In practice, most of the time, no restriction of the post-termination non-compete clause is imposed if the employer offers consideration in return for the agreement. The prohibition of competition may become invalid for two reasons. Firstly, the clause can become irrelevant if the employer has no more interest in maintaining the non-compete clause. Secondly, the clause is not effective if the employer has terminated the employment relationship. However, this does not apply if the employee has given the employer a reason to terminate the employment relationship.

Swiss employment law does not provide for any compensation for a post-termination non-compete clause.

The DFSA and FSRA Rulebooks do not regulate the use of post-termination restrictive covenants. It is fairly typical for financial services firms in both free zones to include non-dealing, non-solicitation, non-compete and similar restrictive covenants in their employment contracts. These are subject to the same common law rules on interpretation and enforceability as in any other sector.  In addition, whilst the courts in both the DIFC and ADGM will award injunctive relief, there is no similar right in the federal courts.  This means that the enforceability of an injunctive order outside of the geographic scope of the two free zones is uncertain.

The SM&CR does not regulate the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector. It is fairly typical for financial services firms in the UK to include non-dealing, non-solicitation, non-compete and similar restrictive covenants in their employment contracts. These are subject to the same common law rules on interpretation and enforceability as in any other sector. The only caveat to this is that firms should ensure that such terms do not include any provision that might conflict with the regulatory duties of either the firm or the employee. This will be a rare occurrence in practice for most types of restrictive covenant, but could arise in respect of post-termination contractual obligations that are closely associated with restrictive covenants, namely those relating to confidentiality. As such, firms should ensure that confidentiality clauses in employment contracts or other agreements such as NDAs include appropriate carve-outs.

The enforceability of restrictive covenants varies greatly depending on applicable state law. Many states impose specific requirements or limitations on enforceable covenants.

FINRA-regulated firms must comply with additional regulations:

• FINRA rules prohibit interference with a customer’s choice to follow a former representative during a change in employment where there is no existing dispute with the customer about the account. The FINRA-registered agent must help transfer a customer’s account in the event of such a customer request. Note that this only explicitly affects requests by customers and not solicitation by a representative. A non-solicit provision might be upheld whereas a non-compete might not.

• Broker-dealer firms that are signatories to the Protocol for Broker Recruiting are subject to additional requirements. Under this protocol, a departing employee may be permitted to take certain information regarding clients they serviced while at the firm to a new employer and use that information to solicit clients. Non-signatories are not bound to this protocol and can sue departing brokers for violating the terms of otherwise enforceable covenants.

Non-competes and so-called garden leave provisions are regularly included in termination documents. The enforceability of these covenants vary based on jurisdiction, with courts evaluating provisions based on duration and geographic scope.

New York

New York law disfavours non-compete agreements as a general rule. However, such agreements may be enforceable if the restrictions are reasonable and are intended to protect a legitimate interest. A court can enforce a non-compete only if the covenant:

• is no greater than required to protect an employer’s legitimate interests;
• does not impose undue hardship on the employee;
• does not cause injury to the public; or
• is reasonable in duration and geographic scope.

California

California law does not allow post-employment non-compete or non-solicit agreements except agreements involving the sale or dissolution of a business. California law protects employer confidential information and prohibits current or former employees from using employer confidential information in the solicitation of employees.