Employment in Financial Services

Specific rules apply to personnel whose professional activities have a significant impact on the company's risk profile (article 92, 2. Directive 2013/36/EU; article 67, Act of 25 April 2014), including:

• all members of the legal administrative body and senior management;
• staff members with supervisory responsibility for control functions or business units;
• employees who received significant remuneration during the previous year (ie, 500,000 EUR or more and equal to or greater than the average remuneration of members of the legal administrative body and senior management) and the employee performs the professional activity in a critical business unit and the nature of the activity is such that it has a significant impact on the risk profile of the business unit concerned.

Variable remuneration is capped at 50% of the fixed remuneration or 50,000 EUR, without exceeding the fixed remuneration, whichever is higher (article 1, Annex II, Act of 25 April 2014). Moreover, it is forbidden to have a guaranteed variable remuneration (article 5). 40% of variable remuneration is delayed for four to five years, with a minimum of five years for members of the legal administrative body and senior management. When the variable remuneration is very high, the percentage of the delayed variable remuneration is 60% (article 7).

The total variable remuneration will be significantly reduced if the company generates a reduced or negative financial return. This applies to variable remuneration not yet earned, variable remuneration earned but not yet paid, and variable remuneration that has already been paid. It occurs through malus or clawback schemes, in particular when the person has participated in practices that have resulted in significant losses, has not respected the “fit and proper” duties or has set up a specific mechanism for tax fraud (article 8).

A termination indemnity is considered a variable remuneration, except for a legal indemnity in lieu of notice or a non-compete indemnity (based on the calculation provided by the Employment Contracts Act). Furthermore, a termination indemnity higher than 12 months, or 18 months for a motivated decision from the remuneration committee, can only be granted subject to the approval of the first ordinary general meeting following the termination (articles 12 and 12/1).

For companies that benefit from government intervention, there is in principle no variable remuneration, except for the person recruited after the public intervention to carry on the restructuring. Moreover, the termination indemnity is capped at nine months, unless the legal indemnity in lieu of notice (based on seniority) is higher (articles 16 and 17).

The Collective Labour Agreement establishes several rules for employees in the sector.

There is a determination, through collective negotiation, of:

• percentage of salary increase;
• minimum wage for employees who begin their activities in the sector;
• minimum wage for employees after 90 days’ tenure;
• additional pay for length of service;
• additional overtime;
• night additional pay;
• additional pay for unhealthy or dangerous work;
• function bonus;
• cash bonus;
• gratuity for check clearing;
• meal assistance;
• food assistance;
• daycare and nanny assistance;
• funeral assistance;
• transportation vouchers; and
• assistance with night-time travel.

Under French law, several mechanisms regulate the compensation of employees in the financial services sector to limit risk-taking.

Concerning guaranteed variable remuneration (welcome bonus, recruitment bonus, etc) for new staff, establishments are not allowed to guarantee this beyond the first year of employment; it is said to be "exceptional" and can only be granted if the financial base is sufficiently sound and solid.

In addition, European Directive 2013/36 EU, UCITS V, of 26 June 2013 introduced a "clawback" mechanism that the legislature has transposed into French law. Thus, article L.511-84 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that "the total amount of variable remuneration may, in whole or in part, be reduced or give rise to restitution when the person concerned has failed to comply with the rules laid down by the institution with regard to risk-taking, in particular because of his responsibility for actions that have led to significant losses for the institution or in the event of failure to comply with the obligations of good repute and competence".

In addition and following the above-mentioned Directive 2013/36/EU (article 94) concerning the deferral of remuneration, the payment of variable remuneration should be made in part immediately and in part on a deferred basis.

Institutions are encouraged to implement a deferral schedule, that properly aligns staff compensation with the institution's business, economic cycle, and risk profile, so that a sufficient portion of variable compensation can be adjusted to results through ex-post risk adjustments.

This schedule consists of the portion of variable compensation deferred, the length of the deferral period and the speed ofvesting of the deferred compensation.

In the event of poor or negative performance by the institutions, leading to a reduction in the total amount of variable compensation, the payment of variable compensation may be subject to specific arrangements implemented by the institutions, as referred to in Directive 2013/36/EU.

In addition, article L.511-84-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code specifies that the variable portion that may be reduced or even recovered as a penalty is excluded from the calculation of several indemnities in the event of dismissal, including the legal indemnity for dismissal.

Finally, following Law No. 2013-672 of 26 July 2013 on the separation and regulation of banking activities, the variable remuneration of managers and traders is capped, and cannot exceed the fixed part. In addition, a "say on pay" mechanism has been implemented (ie, the general meeting of shareholders must be consulted on the remuneration paid to executives and traders).

Yes, there are specific sets of rules on remuneration in the financial services sector, varying in detail per sub-sector. Rules are particularly strict for material risk-takers of significant institutions in light of the increased risk profile of their activities for the entire organisation.

Variable and fixed remuneration must have an appropriate ratio to each other. For financial institutions, the ratio is appropriate if the variable remuneration both complies with an upper limit of 100% of the fixed remuneration (up to 200% maximum based on a shareholders’ resolution) and provides an effective behavioural incentive. Further, variable remuneration may need to be spread over deferral periods. Depending on the sector, remuneration may have to be made subject to malus, holdback or clawback provisions in case specific risks materialise or the employee is found guilty of misconduct. Further, certain remuneration elements must be granted in instruments instead of cash payments, with restrictions around this element again varying by sub-sector.

There are no specific mandatory rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees in Hong Kong.

The HKMA has issued a Supervisory Policy Manual CG-5 “Guideline on a Sound Remuneration System”. This focuses on providing a broad idea and introducing basic principles of how remuneration policies should be designed and implemented in the authorised institution, to encourage employee behaviour that supports the risk management framework, corporate values and long-term financial soundness of the authorised institution.

Under the Guideline, the elements of a sound remuneration system are as follows:

Governance

• Remuneration policy should be in line with objectives, business strategies and the long-term goals of the authorised institution.
• The remuneration arrangement for employees whose activities could have a material impact on the authorised institution’s risk profile and financial soundness should support, but not undermine, the overall risk management approach.
• The Board of an authorised institution is ultimately responsible for overseeing the formulation and implementation of the remuneration policy.
• The establishment of a Board remuneration committee would assist the Board in discharging its responsibility for the design and operation of the authorised institution’s remuneration system.
• Risk control personnel should have appropriate authority and involvement in the process of design and implementation of the authorised institution’s remuneration policy.

Structure of remuneration

• Balance of fixed and variable remuneration should be determined with regard to the seniority, role, responsibilities and activities of their employees and the need to promote behaviour among employees that support the authorised institution’s risk-management framework and long-term financial soundness.
• Variable remuneration should be paid in such a manner as to align an employee’s incentive awards with long-term value creation and the time horizons of risk.
• Guaranteed minimum bonus to senior management or key personnel should be subject to the approval of the Board (or the Board’s remuneration committee with the necessary delegated authority).

Measurement of performance for variable remuneration

• The award of variable remuneration should depend on the fulfilment of certain pre-determined and assessable performance criteria, which include both financial and non-financial factors.
• Size and allocation of variable remuneration should take into account the current and potential risks associated with the activities of employees, as well as the performance (overall performance of the relevant business units and the authorised institution as a whole as well as the contribution of individual employees to such performance).
• Judgement and common sense may be required during the process to arrive at a fair and appropriate remuneration decision. The rationale for the exercise of judgment and the outcomes should be recorded in writing.

Alignment of remuneration pay-outs to the time horizon of risks

• Deferment of variable remuneration is appropriate when the risks taken by the employee in question are harder to measure or will be realised over a longer timeframe.
• The award of deferred remuneration should be subject to a minimum vesting period and pre-defined vesting conditions in respect of future performance.
• Authorised institutions should seek undertakings from employees not to engage in personal hedging strategies or remuneration and liability-related insurance to hedge their exposures in respect of the unvested portion of their deferred remuneration.

Remuneration disclosure

• Authorised institutions should make remuneration disclosures at least annually. The disclosure should include the qualitative and quantitative information that the HKMA has set out in its annual remuneration disclosure.

There are certain rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees, such as those in the banking, mutual fund or asset management, and insurance industries.

The central bank of India, the RBI, deals with the compensation policy for all private-sector banks and foreign banks operating in India by requiring them to formulate their own compensation policy and annually reviewing it. Banks are not allowed to employ or continue the employment of any person whose remuneration is excessive in the RBI’s opinion. For instance, the RBI lays down guidelines on the compensation of “Whole Time Directors (“WTD”) / Chief Executive Officers / Material Risk Takers and Control Function Staff”[1], elaborate guidelines encompassing the governance of compensation and its alignment with prudent risk-taking, policies for risk control and compliance staff, the identification of “material risk takers”, and disclosure and engagement by stakeholders. It even envisages deferred payments being subjected to malus or clawback arrangements if there was negative performance. For variable pay, it mandates banks to incorporate malus or clawback mechanisms and suggests they specify periods of malus or clawback application to cover at least deferral and retention periods.[2] It is pertinent to highlight that private sector and foreign banks in India must obtain regulatory approval[3] for the grant of remuneration to WTDs or CEOs.

The RBI also prescribes guidelines around compensation for key managerial personnel (KMP) and senior management in non-banking financial companies (NBFCs)[4]:

• NBFCs are mandated to form “Nomination and Remuneration Committees” (NRCs) as per Section 178 of the Companies Act, 2013, which will then be entrusted with framing, reviewing and implementing the compensation policy to be approved by the board of the company.
• The compensation must align with the risk related to the decision-making process. The compensation package can comprise both fixed and variable pay and may also be a mix of cash, equity or other forms, in line with projected risk factors.
• A bonus has no bearing on the performance of the individual. The bonus is guaranteed based on the fulfilment of certain criteria as may be specified in the compensation policy. A guaranteed bonus should neither be considered part of fixed pay nor variable pay and the same is not payable to KMP and senior management. However, a guaranteed bonus can be paid to new employees as part of a sign-on bonus whereby potential employees can be incentivised to join NBFCs.
• "Deferred compensation may be subject to malus/clawback arrangements."  The compensation policy concerning malus or clawback must mandatorily apply for the period equal to at least the deferred retention period. 

Despite the aforementioned guidelines being applicable from 1 April 2023, NBFCs must immediately begin aligning their internal procedures to comply with the mandatory guidelines above to assist the transition. Existing remuneration policies being followed by the NBFCs should be reviewed to make the necessary changes to be compliant with the above-mentioned policies.

When it comes to regulations on an “employee stock option plan” (ESOP) for financial services employees, regulators may impose industry-specific guidelines. For instance, as per the SEBI (Share Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021[5], the employee stock option scheme should be drafted in a manner that no such employee violates SEBI (Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 and SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to the Securities Market) Regulations, 1995. ESOPs issued to managerial staff and for non-cash consideration shall be treated as part of managerial remuneration. In another development, the RBI has directed that ESOPs should be at a fair value, shooting up costs and creating the cascading effect of replacing ESOPs with deferred bonus payments for senior managerial personnel.

There are prescriptive, sector-specific requirements, which apply to the remuneration of specified categories of employees or directors, and which apply in the asset management, investment services, banking, and insurance sectors.

Employers in these sectors are tasked with ensuring that the remuneration paid to material risk takers (individuals whose professional activities have a material impact on an RFSP's risk profile) or identified staff align with the RFSP risk profile.

There are detailed rules with technical guidance (emanating from EU law) specific to each sector, but at a high level they (to differing degrees) set out rules on; variable remuneration composition, ratios or other metrics to compare variable to fixed remuneration to ensure it is appropriate; malus requirements, which would allow the RFSP to cancel or reduce the employee's variable remuneration before it is paid out; and clawback provisions which allow RFSPs to recover variable remuneration after it has been awarded. It is important to ensure that employees' contracts of employment acknowledge that any variable remuneration will be subject to all regulatory restrictions and rules and may be clawed back in certain circumstances.

The CBI's 2014 Guidelines on Variable Remuneration Arrangements for Sales Staff also emphasise the importance of remuneration structures to have sufficient deterrents built into them (such as malus and clawback mechanisms) to avoid incentivising undesirable/risky behaviours from sales staff in the banking, insurance and investment services sectors.

There are no prescribed rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees and any remuneration, bonuses or clawback will be a matter of contract between the financial services employee and the financial institution. Inevitably, this will reflect what is typical in the market for experienced, qualified, financial services personnel performing the role for which they are applying or are currently carrying out.

Brokerage houses must implement a compensation system under the general provisions set forth by the CNBV. This system must include all compensation provided and must contain the responsibilities of the boards that implement the compensation schemes, ordinary and extraordinary compensation policies, and periodic reviews of payment policies. The board of directors must incorporate a special committee for compensation.

Under article 9 of the general provisions applicable to brokerage houses, account management fees may be paid to stock proxies provided that they comply entirely with the applicable laws in the exercise of their duties. Stock operators must not execute operations with the public or receive any remuneration or account management fees, except if, with the proxy’s authorisation, they execute orders of institutional investors in the brokerage house’s reception and allocation system.

Brokerage houses must not pay fees, commissions, and other remuneration of third parties that act as promoters, sellers, associates, independent commissioners, investment advisors or any similar roles. This also applies to proxies of the investor client without being proxies of the brokerage house, or those who have a conflict of interest to receive fees, commissions, or any other remuneration from the investor client.

If there is a critical event, such as a control measure, the CNBV may order the brokerage house to suspend the payment of extraordinary compensation and bonuses to the general manager and senior officers. This includes preventing the granting of new compensation until the matter is properly resolved. This should be included in employment contracts, to avoid labour-related disputes should the extraordinary measure of the CNBV is enacted.

Remuneration policy

Under Dutch law, financial services companies must implement an internal remuneration policy. Financial services companies must explain in the management report the relationship between the remuneration policy and the social function of the company.

Variable remuneration

The variable remuneration that a financial services company awards to an employee amounts to a maximum of 20% of that person's fixed annual remuneration. There are a (very) limited number of exceptions to this maximum.

Five-year statutory retention period for shares and other financial instruments

Financial services employees whose fixed remuneration consists of shares or related instruments may only sell them after five years.

Adjustment or recovery of bonuses (claw-back)

Adjustment or recovery of bonuses is mandatory if a financial services employee has failed to meet appropriate standards of competence and proper conduct or has been responsible for conduct that led to a significant deterioration in the company's position.

Severance payments

Paying out severance payments by financial services companies is not allowed if the employee leaves voluntarily or if there are seriously culpable acts or omissions in the performance of the function. Severance payments for directors (or other policymakers) may not exceed more than 100 per cent of their fixed annual salary.

Disclosure requirements may apply depending on the employee’s role. For example, with some exemptions, financial advisors are required to disclose to the client the remuneration that they receive or will receive for making any recommendations in respect of a particular investment product, or executing a purchase or sale contract relating to a designated investment product on their clients’ behalf.

MAS’ Guidelines on Corporate Governance (applicable to designated financial holding companies, banks, and some insurers) also requires the FI’s board of directors to have a formal and transparent procedure for developing policies on and fixing the remuneration of directors, executives, and key management personnel. A separate remuneration committee made up of non-executive directors must be established to make the relevant recommendations. MAS expects compliance with these guidelines in a manner commensurate with the size, nature of activities and risk profile of the FI. Diverging from the guidelines is acceptable to the extent that FIs explicitly state and explain how their practices are consistent with the policy intent of the relevant principle.

Companies listed on the Singapore stock exchange have similar requirements under MAS’ Code of Corporate Governance, and these also exist in subsidiary legislation applicable to the FI. As for all other non-exempt companies, director and employee remuneration will ordinarily have to be disclosed through publicly available financial statements, under applicable accounting standards.

Apart from the above, there are no strict limits on compensation or requirements to impose deferral, malus or clawback provisions. Employers may include such provisions in their contracts, but should be aware that the enforcement of such provisions may be subject to challenge.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

Both the DFSA General Rulebook and FSRA General Rulebook contain Best Practice Guidance for remuneration structure and strategies of authorised entities. In particular, the guidance identifies that the governing body of an authorised entity ought to consider the risk to which the firm could be exposed to as a result of the conduct or behaviour of its employees, and to consider the ratio and balance between fixed and variable remuneration components, the nature of the duties and functions performed by the relevant employees, the assessment criteria against which performance based components of remuneration are to be awarded, and the integrity and objectivity of any performance assessment against that criteria.

The remuneration of financial services employees working at certain firms (such as banks, building societies, asset managers and investment firms) is heavily regulated. The relevant rules can be found in various FCA “Remuneration Codes” (each Code tailored to different firms) and also (for dual-regulated firms) in specific remuneration parts of the PRA Rulebook and directly applicable retained EU law.

The remuneration rules are complex and their application is dependent on each firm. The key principle of the rules, however, is that firms subject to them must ensure that their remuneration policies and practices are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.

Some elements of the rules apply to all staff, whereas others apply only to material risk-takers within a particular firm.

By way of a snapshot, the rules generally cover such matters as:

• the appropriate ratio between fixed pay and variable pay, to ensure that fixed pay is a sufficiently high proportion of total remuneration to allow for the possibility of paying no variable pay;
• the amount of any discretionary bonus pool, which should be based on profit, adjusted for current and future risks, and take into account the cost and quantity of the capital and liquidity required;
• performance-related bonuses, which should be assessed based on a variety of factors, including the performance of the individual, the relevant business unit and the overall results of the firm;
• restrictions on guaranteed variable pay and payments on termination of employment; and
• malus and clawback requirements.

Overtime

Financial services employees in the United States are commonly classified as administrative employees exempt from both minimum wage and overtime laws. To qualify for this administrative exception under the Fair Labor Standard Acts (FLSA) and often, applicable state law, an employee must:

• be compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate at least equal to the minimum required threshold (at the time of writing set at $684 a week or $35,568 annually); and
• have a primary duty:
  • that is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers; and
  • includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment on significant matters.

Examples of employees qualifying for the administrative exemption are those whose duties include:

• collecting and analysing information regarding the customer’s income, assets, investments or debts;
• determining which financial products best meet a customer’s needs;
• advising customers regarding the pros and cons of various financial products; and
• marketing, servicing, or promoting financial products.

An employee whose sole duty is selling financial products does not qualify for the administrative exemption. United States courts are split on whether financial advisors are exempt.

Many states have a higher minimum annual salary threshold for the administrative exemption, including California ($1,240 a week, as of 1 January 2023) and New York ($1,125 a week for New York City and Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester counties and $990 a week for the remainder of the state. The remainder of the State increased to $1,064.25 a week on 31 December 2022).

California has an administrative exemption test, which also requires the employee to customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgement, in addition to being primarily engaged in administrative duties. Employees that do not qualify as non-exempt under one of the exemptions must receive overtime pay under California law.

FLSA also exempts “highly compensated” employees. To qualify for this exemption, an employee must earn at least $107,432 in total annual compensation (not including discretionary bonuses), must perform office or non-manual work as part of their primary duty, and must customarily perform one or more exempt duties of an administrative, executive, or professional employee.

Bonuses

Discretionary bonuses can be for any amount and can be determined on quantitative factors (eg, employer profits) or subjective factors (eg, known performance indicators, performance, merit) and employers may condition an employee’s eligibility to receive a bonus on their active employment at the time when bonuses are paid.

Guaranteed bonuses are typically non-discretionary and set at a fixed number or percentage (eg, a percentage of the employee’s annual base salary or the employer’s profits). A guaranteed bonus (unlike a discretionary one) creates a contractual obligation and will be considered wages. Once a payment is considered a “wage,” employers generally cannot withhold, recover or claw back the bonus from an employee.

California requires non-discretionary bonuses to be included in a non-exempt employee’s regular rate for overtime calculation.

Certain compensation plans include “forgivable loans,” conditioning an employee’s obligation to repay on their continued employment with the new employer for a time. If the employee leaves or is fired for certain reasons before the full loan amount is forgiven, the unforgiven share, with interest, can become due and payable.

California generally prohibits employers from deducting any outstanding loan balances from an employee’s final paycheck without express permission in contemporaneous writing signed by the employee, both at the time the loan or advance was given and at separation.

Similarly, New York has extremely nuanced rules related to permissible deductions for employee benefits, which are limited (eg, authorised deductions and deductions for the benefit of the employee).

Employees must not, both during and after the termination of the contract, obtain, use or unlawfully disclose a business secret he or she became aware of in the course of his or her professional activity, or disclose the secrecy of any matter of a personal or confidential nature of which he or she became aware in the course of his or her professional activity (article 17, 3°, a, Employment Contracts Act).

The company can include a NDA in the employment contract to underline what is considered confidential information. A penalty clause (with a lump sum to be paid) can be foreseen in case of a breach after the end of the employment contract, but not during the period of the employment relationship. This is because of the prohibition on restricting the rights of employees or increasing their obligations in comparison with what is foreseen by the Employment Contracts Act (article 6).

Yes, non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) are potentially lawful in Brazil. The applicable rules are the same as for any legal transaction: expression of will, legality of the object, and compliance with the law.

As a rule, NDAs are a consequence of professional activity and do not require specific consideration.

Protected information is specific to the contractor (employer) and shared with the employee during the execution of the contract (strategies, customers, commercial secrets, etc).       

General information belonging to the employee due to his or her academic training and previous professional experience is not included in NDAs.

All actors in the financial services sector are bound by strict professional and banking secrecy.

But beyond the professional secrecy that is inherent to the employment contract, there may be an interest in particular circumstances to strengthen this requirement and make it an obligation of absolute professional secrecy. This is legal under French law and generally takes the form of a confidentiality clause (non-disclosure) inserted in the employee's employment contract.

In principle, a confidentiality clause, which includes an obligation of professional secrecy to which the employee is bound as well as an obligation of discretion, is not subject to any particular conditions. In particular, it does not require the payment of any financial consideration.

On the other hand, when an employee by an agreement or transaction goes further and waives his freedom of expression, the case law sets stricter conditions of validity. The agreement must be adapted, necessary and proportionate to the aim sought.

Confidentiality clauses must also comply with any obligations in terms of transparency, the fight against corruption and influence peddling provided for by Law No. 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016.

The only entities against which banking secrecy cannot be invoked are the French Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority, the Banque de France and the judicial authority acting in the context of criminal proceedings (article L. 511-33 of the Monetary and Financial Code). On the other hand, bank secrecy is enforceable in civil court proceedings, as confirmed by abundant case law.

Under German law, it is permissible to enter into non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements. In practice, NDAs are usually agreed upon in written or text form, although this is not legally required. If drafted for use in multiple cases, NDAs are subject to a particularly strict test to be effective: they must be transparent and may not unduly burden the employee under General Terms and Conditions legislation. NDAs should, therefore, only relate to very limited and specific information.

In practice, NDAs are difficult to enforce as it is the employer who must prove a culpable breach of contract, as well as damages resulting from such a breach. Employers should, therefore, also use other means to ensure data protection and confidentiality, such as properly defining and protecting business secrets under the Business Secrets Act; and implementing technical and organisational measures to limit access to certain information, which may include sharing information only on a need-to-know basis.

Non-disclosure agreements are legally enforceable in Hong Kong. They follow the contract law rules and there is no other particular form or rules. To be enforceable, a non-disclosure agreement must protect information that is both confidential and valuable. There are common exceptions where confidentiality will not apply to certain information, including information available in the public domain, information lawfully received from a third party without proprietary or confidentiality limitations, information known to the employee before first receipt of same from the employer, and information disclosed in circumstances required by law or regulatory requirement.

NDAs are governed by the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and are generally lawful in India.

Generally, post-contract restrictive covenants like non-compete clauses that restrain a person’s exercise of lawful trade, profession or business are declared void because of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act.

The enforceability of NDAs may be affected if they restrain an employee from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business. Accordingly, an NDA crafted to protect the “confidential information” of the former employer but not to impose the above-mentioned restraints on the employee is saved from any clash with Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act and is, therefore, enforceable in the courts of law in India. If NDAs prohibit an employee from disclosing commercial or trade secrets, then they cannot be held to be in restraint of trade. This was observed by the Bombay High Court in VFS Global Services Pvt Ltd v Mr Suprit Roy[1].

Yes. It is possible to use NDAs in Ireland and it is quite common for them to be used, but there are some limitations on their use and enforceability.

Certain mandatory reporting obligations will override a contractual non-disclosure agreement, such as the requirement for PCFs under section 38(2) of the CBI (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 to disclose certain matters to the CBI.

Further, an NDA cannot extinguish an employee's right to anti-retaliation protection where the employee makes a protected disclosure either internally or externally under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 - 2022.

Yes, non-disclosure agreements are potentially lawful in the Isle of Man. A contract of employment may also contain confidentiality provisions for financial services employees. However, a non-disclosure agreement or confidentiality clause would not (and could not) prevent a financial services employee (or any employee) from making a protected disclosure, (ie, a disclosure made by an employee where they reasonably believe there is serious wrongdoing within the workplace (whistleblowing)).

A financial services employee may, furthermore, be subject to a legal requirement to disclose information in certain circumstances that might override an NDA. For example, an individual can be compelled to provide information by the IoM FSA during an interview, and such compulsion will generally override an employee’s duties of confidentiality. Alternatively, an individual can be subject to a requirement to disclose information in the context of legal proceedings (eg, by court order).

Non-disclosure provisions under Mexican law are applicable and enforceable. All information to which employees have access, given their position and services, regarding third parties and deemed sensitive or confidential (ie, non-public information) may not be disclosed at any time after the termination of employment or used for any other purposes.

The breach of non-disclosure obligations of confidential information and trade secrets may lead to economic sanctions or imprisonment. The disclosure of confidential information or using it to an employer’s detriment is an offence under criminal law. Also, employees that breach confidential obligations may have to pay damages to the affected party.

Pursuant to article 186 of the general provisions applicable to brokerage houses, internal policies must be in place to establish guidelines and procedures for the use, management, conservation and, as applicable, destruction of books, records, documents, and other information; and must guarantee the adequate use and control of documents containing the confidential information of clients. Also, these entities must establish strict controls to avoid the improper use of books, records, and documents in general.

According to the Law to Regulate Technological Finance Institutions, entities must include measures and policies to control operational risks within their filing for authorisation at the CNBV. They must also provide information security and confidentiality policies, with evidence of secure, trustable and precise technological support for their clients and with minimum standards of security to ensure the confidentiality, availability and integrity of information, as well as to prevent fraud and cyberattacks.

Additionally, financial entities must guarantee the security and integrity of the information, and implement security measures to preserve the integrity and confidentiality of the information generated, stored, or processed.

Lastly, under the Federal Law for the Prevention and Identity of Transactions with Illegally Obtained Resources, filing notices, information and documentation related to vulnerable activities to the SHCP does not qualify as a breach of confidentiality obligations.

Since there is no specific legislation on NDAs under Dutch law, the general principle is that NDAs are permitted.

NDAs may never prevent a financial sector employee from reporting or revealing suspected misconduct.

NDAs are generally lawful in Singapore, although the extent of their enforceability depends on their contents. For example, restrictive covenants can be subject to further scrutiny (see question 13). While not subject to any particular form or rules, employers should take particular care to specify the type of information protected under the NDA, so that employees have a clear understanding of the protected information – and to enhance the enforceability of the NDA.

Under Singapore common law, in addition to breach of contract, a party may also bring an action for breach of confidence. A plaintiff will have to show on the facts that the information is confidential and was imparted in circumstances giving rise to an obligation of confidence (including if confidential information has been accessed or acquired without a plaintiff’s knowledge or consent), which will then invoke the presumption of a breach of confidence. The burden will then fall on the defendant to rebut this presumption.

Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) are generally lawful in Switzerland. However, NDAs are not regulated by statutory law and therefore do not have to follow any particular statutory form or rule. Nevertheless, most NDAs often contain a similar basic structure.

The core clauses of an NDA concern:

• manufacturing and business secrets or the scope of further confidentiality;
• the purpose of use;
• the return and destruction of devices containing confidential information; and
• post-contractual confidentiality obligations.

As a general rule, it is recommended to use the written form.

To ensure possible enforcement of an NDA in the employment context, the requirements of a post-contractual non-compete obligation (see below) must be met.

Non-disclosure agreements may be used in the UAE (including DIFC and ADGM free zones).  There are no particular requirements regarding the form or rules for those NDAs.

NDAs (also known as confidentiality agreements) are potentially lawful and enforceable in the UK. It is common to include NDAs in employment contracts (to protect the confidential information of the employer during and after employment) and in settlement agreements (to reiterate existing confidentiality obligations and to keep the circumstances of the settlement confidential).

NDAs do not need to follow a particular form, but they must be reasonable in scope. Following #MeToo, there has been considerable government, parliamentary, and regulatory scrutiny of the use of NDAs and their reasonableness in different circumstances.

The following limitations on NDAs should be noted:

• By law, any NDA purporting to prevent an individual from making a “protected disclosure” as defined in the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ie, blowing the whistle about a matter) is void.

• The regulatory body for solicitors in England and Wales, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), has issued a detailed warning notice and guidance to practitioners setting out – in its view – inappropriate or improper uses of NDAs. Failure to comply with the SRA’s warning notice may lead to disciplinary action. The SRA lists the following as examples of improper use of NDAs:

• • using an NDA as a means of preventing, or seeking to impede or deter, a person from:
    • cooperating with a criminal investigation or prosecution;
    • reporting an offence to a law enforcement agency;
    • reporting misconduct, or a serious breach of the SRA’s regulatory requirements, to the SRA, or making an equivalent report to any other body responsible for supervising or regulating the matters in question; and
    • making a protected disclosure;
    • using an NDA to influence the substance of such a report, disclosure or cooperation;
    • using an NDA to prevent any disclosure required by law;
    • using an NDA to prevent proper disclosure about the agreement or circumstances surrounding the agreement to professional advisers, such as legal or tax advisors, or medical professionals and counsellors, who are bound by a duty of confidentiality;
    • including or proposing clauses known to be unenforceable; and
    • using warranties, indemnities and clawback clauses in a way that is designed to, or has the effect of, improperly preventing or inhibiting permitted reporting or disclosures being made (for example, asking a person to warrant that they are not aware of any reason why they would make a permitted disclosure, in circumstances where a breach of warranty would activate a clawback clause).
       
• The Law Society of England and Wales, a professional association representing solicitors in England and Wales, has issued similar guidance (including a practice note) on the use of NDAs in the context of the termination of employment relationships.
• Other non-regulatory guidance on the use of NDAs has also been issued, including by the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service and by the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission.

Care should be taken accordingly to ensure that the wording of any NDA complies with prevailing guidance, especially from the SRA.

Non-disclosure agreements are currently permissible under United States law with some exceptions, typically pertaining to whistleblower, harassment, and discrimination matters. On 7 December 2022, President Joe Biden signed the Speak Out Act, which prohibits the enforcement of non-disclosure and non-disparagement provisions that were agreed to before an incident of workplace sexual assault or sexual harassment occurred. In other words, it does not prohibit these provisions in settlement or severance agreements.

Both Dodd-Frank and SOX prohibit employers from impeding an individual’s whistleblowing process. Confidentiality provisions should expressly authorise employee communications directly with, or responding to any inquiry from, or providing testimony before the SEC, FINRA, any other self-regulatory organisation or any other state or federal regulatory authority.

The United States Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2018 discourages NDAs in the settlement of sexual harassment claims. Under this law, employers settling claims alleging sexual harassment or abuse that include a confidentiality or non-disclosure provision in the settlement agreement cannot take a tax deduction for that settlement payment or related attorneys' fees.

Under the National Labor Relations Act, employees (except for supervisors) cannot be prohibited from discussing their compensation or working conditions

California

• California Law prohibits NDAs that would prevent employees from discussing or disclosing their compensation or discussing the wages of others. However, California permits the use of a non-disclosure provision that may preclude the disclosure of any amount paid in any separation or settlement agreement.
• California imposes restrictions on the use of non-disclosure provisions that are designed to restrict an employee's ability to disclose information about unlawful acts in the workplace, including information pertaining to harassment or discrimination or any other conduct the employee has reason to believe is unlawful in employment agreements, settlement agreements, and separation agreements.
• California employers cannot:
  • require employees, in exchange for a raise or a bonus, or as a condition of employment or for continued employment, to sign any non-disparagement or non-disclosure provision that denies the employee the right to disclose information about unlawful acts in the workplace;
  • include in any separation agreement a provision that prohibits the disclosure of information about unlawful acts in the workplace; or
  • include a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents or restricts the disclosure of factual information related to claims for sexual assault, sexual harassment, workplace harassment or discrimination, retaliation, or failure to prevent workplace harassment or discrimination that are filed in a civil or administrative action, unless the settlement agreement is negotiated, which means that the agreement is voluntary, deliberate, informed, provides consideration of value to the employee, and the employee is giving notice and an opportunity to retain an attorney or is represented by an attorney.

New York

• New York law prohibits NDAs that:
  • prevent an employee from discussing or disclosing their wages or the wages of another employee.
  • prevent an employee from disclosing factual information related to a future discrimination claim, unless the agreement notifies employees that it does not prevent them from speaking to the EEOC, the New York Department of Human Rights, and any local human rights commission or attorney retained by the individual.

New York law also prohibits employers from mandating confidentiality or non-disclosure provisions when settling sexual harassment claims (though allows such provisions where it is the employee’s preference to include them).