Employment in Financial Services

Specific rules apply to personnel whose professional activities have a significant impact on the company's risk profile (article 92, 2. Directive 2013/36/EU; article 67, Act of 25 April 2014), including:

• all members of the legal administrative body and senior management;
• staff members with supervisory responsibility for control functions or business units;
• employees who received significant remuneration during the previous year (ie, 500,000 EUR or more and equal to or greater than the average remuneration of members of the legal administrative body and senior management) and the employee performs the professional activity in a critical business unit and the nature of the activity is such that it has a significant impact on the risk profile of the business unit concerned.

Variable remuneration is capped at 50% of the fixed remuneration or 50,000 EUR, without exceeding the fixed remuneration, whichever is higher (article 1, Annex II, Act of 25 April 2014). Moreover, it is forbidden to have a guaranteed variable remuneration (article 5). 40% of variable remuneration is delayed for four to five years, with a minimum of five years for members of the legal administrative body and senior management. When the variable remuneration is very high, the percentage of the delayed variable remuneration is 60% (article 7).

The total variable remuneration will be significantly reduced if the company generates a reduced or negative financial return. This applies to variable remuneration not yet earned, variable remuneration earned but not yet paid, and variable remuneration that has already been paid. It occurs through malus or clawback schemes, in particular when the person has participated in practices that have resulted in significant losses, has not respected the “fit and proper” duties or has set up a specific mechanism for tax fraud (article 8).

A termination indemnity is considered a variable remuneration, except for a legal indemnity in lieu of notice or a non-compete indemnity (based on the calculation provided by the Employment Contracts Act). Furthermore, a termination indemnity higher than 12 months, or 18 months for a motivated decision from the remuneration committee, can only be granted subject to the approval of the first ordinary general meeting following the termination (articles 12 and 12/1).

For companies that benefit from government intervention, there is in principle no variable remuneration, except for the person recruited after the public intervention to carry on the restructuring. Moreover, the termination indemnity is capped at nine months, unless the legal indemnity in lieu of notice (based on seniority) is higher (articles 16 and 17).

The Collective Labour Agreement establishes several rules for employees in the sector.

There is a determination, through collective negotiation, of:

• percentage of salary increase;
• minimum wage for employees who begin their activities in the sector;
• minimum wage for employees after 90 days’ tenure;
• additional pay for length of service;
• additional overtime;
• night additional pay;
• additional pay for unhealthy or dangerous work;
• function bonus;
• cash bonus;
• gratuity for check clearing;
• meal assistance;
• food assistance;
• daycare and nanny assistance;
• funeral assistance;
• transportation vouchers; and
• assistance with night-time travel.

Under French law, several mechanisms regulate the compensation of employees in the financial services sector to limit risk-taking.

Concerning guaranteed variable remuneration (welcome bonus, recruitment bonus, etc) for new staff, establishments are not allowed to guarantee this beyond the first year of employment; it is said to be "exceptional" and can only be granted if the financial base is sufficiently sound and solid.

In addition, European Directive 2013/36 EU, UCITS V, of 26 June 2013 introduced a "clawback" mechanism that the legislature has transposed into French law. Thus, article L.511-84 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that "the total amount of variable remuneration may, in whole or in part, be reduced or give rise to restitution when the person concerned has failed to comply with the rules laid down by the institution with regard to risk-taking, in particular because of his responsibility for actions that have led to significant losses for the institution or in the event of failure to comply with the obligations of good repute and competence".

In addition and following the above-mentioned Directive 2013/36/EU (article 94) concerning the deferral of remuneration, the payment of variable remuneration should be made in part immediately and in part on a deferred basis.

Institutions are encouraged to implement a deferral schedule, that properly aligns staff compensation with the institution's business, economic cycle, and risk profile, so that a sufficient portion of variable compensation can be adjusted to results through ex-post risk adjustments.

This schedule consists of the portion of variable compensation deferred, the length of the deferral period and the speed ofvesting of the deferred compensation.

In the event of poor or negative performance by the institutions, leading to a reduction in the total amount of variable compensation, the payment of variable compensation may be subject to specific arrangements implemented by the institutions, as referred to in Directive 2013/36/EU.

In addition, article L.511-84-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code specifies that the variable portion that may be reduced or even recovered as a penalty is excluded from the calculation of several indemnities in the event of dismissal, including the legal indemnity for dismissal.

Finally, following Law No. 2013-672 of 26 July 2013 on the separation and regulation of banking activities, the variable remuneration of managers and traders is capped, and cannot exceed the fixed part. In addition, a "say on pay" mechanism has been implemented (ie, the general meeting of shareholders must be consulted on the remuneration paid to executives and traders).

Yes, there are specific sets of rules on remuneration in the financial services sector, varying in detail per sub-sector. Rules are particularly strict for material risk-takers of significant institutions in light of the increased risk profile of their activities for the entire organisation.

Variable and fixed remuneration must have an appropriate ratio to each other. For financial institutions, the ratio is appropriate if the variable remuneration both complies with an upper limit of 100% of the fixed remuneration (up to 200% maximum based on a shareholders’ resolution) and provides an effective behavioural incentive. Further, variable remuneration may need to be spread over deferral periods. Depending on the sector, remuneration may have to be made subject to malus, holdback or clawback provisions in case specific risks materialise or the employee is found guilty of misconduct. Further, certain remuneration elements must be granted in instruments instead of cash payments, with restrictions around this element again varying by sub-sector.

There are no specific mandatory rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees in Hong Kong.

The HKMA has issued a Supervisory Policy Manual CG-5 “Guideline on a Sound Remuneration System”. This focuses on providing a broad idea and introducing basic principles of how remuneration policies should be designed and implemented in the authorised institution, to encourage employee behaviour that supports the risk management framework, corporate values and long-term financial soundness of the authorised institution.

Under the Guideline, the elements of a sound remuneration system are as follows:

Governance

• Remuneration policy should be in line with objectives, business strategies and the long-term goals of the authorised institution.
• The remuneration arrangement for employees whose activities could have a material impact on the authorised institution’s risk profile and financial soundness should support, but not undermine, the overall risk management approach.
• The Board of an authorised institution is ultimately responsible for overseeing the formulation and implementation of the remuneration policy.
• The establishment of a Board remuneration committee would assist the Board in discharging its responsibility for the design and operation of the authorised institution’s remuneration system.
• Risk control personnel should have appropriate authority and involvement in the process of design and implementation of the authorised institution’s remuneration policy.

Structure of remuneration

• Balance of fixed and variable remuneration should be determined with regard to the seniority, role, responsibilities and activities of their employees and the need to promote behaviour among employees that support the authorised institution’s risk-management framework and long-term financial soundness.
• Variable remuneration should be paid in such a manner as to align an employee’s incentive awards with long-term value creation and the time horizons of risk.
• Guaranteed minimum bonus to senior management or key personnel should be subject to the approval of the Board (or the Board’s remuneration committee with the necessary delegated authority).

Measurement of performance for variable remuneration

• The award of variable remuneration should depend on the fulfilment of certain pre-determined and assessable performance criteria, which include both financial and non-financial factors.
• Size and allocation of variable remuneration should take into account the current and potential risks associated with the activities of employees, as well as the performance (overall performance of the relevant business units and the authorised institution as a whole as well as the contribution of individual employees to such performance).
• Judgement and common sense may be required during the process to arrive at a fair and appropriate remuneration decision. The rationale for the exercise of judgment and the outcomes should be recorded in writing.

Alignment of remuneration pay-outs to the time horizon of risks

• Deferment of variable remuneration is appropriate when the risks taken by the employee in question are harder to measure or will be realised over a longer timeframe.
• The award of deferred remuneration should be subject to a minimum vesting period and pre-defined vesting conditions in respect of future performance.
• Authorised institutions should seek undertakings from employees not to engage in personal hedging strategies or remuneration and liability-related insurance to hedge their exposures in respect of the unvested portion of their deferred remuneration.

Remuneration disclosure

• Authorised institutions should make remuneration disclosures at least annually. The disclosure should include the qualitative and quantitative information that the HKMA has set out in its annual remuneration disclosure.

There are certain rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees, such as those in the banking, mutual fund or asset management, and insurance industries.

The central bank of India, the RBI, deals with the compensation policy for all private-sector banks and foreign banks operating in India by requiring them to formulate their own compensation policy and annually reviewing it. Banks are not allowed to employ or continue the employment of any person whose remuneration is excessive in the RBI’s opinion. For instance, the RBI lays down guidelines on the compensation of “Whole Time Directors (“WTD”) / Chief Executive Officers / Material Risk Takers and Control Function Staff”[1], elaborate guidelines encompassing the governance of compensation and its alignment with prudent risk-taking, policies for risk control and compliance staff, the identification of “material risk takers”, and disclosure and engagement by stakeholders. It even envisages deferred payments being subjected to malus or clawback arrangements if there was negative performance. For variable pay, it mandates banks to incorporate malus or clawback mechanisms and suggests they specify periods of malus or clawback application to cover at least deferral and retention periods.[2] It is pertinent to highlight that private sector and foreign banks in India must obtain regulatory approval[3] for the grant of remuneration to WTDs or CEOs.

The RBI also prescribes guidelines around compensation for key managerial personnel (KMP) and senior management in non-banking financial companies (NBFCs)[4]:

• NBFCs are mandated to form “Nomination and Remuneration Committees” (NRCs) as per Section 178 of the Companies Act, 2013, which will then be entrusted with framing, reviewing and implementing the compensation policy to be approved by the board of the company.
• The compensation must align with the risk related to the decision-making process. The compensation package can comprise both fixed and variable pay and may also be a mix of cash, equity or other forms, in line with projected risk factors.
• A bonus has no bearing on the performance of the individual. The bonus is guaranteed based on the fulfilment of certain criteria as may be specified in the compensation policy. A guaranteed bonus should neither be considered part of fixed pay nor variable pay and the same is not payable to KMP and senior management. However, a guaranteed bonus can be paid to new employees as part of a sign-on bonus whereby potential employees can be incentivised to join NBFCs.
• "Deferred compensation may be subject to malus/clawback arrangements."  The compensation policy concerning malus or clawback must mandatorily apply for the period equal to at least the deferred retention period. 

Despite the aforementioned guidelines being applicable from 1 April 2023, NBFCs must immediately begin aligning their internal procedures to comply with the mandatory guidelines above to assist the transition. Existing remuneration policies being followed by the NBFCs should be reviewed to make the necessary changes to be compliant with the above-mentioned policies.

When it comes to regulations on an “employee stock option plan” (ESOP) for financial services employees, regulators may impose industry-specific guidelines. For instance, as per the SEBI (Share Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021[5], the employee stock option scheme should be drafted in a manner that no such employee violates SEBI (Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 and SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to the Securities Market) Regulations, 1995. ESOPs issued to managerial staff and for non-cash consideration shall be treated as part of managerial remuneration. In another development, the RBI has directed that ESOPs should be at a fair value, shooting up costs and creating the cascading effect of replacing ESOPs with deferred bonus payments for senior managerial personnel.

There are prescriptive, sector-specific requirements, which apply to the remuneration of specified categories of employees or directors, and which apply in the asset management, investment services, banking, and insurance sectors.

Employers in these sectors are tasked with ensuring that the remuneration paid to material risk takers (individuals whose professional activities have a material impact on an RFSP's risk profile) or identified staff align with the RFSP risk profile.

There are detailed rules with technical guidance (emanating from EU law) specific to each sector, but at a high level they (to differing degrees) set out rules on; variable remuneration composition, ratios or other metrics to compare variable to fixed remuneration to ensure it is appropriate; malus requirements, which would allow the RFSP to cancel or reduce the employee's variable remuneration before it is paid out; and clawback provisions which allow RFSPs to recover variable remuneration after it has been awarded. It is important to ensure that employees' contracts of employment acknowledge that any variable remuneration will be subject to all regulatory restrictions and rules and may be clawed back in certain circumstances.

The CBI's 2014 Guidelines on Variable Remuneration Arrangements for Sales Staff also emphasise the importance of remuneration structures to have sufficient deterrents built into them (such as malus and clawback mechanisms) to avoid incentivising undesirable/risky behaviours from sales staff in the banking, insurance and investment services sectors.

There are no prescribed rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees and any remuneration, bonuses or clawback will be a matter of contract between the financial services employee and the financial institution. Inevitably, this will reflect what is typical in the market for experienced, qualified, financial services personnel performing the role for which they are applying or are currently carrying out.

Brokerage houses must implement a compensation system under the general provisions set forth by the CNBV. This system must include all compensation provided and must contain the responsibilities of the boards that implement the compensation schemes, ordinary and extraordinary compensation policies, and periodic reviews of payment policies. The board of directors must incorporate a special committee for compensation.

Under article 9 of the general provisions applicable to brokerage houses, account management fees may be paid to stock proxies provided that they comply entirely with the applicable laws in the exercise of their duties. Stock operators must not execute operations with the public or receive any remuneration or account management fees, except if, with the proxy’s authorisation, they execute orders of institutional investors in the brokerage house’s reception and allocation system.

Brokerage houses must not pay fees, commissions, and other remuneration of third parties that act as promoters, sellers, associates, independent commissioners, investment advisors or any similar roles. This also applies to proxies of the investor client without being proxies of the brokerage house, or those who have a conflict of interest to receive fees, commissions, or any other remuneration from the investor client.

If there is a critical event, such as a control measure, the CNBV may order the brokerage house to suspend the payment of extraordinary compensation and bonuses to the general manager and senior officers. This includes preventing the granting of new compensation until the matter is properly resolved. This should be included in employment contracts, to avoid labour-related disputes should the extraordinary measure of the CNBV is enacted.

Remuneration policy

Under Dutch law, financial services companies must implement an internal remuneration policy. Financial services companies must explain in the management report the relationship between the remuneration policy and the social function of the company.

Variable remuneration

The variable remuneration that a financial services company awards to an employee amounts to a maximum of 20% of that person's fixed annual remuneration. There are a (very) limited number of exceptions to this maximum.

Five-year statutory retention period for shares and other financial instruments

Financial services employees whose fixed remuneration consists of shares or related instruments may only sell them after five years.

Adjustment or recovery of bonuses (claw-back)

Adjustment or recovery of bonuses is mandatory if a financial services employee has failed to meet appropriate standards of competence and proper conduct or has been responsible for conduct that led to a significant deterioration in the company's position.

Severance payments

Paying out severance payments by financial services companies is not allowed if the employee leaves voluntarily or if there are seriously culpable acts or omissions in the performance of the function. Severance payments for directors (or other policymakers) may not exceed more than 100 per cent of their fixed annual salary.

Disclosure requirements may apply depending on the employee’s role. For example, with some exemptions, financial advisors are required to disclose to the client the remuneration that they receive or will receive for making any recommendations in respect of a particular investment product, or executing a purchase or sale contract relating to a designated investment product on their clients’ behalf.

MAS’ Guidelines on Corporate Governance (applicable to designated financial holding companies, banks, and some insurers) also requires the FI’s board of directors to have a formal and transparent procedure for developing policies on and fixing the remuneration of directors, executives, and key management personnel. A separate remuneration committee made up of non-executive directors must be established to make the relevant recommendations. MAS expects compliance with these guidelines in a manner commensurate with the size, nature of activities and risk profile of the FI. Diverging from the guidelines is acceptable to the extent that FIs explicitly state and explain how their practices are consistent with the policy intent of the relevant principle.

Companies listed on the Singapore stock exchange have similar requirements under MAS’ Code of Corporate Governance, and these also exist in subsidiary legislation applicable to the FI. As for all other non-exempt companies, director and employee remuneration will ordinarily have to be disclosed through publicly available financial statements, under applicable accounting standards.

Apart from the above, there are no strict limits on compensation or requirements to impose deferral, malus or clawback provisions. Employers may include such provisions in their contracts, but should be aware that the enforcement of such provisions may be subject to challenge.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

Both the DFSA General Rulebook and FSRA General Rulebook contain Best Practice Guidance for remuneration structure and strategies of authorised entities. In particular, the guidance identifies that the governing body of an authorised entity ought to consider the risk to which the firm could be exposed to as a result of the conduct or behaviour of its employees, and to consider the ratio and balance between fixed and variable remuneration components, the nature of the duties and functions performed by the relevant employees, the assessment criteria against which performance based components of remuneration are to be awarded, and the integrity and objectivity of any performance assessment against that criteria.

The remuneration of financial services employees working at certain firms (such as banks, building societies, asset managers and investment firms) is heavily regulated. The relevant rules can be found in various FCA “Remuneration Codes” (each Code tailored to different firms) and also (for dual-regulated firms) in specific remuneration parts of the PRA Rulebook and directly applicable retained EU law.

The remuneration rules are complex and their application is dependent on each firm. The key principle of the rules, however, is that firms subject to them must ensure that their remuneration policies and practices are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.

Some elements of the rules apply to all staff, whereas others apply only to material risk-takers within a particular firm.

By way of a snapshot, the rules generally cover such matters as:

• the appropriate ratio between fixed pay and variable pay, to ensure that fixed pay is a sufficiently high proportion of total remuneration to allow for the possibility of paying no variable pay;
• the amount of any discretionary bonus pool, which should be based on profit, adjusted for current and future risks, and take into account the cost and quantity of the capital and liquidity required;
• performance-related bonuses, which should be assessed based on a variety of factors, including the performance of the individual, the relevant business unit and the overall results of the firm;
• restrictions on guaranteed variable pay and payments on termination of employment; and
• malus and clawback requirements.

Overtime

Financial services employees in the United States are commonly classified as administrative employees exempt from both minimum wage and overtime laws. To qualify for this administrative exception under the Fair Labor Standard Acts (FLSA) and often, applicable state law, an employee must:

• be compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate at least equal to the minimum required threshold (at the time of writing set at $684 a week or $35,568 annually); and
• have a primary duty:
  • that is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers; and
  • includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment on significant matters.

Examples of employees qualifying for the administrative exemption are those whose duties include:

• collecting and analysing information regarding the customer’s income, assets, investments or debts;
• determining which financial products best meet a customer’s needs;
• advising customers regarding the pros and cons of various financial products; and
• marketing, servicing, or promoting financial products.

An employee whose sole duty is selling financial products does not qualify for the administrative exemption. United States courts are split on whether financial advisors are exempt.

Many states have a higher minimum annual salary threshold for the administrative exemption, including California ($1,240 a week, as of 1 January 2023) and New York ($1,125 a week for New York City and Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester counties and $990 a week for the remainder of the state. The remainder of the State increased to $1,064.25 a week on 31 December 2022).

California has an administrative exemption test, which also requires the employee to customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgement, in addition to being primarily engaged in administrative duties. Employees that do not qualify as non-exempt under one of the exemptions must receive overtime pay under California law.

FLSA also exempts “highly compensated” employees. To qualify for this exemption, an employee must earn at least $107,432 in total annual compensation (not including discretionary bonuses), must perform office or non-manual work as part of their primary duty, and must customarily perform one or more exempt duties of an administrative, executive, or professional employee.

Bonuses

Discretionary bonuses can be for any amount and can be determined on quantitative factors (eg, employer profits) or subjective factors (eg, known performance indicators, performance, merit) and employers may condition an employee’s eligibility to receive a bonus on their active employment at the time when bonuses are paid.

Guaranteed bonuses are typically non-discretionary and set at a fixed number or percentage (eg, a percentage of the employee’s annual base salary or the employer’s profits). A guaranteed bonus (unlike a discretionary one) creates a contractual obligation and will be considered wages. Once a payment is considered a “wage,” employers generally cannot withhold, recover or claw back the bonus from an employee.

California requires non-discretionary bonuses to be included in a non-exempt employee’s regular rate for overtime calculation.

Certain compensation plans include “forgivable loans,” conditioning an employee’s obligation to repay on their continued employment with the new employer for a time. If the employee leaves or is fired for certain reasons before the full loan amount is forgiven, the unforgiven share, with interest, can become due and payable.

California generally prohibits employers from deducting any outstanding loan balances from an employee’s final paycheck without express permission in contemporaneous writing signed by the employee, both at the time the loan or advance was given and at separation.

Similarly, New York has extremely nuanced rules related to permissible deductions for employee benefits, which are limited (eg, authorised deductions and deductions for the benefit of the employee).

The NBB has issued a Fit & Proper Handbook, which was last updated on 22 December 2022.

Besides, Febelfin has adopted codes of conduct and regulations for relations between financial institutions and their customers, which can be considered standard practice in the sector.

Each financial institution may also provide more concrete or more precise quality standards for its clientele.

There is no general code defined by law or regulation.

Each company can adopt its standard of behaviour as a rule.

Certain activities require specific protocols for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism:

• the capture, intermediation, and investment of financial resources from third parties in national or foreign currency;

• the purchase and sale of foreign currency or gold as a financial asset or exchange instrument; and

• the custody, issuance, distribution, settlement, negotiation, intermediation, or securities administration.

Within the scope of the Brazilian System for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, it is up to institutions and their employees to adequately comply with Central Bank regulations. Also, institutions must promote the effectiveness of the apparatus to combat and prevent money laundering, carry out risk management with the implementation of effective policies, procedures, and controls, and help the Brazilian state locate suspicious financial operations so that they can be investigated.

First of all, various obligations discussed so far have the effect of forcing, if they were not already there, employees in the financial services sector to behave in an honourable manner and respect prudential rules.

In addition, Law 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016 on transparency, the fight against corruption and the modernisation of economic life states in article 17 that in certain large companies, managers must take all measures to prevent and detect the commission, in France or abroad, of acts of corruption or influence peddling.

This means setting up a code of conduct that will be integrated into the internal regulations, in compliance with the procedure for consulting employee representatives provided for in article L. 1321-4 of the French Labour Code.

This code of conduct involves the implementation of measures and procedures that will be monitored by the French Anti-Corruption Agency. In particular, the code of conduct must define and provide examples of the various types of behaviour to be prohibited as likely to constitute corruption or influence peddling. It must also establish an evaluation and control system, as well as a disciplinary system, enabling the company's employees to be sanctioned if there is a violation of the company's code of conduct.

In addition to this code of conduct, which is part of the internal regulations, almost all players in the financial services sector have put in place charters and policies to protect confidential information and regulate risky activities.

Employees must conduct themselves in line with their respective roles and responsibilities, which in client-facing roles indirectly leads to them being subject to specific behavioural obligations (such as having to adhere to certain procedures and documentation obligations before selling a service or product to a client). In addition, company policies required by the regulator (eg, on sustainability or equal treatment) often include behavioural standards.

In addition, there are voluntary standards adopted by various professional associations, such as the Code of Conduct of the Federal Association of Financial Services, which apply to their respective members.

SFC

Under the SFO, licensed representatives and ROs are required to be “a fit and proper person” to carry on the regulated activities and must adhere to the standards of behaviour set out in the “Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures Commission”. Other relevant guidelines regarding standards of behaviour include:

• “Fit and Proper Guidelines”, which set out the general expectations of the SFC of what is necessary to satisfy the licensing or registration requirements that a person is fit and proper.
• “Guidelines on Competence”, which set out the competence requirements and its objective to ensure a person is equipped with the necessary technical skills and professional expertise to be “fit”, and is aware of the relevant ethical standards and regulatory knowledge to be “proper” in carrying on any regulated activities.

HKMA

Under the BO, employees of an authorised institution that carry on regulated activities under the SFO are required to be fit and proper. In addition, the HKMA needs to be satisfied that the chief executive, directors, controllers and executive officers of the authorised institutions are fit and proper. Other relevant guidelines regarding standards of behaviour include:

• “Code of Banking Practice”, which is to be observed by authorised institutions in dealing with and providing services to their customers.
• Supervisory Policy Manual CG – 2 “Systems of Control for Appointment of Managers”, which sets out the system of control that authorised institutions should have for ensuring the fitness and propriety of individuals appointed as managers.

IA

The conduct requirements for licensed insurance agents and brokers are set out in Division 4 of the IO. Other relevant codes and guidelines include:

• “Code of Conduct for Licensed Insurance Agents”, which sets out the fundamental principles of professional conduct that buyers of insurance are entitled to expect in their dealings with licensed insurance agents.
• “Code of Conduct for Licensed Insurance Brokers”, which sets out the fundamental principles of professional conduct that buyers of insurance are entitled to expect in their dealings with licensed insurance brokers.
• “Guideline on ‘Fit and Proper’ Criteria under the Insurance Ordinance”

Financial services regulators like the RBI, SEBI and Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI) regulate employees through prescribed frameworks and their organisation-specific rules.

The obligations for the conduct of employees in financial services are determined depending upon the type of organisation: public sector banks (majorly owned by the state) or private banks; sectors (banking, non-banking, insurance, capital market); regions (different local laws); and level of seniority (liability of officers or manager is different from regular employees or clerical staff).  Though there are no statutory standards, judicial pronouncements have set a higher threshold of duty of care for employees in the financial services sectors. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Harinarayan Seet v Andhra Bank[1] held dismissal of service as a proportionate punishment for dereliction of duty by banking employees, which would have otherwise attracted a lesser penalty for employees in less-critical sectors.

In terms of general labour legislation also applicable to financial services employees, financial services organisations fall under the definition of “commercial establishments”, whose definition has been laid down by the Shops & Commercial Establishments Act (state level). They provide certain conduct-specific obligations, for example, a prohibition against discrimination, suspension or dismissal for misconduct.

The other major piece of labour legislation that lays down standards of conduct is the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (IESOA). However, its applicability to commercial establishments or to a specific industry is dependent upon state-wide laws. For example, the states of Haryana and Karnataka have notified the application of the IESOA to commercial establishments with a minimum of 50 employees. This implies that financial services institutions in these states, meeting the above criteria, are bound to comply with the IESOA. Upon the application of the IESOA, the establishments are required to submit to the certifying officer draft standing orders proposed for their establishment, which should cover acceptable standards for employees.

In the banking sector, employees of public-sector banks, private-sector banks and foreign banks are bound by the obligations laid down by the RBI and their organisation rules. The provisions of these rules, which are different from other industries, are stricter: observance of secrecy; prohibition against using influence to secure employment for family members; bypassing regular compliance checks for availing of banking facilities; prohibition against media contributions, participating in politics or standing for election; demonstrations prejudicial to the public interest; and acceptance of gifts in an official capacity.

In terms of financial propriety, employees must not indulge in speculation in stocks and shares, but must avoid personal insolvency and even disclose their moveable and immoveable assets. During employment, they are also forbidden from engaging in any outside employment (stipendiary or honorary) without the prior approval of the organisation. Higher managerial employees are subject to additional scrutiny. Those belonging to public sector enterprises are brought within the jurisdiction of the Central Vigilance Commission, the apex vigilance institution. It is due to the gravity of corruption cases that the senior management of private sector banks is also included within the ambit of “public servant”, which usually includes employees of only public sector organisations. This was upheld by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v Ramesh Gelli[2].  The organisations in the insurance and capital markets sectors also have similar institution-wide conduct and disciplinary rules.

Directors of organisations in the financial services sector may also be subject to duties stated in Schedule IV of the Companies Act 2013 and the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations 2015.

When it comes to outsourcing activities, financial institutions formulate a board-approved “Code of Conduct” as part of the “Outsourcing Agreement”, which is to be complied with by the outsourced service providers and their employees.[3]

Though financial services employees are held to a higher set of moral standards, their right to participate in trade union actions for voicing their concerns has been upheld time and again. Recently, the Madras High Court in the case of D Thomas Franco Rajendra Dev v The Disciplinary Authority and Circle Development Officer and State Bank of India[4] observed bank officers’ right to unionise.  However, the right of bank employees to go on a strike gets limited since banks and other financial institutions are declared as ‘Public Utility Services’ (“PUS”). Accordingly, while they are not barred from going on strike, they must adhere to certain pre-requisites namely service of notice of at least 6 weeks before going on a strike, prohibition of any strike within 14 days from date of service of above notice, prohibition of going on a strike before the expiry of the date of that strike and non-authorization of any strike during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or 7 days after the conclusion of such a proceeding. Upon being declared a PUS, the concerned industry must adhere to these conditions failing which the strikes would be declared as illegal.

Yes there are. They are:

• the F&P Standards;
• the minimum competency regime; and
• the IAF and SEAR (see question 1).

There are also sector-specific conduct of business requirements in legislation and codes, including the Consumer Protection Code 2012, the MiFID II regime, and other regulatory requirements applicable to RFSPs based on their industry sector that apply and deal with matters such as:

• error handling,
• disclosures to customers,
• acting in the best interests of customers; and
• complaints handling.

Yes, financial institutions are required to comply with the rules and standards of conduct as set out in the Rule Book (as a minimum).

Financial institutions must notify the IoM FSA of any departure or intended departure of an employee who undertakes a Controlled Function within ten business days. Furthermore, where a financial institution discovers an event which may lead to a final warning being given to, or other serious disciplinary action being taken against, any of its employees, the financial institution must inform the IoM FSA within ten business days. The notice must specify the event, and the name of the employee where the employee holds a Controlled Function or is a “key person”. Where the employee is not a “key person” and does not hold a Controlled Function role, the financial institution is not required to inform the IoM FSA of the name of the employee unless – following an investigation – the employee is given a final warning or other serious disciplinary action is taken (in which case, the financial institution will have to inform the IoM FSA of the employee’s name at that point).

Financial entities must establish, implement and apply, among other things:

• confidentiality policies;
• policies for internal control to confirm the acts, operations and services of individuals are carried out in an ethical, professional and legal manner;
• policies regarding the prevention of acts and operations with illegal resources;
• policies to prevent psychological risk factors;
• policies that allow the identification, follow-up and control of risks inherent to operations; and
• conflict of interest resolution policies.

Under the general provisions applicable to operations with securities carried out by members of the board of directors, officers and employees of financial entities and other obligated parties, the principles that must be complied with are the following:

• transparency in operations;
• equal opportunity before all other market participants in sureties operations;
• compliance with fair stock market customs and practices;
• absence of a conflict of interest; and
• prevention of improper behaviour that may have as its origin the use of privileged or confidential information.

Policies, manuals and codes must also include guidelines for the resolution of potential conflicts of interest, as well as the mechanisms to avoid the existence of such conflicts.

Financial entities must inform the CNBV annually, within 15 days, a report on the conduct, operations, and services of individuals. If any act or operation with illegal resources is detected, financial entities must inform the authorities immediately, including the CNBV and the SHCP.

The board of directors of operating companies of investment funds, distribution entities, and stock appraisers of investment funds must approve a code of conduct, which must consider:

• activities in compliance with the applicable laws;
• internal control rules for the compliance of provisions and policies contained in the code, including investment provisions issued by the CNBV;
• security mechanisms to ensure confidential information is used solely for authorised purposes and security measures to protect clients’ files from fraud, robbery or misuse;
• an obligation on the general manager, officers and employees to conduct themselves in a fair, honest and professional manner in the performance of their activities; and
• a prohibition on officers, employees and proxies executing any type of operation with the public that contravenes market practices.

Members of the board of directors, the general manager, officers, regulatory comptrollers, proxies, and other employees must immediately report the existence of illegal or unethical conduct or activity to the regulatory comptroller.

Under Dutch law, financial services companies must maintain integrity and ensure safety, stability and integrity within their company. This also means that financial services companies must prevent their employees from committing criminal offences, other violations of the law or socially inappropriate behaviour that undermines confidence in the financial services sector or financial markets. For these reasons, it is common to implement company-specific codes of conduct.

There are many statutory general regulations and standards of behaviour that financial services employees are expected to adhere to. Moreover, all industries have their own specific industry-wide guidelines and codes of conduct.

An important statutory obligation for directors, (other) policymakers and employees with customer contact is to take an oath or promise before entering into employment. The oath or promise contains a declaration that – among other things – the employee will perform his or her duties with care and integrity, will put customer interests first and will make every effort to maintain and promote confidence in the financial services sector.

In addition to the oath or promise as mentioned above, there is also the “banker's oath”. This oath goes further than the oath or promise mentioned above and is mandatory for all employees who work for banks.

Breaching guidelines, codes of conduct or the statutory oath could lead to disciplinary sanctions being taken by the company itself (such as termination of the employment contract) or by disciplinary supervisors (such as a reprimand or a fine).

Generally, MAS’ Guidelines on Individual Accountability and Conduct emphasises the importance of reinforcing standards of proper conduct among all employees, while employees conducting regulated activities must remain fit and proper for their roles under MAS’ Guidelines on Fit and Proper Criteria.

Guidelines, codes, directions, notices and legislation in relation to corporate governance and risk management (including those mentioned in questions 5 and 6) should also be considered.

Depending on the regulatory status of the employing entity and, as the case may be, on the exact activities of a financial service employee, a financial service employee needs to adhere to certain code of conduct rules (eg, regarding transparency and care, documentation and accountability).

Supervised companies in Switzerland are, in principle, required to set up an organisation that ensures the compliance with Swiss financial market laws and its statutory code of conduct rules. For this purpose, among others, companies are required to issue regulations that their employees must follow.

Under Swiss financial market laws, code of conduct rules are generally based on abstract statutory rules and concretized by recognised privately organised associations.

In particular, several professional organisations (eg, the Swiss Bankers Association or the Asset Management Association) and self-regulated organisations issue their own set of code of conduct rules that members are required to follow.

In the DIFC, the DFSA General Rulebook provides that authorised individuals must adhere to six principles, as follows:

• Principle 1 – Integrity
• Principle 2 – Due skill, care and diligence
• Principle 3 – Market conduct
• Principle 4 – Relations with the DFSA
• Principle 5 – Management, systems and control
• Principle 6 – Compliance
   

In the ADGM, the FSRA General Rulebook provides that authorized individuals must adhere to eleven principles, as follows:

• Principle 1 – Integrity
• Principle 2 – Due skill, care and diligence
• Principle 3 – Management, systems and control
• Principle 4 – Resources
• Principle 5 – Market conduct
• Principle 6 – Information and interests
• Principle 7 – Conflicts of Interest
• Principle 8 – Suitability
• Principle 9 – Customer assets and money
• Principle 10 – Relations with regulators
• Principle 11 – Compliance with high standards of corporate governance

Yes. Both the FCA and PRA have established their own high-level required standards of conduct known as the Conduct Rules. The FCA’s conduct rules are set out in the FCA’s Code of Conduct sourcebook. The PRA’s conduct rules are set out in the PRA Rulebook (and different versions apply to different types of PRA-regulated firms).

The FCA’s conduct rules apply to most individuals working at an SM&CR firm. The PRA’s conduct rules apply to more limited individuals working at dual-regulated SM&CR firms: senior managers (approved by the PRA or FCA); individuals within the PRA’s certification regime; key function holders; and non-executive directors.

The Conduct Rules apply to conduct relating to the carrying out of an individual’s role. They do not extend to conduct within an individual’s private life, provided that the conduct is unrelated to the activities they carry out for their firm. Nevertheless, an individual’s behaviour outside of work can still be relevant to the separate consideration of their fitness and propriety.

There are two tiers of Conduct Rules: a first tier of rules applicable to all individuals subject to the Conduct Rules; and a second tier applicable to senior managers only.

The rules of the first tier are:

• Rule 1 – You must act with integrity.
• Rule 2 – You must act with due skill, care and diligence.
• Rule 3 – You must be open and cooperative with the FCA, PRA and other regulators.
• Rule 4 – You must pay due regard to the interests of the customer and treat them fairly.
• Rule 5 – You must observe proper standards of market conduct.

The rules of the second tier (applicable to senior managers) are:

• SC1 – You must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm for which you are responsible is controlled effectively.
• SC2 – You must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm for which you are responsible complies with the relevant requirements and standards of the regulatory system.
• SC3 – You must take reasonable steps to ensure that any delegation of your responsibilities is to an appropriate person and that you oversee the discharge of the delegated responsibility effectively.
• SC4 – You must disclose appropriately any information for which the FCA or PRA would reasonably expect notice.
• SC5 (certain dual-regulated firms only) – When exercising your responsibilities, you must pay due regard to the interests of current and potential future policyholders in ensuring the provision by the firm of an appropriate degree of protection for their insured benefits.

Firms must notify the FCA if they take disciplinary action against an individual for a breach of the Conduct Rules.

Employees in some states, including California and New York, are required to receive periodic sexual harassment training.

Employers are also required to implement anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies that:

• contain information about where and how employees can report improper conduct;
• prohibit retaliation for reporting or opposing improper conduct, or participating in an investigation regarding misconduct; and
• comply with state and local provisions that require employer policies to contain certain provisions (eg, New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco).

New York law prohibits employers from mandating confidentiality or non-disclosure provisions when settling sexual harassment claims (though it allows such provisions where it is the employee’s preference to include them).

California law prohibits employers from mandating confidentiality or non-disclosure provisions in employment agreements, settlement agreements, and separation agreements that are designed to restrict an employee's ability to disclose information about unlawful acts in the workplace, including information pertaining to harassment or discrimination or any other conduct the employee has reason to believe is unlawful.

FINRA and the SEC both have requirements and recommendations for social media use.

FINRA requires that broker-dealers retain records of social media communications related to the broker-dealer’s business made using social media sites and adopt policies and procedures designed to ensure that their employees who use social media sites for business purposes are appropriately supervised and trained, and do not present an undue risk to investors.

The SEC similarly requires that social media use complies with all federal security laws, including antifraud, compliance, and recordkeeping provisions.

Banking regulators provide guidance stating that each financial institution is expected to carry out an appropriate risk assessment that takes social media activities into consideration.