Employment in Financial Services

Specifically, employees holding executive, overall management, oversight or control functions in regulated companies are responsible for ensuring that the companies’ organization ensures the continued compliance with applicable financial market laws. Swiss financial market laws do not have enhanced responsibilities for different employee categories. Instead, a person’s fitness and propriety are assessed within the context of the specific requirements and functions of a given company, the scope of activities at that company, and the complexity of that company.

Responsibility differs based on the complexity and responsibility of the tasks assigned to the employee and defined by the employer. However, all companies in the sector must comply with financial market institutions, which may imply that employees have a responsibility towards different entities. We summarise the institutions of the Brazilian financial market as follows:

The Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM)

This was created to monitor, regulate, discipline, and develop the Brazilian securities market. It is responsible for creating rules for the market and supervising its functioning. The CVM is part of the government and is linked to the Treasury Department, but it has administrative independence.

The Brazilian National Central Bank

This is a federal agency linked to the Treasury Department but with administrative independence, which aims to guarantee the stability of the currency's purchasing power and maintain a solid and efficient financial system. It controls monetary, exchange rate, credit, and financial relations policies abroad, in addition to regulating the National Financial System. The national central bank also supervises financial market institutions.

B3 (Stock Exchange)

This was created in 2017 from the merger of BM&FBOVESPA and Cetip, two crucial financial market players. The new company began accumulating services that serve the market and its investors for fixed and variable income transactions, among other duties.

The Credit Guarantee Fund

This is a non-profit civil association that aims to provide credit guarantees to customers of institutions participating in the fund.

The Private Insurance Superintendence

This controls and supervises the insurance, open private pension, capitalisation, and reinsurance markets.

The Brazilian Association of Financial and Capital Market Entities (ANBIMA)

This has represented the market for over four decades and is responsible for more than 300 institutions. The entity's activities are organised around four commitments: represent, self-regulate, inform and educate. Its main objective is to strengthen the sector's representation and support the evolution of a capital market capable of financing local economic and social development and influencing the global market.

The activities of certain categories of employees in the financial services sector benefit from greater supervision, due to the risky nature of their activity. These include employees who have business dealings with individuals and employees who may have exposure to the financial markets.

Thus, Article L.533-10 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that portfolio management companies and investment service providers must, on the one hand, put in place rules and procedures to ensure compliance with the provisions applicable to them. On the other hand, they must put in place rules and procedures defining the conditions and limits under which their employees may carry out personal transactions on their behalf.

They must still take all reasonable steps to prevent conflicts of interest that could affect their clients. In practice, these employees may be referred to as "sensitive personnel".

In addition, Law No. 2013-672 of 26 July 2013, on the separation and regulation of banking activities introduced several provisions constraining employees who may expose their company to the financial markets. These employees must comply with strict obligations in their activity to limit risk-taking.

Employees who qualify as risk-takers have enhanced responsibilities due to their influence on an institution’s risk profile, including documentation requirements. Investment brokers advising private clients are also subject to strict rules and extensive documentation requirements, inter alia, on the investment advice provided and how the investment was tailored to the preferences, investment objectives, and other characteristics of the investor.

Under the SFO, ROs have enhanced responsibilities. They assume primary responsibility for compliance at a licensed corporation and are involved in supervising the regulated activities. A licensed corporation is required to appoint no less than two ROs to directly supervise the conduct of each regulated activity. Similarly, under the BO, registered institutions are required to appoint no less than two executive officers to be responsible for directly supervising the conduct of each regulated activity under the SFO. For each regulated activity, at least one RO must be available at all times to supervise the business and must be an executive director.

Under the IO, an RO of a licensed insurance agency or licensed insurance broker company has enhanced responsibilities. Responsible officers must use their best endeavours to ensure the agency or broker has established and maintains proper controls and procedures for securing compliance with the conduct requirements under the IO.

There are no provisions that lay down enhanced responsibilities for a particular category of employees in the financial services sector.

However, the conduct rules for employees in the financial sector mandate employees to adhere to higher standards of code of conduct and self-discipline. Their codes of conduct include inter alia anti-bribery obligations, prohibition from accepting gifts in an official capacity, making representations to media, making contribution to political parties, holding demonstration against public interest, exercising undue influence to secure appointments of family members at same organisation or granting banking facilities without permission. They are supposed to observe secrecy in general and specifically, maintain financial secrecy about stocks too.

This question was upheld in Harinarayan Seet v. Andhra Bank[1], wherein the Andhra Pradesh High Court recognised that banking sector employees are mandated to exhibit higher standards of honesty, integrity, devotion and diligence and any failure to discharge such duty with diligence may trigger dismissal.

Yes. Common Conduct Standards and Additional Conduct Standards were introduced by the 2023 Act and employers need to update employees' contractual documents to reflect same.

The Common Conduct Standards set out standards of behaviour expected of individuals carrying out Controlled Functions (CFs) within firms. The Common Conduct Standards are basic standards such as acting with honesty and integrity with due skill, care and diligence and in the best interest of customers. An individual that is subject to the Common Conduct Standards will be expected to take reasonable steps to ensure that the Common Conduct Standards are met.

In addition, senior executives, which includes individuals performing PCF roles (e.g. the directors, designated persons) and other individuals who exercise significant influence on the conduct of a firm's affairs (CF1) will also have Additional Conduct Standards related to running the part of the business for which they are responsible. An individual who performs a PCF/CF1 role should take reasonable steps to ensure that the Additional Conduct Standards are met.

When SEAR comes into effect, those performing senior executive functions will be required to have detailed statements of responsibility setting out the scope of their role. The Duty of Responsibility which the PCF will have under SEAR is extensive. The duty extends to taking any step that is reasonable in the circumstances to avoid a breach by their firm of its obligations in relation to an aspect of the firm's affairs for which the PCF is responsible.

There are a number of General Prescribed Responsibilities that will need to be assigned to PCFs:

(a)   Performance by the Firm of its obligations under SEAR

(b)   Performance by the Firm of its obligations under the F&P framework

(c)   Performance by the Firm of its obligations under the new Conduct Standards

(d)   Responsibility for overseeing the adoption of the firm’s policy on diversity and inclusion.

Employees who carry out a Controlled Function will have a duty of responsibility to ensure compliance with the financial institution’s ongoing regulatory requirements. 

All employees, including general managers and officers, must keep information and documents confidential and may only provide information to the competent authorities or authorised parties, with the prior express authorisation of the user or client.

Also, employees must:

• not stop internal committees from carrying out their functions;
• disclose to the financial entity all information regarding the use of illegal resources, or any act against goods, services, an individual’s life, or physical or emotional integrity, the use of toxic substances, or terrorist acts, so that the financial entity may provide the SHCP with a report on the subject; and
• in insurance or bonding Institutes, not offer discounts, reduce premiums or grant different benefits than those outlined in the corresponding policy.

General managers and officers must provide reports and information to the board of directors and the corresponding authorities periodically. The general manager must also provide precise data and reports to assist the board of directors in making prudent decisions.

General managers must develop and present to the board of directors, for its approval,  adequate policies for employment and the use of material and human resources, including restrictions on the use of goods, supervision and control mechanisms, and the application of resources to the company’s activities consistent with their business purposes.  

Insurance and bond companies will respond to the conduct of the general manager and officers, without prejudice to the civil and criminal liabilities that they may personally incur.

Also, if any conflict of interest exists or arises, general managers and officers must inform their employers immediately and suspend any activity within the scope of the contract that gives rise to the conflict until the matter is addressed.

Additionally, general managers and officers must verify the compliance of all individuals under their responsibility with all applicable legal provisions for financial services. These include: confidential obligations; the development of reports; informing their direct superior, officers, general manager or board of directors if there is a conflict of interest; informing the SCHP and Prosecutor’s Office if there is an act, operation or service using illegal resources, or an act that may harm the company, or the health or wellbeing of an individual or the general public.

Specifically, general managers in brokerage houses must:

• design and carry out a communications policy regarding identifying contingencies;
• implement and distribute the continuity business plan within the brokerage house and establish training programmes;
• inform the CNBV of contingencies in any of the systems and channels for clients, authorities and central securities counterparties;
• ensure that the continuity business plan is submitted for efficiency testing; and
• inform the CNBV in writing of the hiring or removal of the responsible party for internal audit functions.

The reliability, propriety and fitness of (supervisory) directors and executives in the financial services sector, as well as employees in an integrity-sensitive position, must be “beyond doubt”. This is also assessed by local authorities.

Employees who are managers and executives or above generally have enhanced responsibilities, particularly regarding corporate governance.

MAS’ Guidelines on Individual Accountability and Conduct provide that senior managers (ie, those principally responsible for day-to-day management) should be clearly identified, fit and proper for their roles, and responsible for the actions of employees and the conduct of the business under their purview. As for material risk personnel (ie, individuals who have the authority to make decisions or conduct activities that can significantly impact the FI’s safety and soundness, or cause harm to a significant segment of the FI’s customers or other stakeholders), they should be fit and proper for their roles, and subject to effective risk governance, appropriate incentive structures, and standards of conduct.

Subsidiary legislation or other MAS guidelines specific to the FI’s sector also contain corporate governance regulations, prescribing responsibilities to the board of directors, nominating committees, or senior management.

MAS’ Guidelines on Risk Management Practices – Board and Senior Management further states that an FI’s board and senior management are responsible for governing risk within an institution. This includes setting up appropriate risk management systems, stress-testing programmes and business contingency plans.

Specifically, employees holding executive, overall management, oversight or control functions in regulated companies are responsible for ensuring that the companies’ organization ensures the continued compliance with applicable financial market laws. Swiss financial market laws do not have enhanced responsibilities for different employee categories. Instead, a person’s fitness and propriety are assessed within the context of the specific requirements and functions of a given company, the scope of activities at that company, and the complexity of that company.

There are no provisions that lay down enhanced responsibilities for a particular category of employees in the financial services sector.
 

Every senior manager under the SMR has a “duty of responsibility” concerning the areas for which they are responsible. If a firm breaches a regulatory requirement, the senior manager responsible for the area relevant to the breach could be held accountable for the breach if they failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or stop the breach.

In addition, for most firms, the FCA requires that certain responsibilities – “prescribed responsibilities” – are allocated to appropriate senior managers. These responsibilities cover key conduct and prudential risks. They include, among others, responsibility for a firm’s performance of its obligations under the SMR; responsibility for a firm’s performance of its obligations under the CR; and responsibility for a firm’s obligations around conduct rules training and reporting. Firms must give careful thought to the best person to allocate each prescribed responsibility.

While there are certain responsibilities for financial employees, such as being able to pass applicable certifications (see question 4) or registering with certain entities (see question 6), the American regulatory system does not include statutory delineations that create enhanced responsibilities for certain categories of employees.

There are no specific rules for the financial services sector, except that they cannot have an effect that does not respect the caps for remuneration (see question 7).

Yes, restrictive covenants are possible for financial service employees. However, restrictions on work in other companies in the sector (non-competition) must be paid for less than 24 months. These criteria are not provided for by law, but were constructed by Brazilian courts when adjudicating on this issue.

Three specific clauses are potentially relevant to employees in the financial services sector.

Firstly, regarding the confidentiality clause, employees in the financial services sector are bound to respect professional and banking secrecy.

More specifically, article 25 of Section III of Chapter 4 of Title II of Book 1 of the national collective agreement for financial companies of 22 November 1968, provides that all staff members are bound by professional secrecy within the company and towards third parties. Employees may not knowingly pass on to another company information specific to their employer or previous employer.

Article 24 of Chapter 3 of Title III of the national collective bargaining agreement for bank employees of 10 January 2000 codifies the absolute respect of professional secrecy.

Article 44 of Chapter 2 of Title IV of the national collective bargaining agreement for the financial markets of 11 June 2010 states that the employee must comply specifically with the rules of conduct regarding professional secrecy, both within the company and concerning third parties.

Confidentiality clauses can also be concluded between the employee and his or her employer, to reinforce the obligation of confidentiality.

In principle, a confidentiality clause allows for the protection of certain information exchanged during the contract and can be enforced after the termination of the employment contract if it is not perpetual. In this case, it is quite conceivable to contractualise such an obligation for employees in the financial services sector because of their functions, which by their very nature require discretion.

The law already states that anyone who uses or discloses confidential information obtained in the course of negotiations without authorisation is liable. Case law has addressed the issue of confidentiality clauses by ruling that an employee not executing this clause after his or her departure makes him or her liable for the resulting damage, without the employer having to prove gross negligence. The clause may be accompanied by a pecuniary sanction, which may be altered by the judge if it is lenient or excessive.

This clause in no way imposes a non-compete obligation and, therefore, does not entitle the employee to financial compensation.

In practice, it is complex to ensure compliance with this clause; however, the more specific the clause, the more effective it is.

Secondly, a non-compete clause allows an employer to limit an employee's professional activity at the end of an employment contract to prevent that employee from working for a competing company.

Despite the specificity of the activities of the financial sector, it seems that the common law of noncompetition clauses applies.

Thus, such a clause may be provided for by a collective agreement, in which case it is a conventional non-compete obligation. To be enforceable, the employee must have been informed of the existence of the applicable collective agreement. In this case, article 35 of Chapter I of Title IV of the national collective bargaining agreement for financial markets of 11 June 2010 provides for a non-compete obligation.

The non-compete clause is, in the majority of cases, contractual (ie, present in the employee’s employment contract). To be valid, this clause must meet various cumulative conditions to be compatible with the principle of freedom to work.

It must be essential to the protection of the legitimate interests of the company, limited in time and space, take into account the specificities of the employee's job, and include an obligation for the employer to pay the employee meaningful financial compensation. All these conditions are cumulative, and the employer cannot unilaterally extend the scope of the clause, otherwise it is null and void. Given the specificity of the activity of companies in the financial services sector, the condition of protection of the legitimate interests of the company would be met. However, taking into account the specificities of the employee's job may undermine such a clause if it is proven that his or her training and experience would prevent him or her from finding a job. The company's interest in imposing a noncompete clause must therefore be demonstrated.

The judge may restrict the application of the non-compete clause by limiting its effect in time, space or other terms when it does not allow the employee to engage in an activity consistent with his or her training and experience. However, the scope of application of the clause cannot be reduced by the judge if only the nullity of the clause has been invoked by the employee. If the non-compete clause is not enforced, the employer may take summary proceedings against the former employee who does not respect it, and also against the employee's new employer if they were hired with full knowledge of the facts, or if they continue to be employed after learning of the clause.

The employer may waive the clause if this is explicit and results from an unequivocal will. In the specific case of contractual termination, the employer who wishes to waive the clause must do so no later than the termination date set in the agreement.

Finally, concerning the non-solicitation clause, such a clause can be concluded between two companies through a commercial contract. These companies mutually prohibit each other from hiring their respective employees. Therefore, this clause is distinct from a non-compete clause and does not meet its conditions of validity. However, it must be proportionate to the legitimate interests to be protected given the purpose of the contract.

Post-contractual non-compete obligations will typically only be binding when a severance payment is agreed upon that amounts to at least 50% of the pro-rated annual remuneration that the employee received before the obligation comes into force). It is advisable to regularly review for which roles such arrangements are agreed upon as they can be costly, and a unilateral waiver does not automatically eliminate the obligation to pay compensation, only if sufficient advance notice is given.

In the financial services sector, the severance payment for non-competition covenants is considered variable remuneration and subject to the same regulatory compensation rules (for example, section 5 paragraph 6 sentence 1 IVV, section 6 paragraph 4 No. 2 Investment Firm Remuneration Ordinance). However, severance payments do not have to be factored into the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration according to section 25a paragraph 5 sentences 2 to 5 KWG if, subject to section 74 paragraph 2 of the German Commercial Code, the payments do not exceed the total fixed remuneration originally owed.

There are no particular rules that apply concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector. The rules concerning post-termination restrictive covenants are governed by common law principles in which they will only be enforced if the restriction is necessary for the protection of the employer’s legitimate business interest and is reasonable in scope and duration.

Post-termination non-competes are not enforceable, as they are treated as a restraint of trade. Courts have given prevalence to the livelihood of the employee over the employer’s interests. However, a reasonable non-solicit restriction may be enforceable in India.[1]

Employees in financial services are also bound by post-employment (for both resignation and retirement) obligations.[2] RBI employees[3] who cease to be in service should not accept or undertake “commercial employment”[4] for one year from the date on which they cease to be in service without the prior approval of the concerned authority. For SEBI employees[5], the cooling-off period is also one year. “Commercial employment”[6] broadly includes employment in any company or setting up their own practice without having professional qualifications and relying only on official experience. Such engagement may bestow an unfair advantage upon clients by virtue of the ex-employees’ prior experience at the organisation. The grant of prior approval by the concerned authority is dependent on whether there is any ensuing conflict of interest from such engagement.

No there are no bespoke rules that apply. Post termination restrictions in Ireland are void as being in restraint of trade unless it can be shown that the restrictions are necessary to protect an employer's legitimate proprietary interest and they are proportionate and reasonable in their scope and duration to achieve that protection[i].

[i] Law as of 15 April 2024

The IoM FSA does not regulate the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector. Post-termination restrictive covenants will be a matter of contract and will typically include non-compete, non-solicitation and non-dealing restrictions. These are subject to the same common law rules on interpretation and enforceability as in any other sector. Restraint of trade provisions are, in principle, contrary to public policy as a result of which it is for the employer to justify the length and scope of the restrictive covenant and show that it goes no further than necessary to protect its legitimate business interests. If a restraint is considered to be excessive, the courts will not generally rewrite or modify it to make it enforceable and, therefore, the whole of a defective covenant could fall away or be of no effect.

There are no particular rules or legal provisions concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants. Nevertheless, it is common practice to execute termination agreements with officers and general managers whereby non-disclosure, non-compete and non-solicitation provisions are set forth by the parties. The use of non-compete and non-solicitation provisions in termination agreements is only recommended for very specific employees and must be negotiated when the employment is terminated.

Plain non-compete and non-solicitation provisions binding employees after termination are not enforceable under Mexican law, because the Mexican Constitution grants individuals the right to perform any job, industry, commerce or work as long it is legal and not prohibited by a judicial or governmental decision.

Post-employment non-compete obligations, which are treated as an exception, must be agreed upon in connection to specific activities that may be deemed unfair competition, and may be enforced with economic compensation.

The period of enforceability must be proportional to:

• the number of years of employment;
• the level of information and importance of the position;
• the economic compensation; and
• the scope of the non-compete obligations.

Unfair competition and solicitation – either for business, or to induce other individuals to leave the company, while the employment contract between an individual and employer is in effect – may be considered misconduct. This misconduct is a cause of termination without notice for the company, and therefore it is feasible to enforce it.

The terms and conditions must be specifically addressed in writing, within the employment termination agreement, making express reference to the importance of the information, potential competition, activities that may be deemed unfair competition, intellectual property, and commercial advantages. The compensation paid is usually similar to or above the income of the employee while he or she was active with the company. Clawback and damages payments for breach of contract are standard practices.

There are no particular rules that apply concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for financial services employees.

Singapore law in relation to post-termination restrictive covenants is of general application and not specific to the financial services sector. Such restraints are prima facie void, but may be valid and enforceable if they are reasonable (both in the interests of the parties and the public), and if they go no further than what is necessary to protect a party’s legitimate proprietary interest.

The Singapore Courts have recognised that an employer has legitimate proprietary interests in its trade connections (commonly protected by restraints against the solicitation of clients or customers); the maintenance of a stable, trained workforce (commonly protected by restraints against the poaching of employees); and its confidential information and trade secrets (commonly protected by confidentiality restraints). This is not a closed list.

Non-competition clauses are however relatively more difficult to enforce as compared to other restrictive covenants, and they may not be enforceable at all under Singapore law as it presently stands if an employer’s legitimate proprietary interests are already covered by other restraints. Even then, it may still be possible for the employer to obtain an ex parte interim injunction for non-competition though.

Guidelines on restrictive covenants are also expected to be released in the second half of 2024, which will look to shape norms and provide employers and employees with guidance regarding the inclusion and enforcement of restrictive covenants in employment contracts. 

There are no particular rules that apply concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector in Switzerland. Rather, general post-contractual non-compete regulations come into play: the parties of an employment contract may agree on a non-compete clause, which must be included in the employment contract in writing to be valid. For the non-compete clause to be relevant, it must be sufficiently limited in terms of time, place and subject matter. Normally, the duration of a post-termination non-compete clause is no more than one year; however, the statutorily permissible duration is three years.

As a prerequisite for a contractual non-compete clause to be binding, access to sensitive data is required. The employee must either have access to customer data or manufacturing or business secrets. However, access alone is not enough. There must also be the possibility of harming the employer using this knowledge.

If a relationship between the customer and the employee or employer is personal (which is, for example, the case for lawyers or doctors), a post-termination non-compete clause is not applicable according to the Federal Supreme Court.

If there is an excessive non-compete clause, this can be restricted by a judge. In practice, most of the time, no restriction of the post-termination non-compete clause is imposed if the employer offers consideration in return for the agreement. The prohibition of competition may become invalid for two reasons. Firstly, the clause can become irrelevant if the employer has no more interest in maintaining the non-compete clause. Secondly, the clause is not effective if the employer has terminated the employment relationship. However, this does not apply if the employee has given the employer a reason to terminate the employment relationship.

Swiss employment law does not provide for any compensation for a post-termination non-compete clause.

The DFSA and FSRA Rulebooks do not regulate the use of post-termination restrictive covenants. It is fairly typical for financial services firms in both free zones to include non-dealing, non-solicitation, non-compete and similar restrictive covenants in their employment contracts. These are subject to the same common law rules on interpretation and enforceability as in any other sector.  In addition, whilst the courts in both the DIFC and ADGM will award injunctive relief, there is no similar right in the federal courts.  This means that the enforceability of an injunctive order outside of the geographic scope of the two free zones is uncertain.

The SM&CR does not regulate the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector. It is fairly typical for financial services firms in the UK to include non-dealing, non-solicitation, non-compete and similar restrictive covenants in their employment contracts. These are subject to the same common law rules on interpretation and enforceability as in any other sector. The only caveat to this is that firms should ensure that such terms do not include any provision that might conflict with the regulatory duties of either the firm or the employee. This will be a rare occurrence in practice for most types of restrictive covenant, but could arise in respect of post-termination contractual obligations that are closely associated with restrictive covenants, namely those relating to confidentiality. As such, firms should ensure that confidentiality clauses in employment contracts or other agreements such as NDAs include appropriate carve-outs.

The enforceability of restrictive covenants varies greatly depending on applicable state law. Many states impose specific requirements or limitations on enforceable covenants.

FINRA-regulated firms must comply with additional regulations:

• FINRA rules prohibit interference with a customer’s choice to follow a former representative during a change in employment where there is no existing dispute with the customer about the account. The FINRA-registered agent must help transfer a customer’s account in the event of such a customer request. Note that this only explicitly affects requests by customers and not solicitation by a representative. A non-solicit provision might be upheld whereas a non-compete might not.

• Broker-dealer firms that are signatories to the Protocol for Broker Recruiting are subject to additional requirements. Under this protocol, a departing employee may be permitted to take certain information regarding clients they serviced while at the firm to a new employer and use that information to solicit clients. Non-signatories are not bound to this protocol and can sue departing brokers for violating the terms of otherwise enforceable covenants.

Non-competes and so-called garden leave provisions are regularly included in termination documents. The enforceability of these covenants vary based on jurisdiction, with courts evaluating provisions based on duration and geographic scope.

New York

New York law disfavours non-compete agreements as a general rule. However, such agreements may be enforceable if the restrictions are reasonable and are intended to protect a legitimate interest. A court can enforce a non-compete only if the covenant:

• is no greater than required to protect an employer’s legitimate interests;
• does not impose undue hardship on the employee;
• does not cause injury to the public; or
• is reasonable in duration and geographic scope.

California

California law does not allow post-employment non-compete or non-solicit agreements except agreements involving the sale or dissolution of a business. California law protects employer confidential information and prohibits current or former employees from using employer confidential information in the solicitation of employees.