Employment in Financial Services

Under French law, several mechanisms regulate the compensation of employees in the financial services sector to limit risk-taking.

Concerning guaranteed variable remuneration (welcome bonus, recruitment bonus, etc) for new staff, establishments are not allowed to guarantee this beyond the first year of employment; it is said to be "exceptional" and can only be granted if the financial base is sufficiently sound and solid.

In addition, European Directive 2013/36 EU, UCITS V, of 26 June 2013 introduced a "clawback" mechanism that the legislature has transposed into French law. Thus, article L.511-84 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that "the total amount of variable remuneration may, in whole or in part, be reduced or give rise to restitution when the person concerned has failed to comply with the rules laid down by the institution with regard to risk-taking, in particular because of his responsibility for actions that have led to significant losses for the institution or in the event of failure to comply with the obligations of good repute and competence".

In addition and following the above-mentioned Directive 2013/36/EU (article 94) concerning the deferral of remuneration, the payment of variable remuneration should be made in part immediately and in part on a deferred basis.

Institutions are encouraged to implement a deferral schedule, that properly aligns staff compensation with the institution's business, economic cycle, and risk profile, so that a sufficient portion of variable compensation can be adjusted to results through ex-post risk adjustments.

This schedule consists of the portion of variable compensation deferred, the length of the deferral period and the speed ofvesting of the deferred compensation.

In the event of poor or negative performance by the institutions, leading to a reduction in the total amount of variable compensation, the payment of variable compensation may be subject to specific arrangements implemented by the institutions, as referred to in Directive 2013/36/EU.

In addition, article L.511-84-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code specifies that the variable portion that may be reduced or even recovered as a penalty is excluded from the calculation of several indemnities in the event of dismissal, including the legal indemnity for dismissal.

Finally, following Law No. 2013-672 of 26 July 2013 on the separation and regulation of banking activities, the variable remuneration of managers and traders is capped, and cannot exceed the fixed part. In addition, a "say on pay" mechanism has been implemented (ie, the general meeting of shareholders must be consulted on the remuneration paid to executives and traders).

There are no prescribed rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees and any remuneration, bonuses or clawback will be a matter of contract between the financial services employee and the financial institution. Inevitably, this will reflect what is typical in the market for experienced, qualified, financial services personnel performing the role for which they are applying or are currently carrying out.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

Three specific clauses are potentially relevant to employees in the financial services sector.

Firstly, regarding the confidentiality clause, employees in the financial services sector are bound to respect professional and banking secrecy.

More specifically, article 25 of Section III of Chapter 4 of Title II of Book 1 of the national collective agreement for financial companies of 22 November 1968, provides that all staff members are bound by professional secrecy within the company and towards third parties. Employees may not knowingly pass on to another company information specific to their employer or previous employer.

Article 24 of Chapter 3 of Title III of the national collective bargaining agreement for bank employees of 10 January 2000 codifies the absolute respect of professional secrecy.

Article 44 of Chapter 2 of Title IV of the national collective bargaining agreement for the financial markets of 11 June 2010 states that the employee must comply specifically with the rules of conduct regarding professional secrecy, both within the company and concerning third parties.

Confidentiality clauses can also be concluded between the employee and his or her employer, to reinforce the obligation of confidentiality.

In principle, a confidentiality clause allows for the protection of certain information exchanged during the contract and can be enforced after the termination of the employment contract if it is not perpetual. In this case, it is quite conceivable to contractualise such an obligation for employees in the financial services sector because of their functions, which by their very nature require discretion.

The law already states that anyone who uses or discloses confidential information obtained in the course of negotiations without authorisation is liable. Case law has addressed the issue of confidentiality clauses by ruling that an employee not executing this clause after his or her departure makes him or her liable for the resulting damage, without the employer having to prove gross negligence. The clause may be accompanied by a pecuniary sanction, which may be altered by the judge if it is lenient or excessive.

This clause in no way imposes a non-compete obligation and, therefore, does not entitle the employee to financial compensation.

In practice, it is complex to ensure compliance with this clause; however, the more specific the clause, the more effective it is.

Secondly, a non-compete clause allows an employer to limit an employee's professional activity at the end of an employment contract to prevent that employee from working for a competing company.

Despite the specificity of the activities of the financial sector, it seems that the common law of noncompetition clauses applies.

Thus, such a clause may be provided for by a collective agreement, in which case it is a conventional non-compete obligation. To be enforceable, the employee must have been informed of the existence of the applicable collective agreement. In this case, article 35 of Chapter I of Title IV of the national collective bargaining agreement for financial markets of 11 June 2010 provides for a non-compete obligation.

The non-compete clause is, in the majority of cases, contractual (ie, present in the employee’s employment contract). To be valid, this clause must meet various cumulative conditions to be compatible with the principle of freedom to work.

It must be essential to the protection of the legitimate interests of the company, limited in time and space, take into account the specificities of the employee's job, and include an obligation for the employer to pay the employee meaningful financial compensation. All these conditions are cumulative, and the employer cannot unilaterally extend the scope of the clause, otherwise it is null and void. Given the specificity of the activity of companies in the financial services sector, the condition of protection of the legitimate interests of the company would be met. However, taking into account the specificities of the employee's job may undermine such a clause if it is proven that his or her training and experience would prevent him or her from finding a job. The company's interest in imposing a noncompete clause must therefore be demonstrated.

The judge may restrict the application of the non-compete clause by limiting its effect in time, space or other terms when it does not allow the employee to engage in an activity consistent with his or her training and experience. However, the scope of application of the clause cannot be reduced by the judge if only the nullity of the clause has been invoked by the employee. If the non-compete clause is not enforced, the employer may take summary proceedings against the former employee who does not respect it, and also against the employee's new employer if they were hired with full knowledge of the facts, or if they continue to be employed after learning of the clause.

The employer may waive the clause if this is explicit and results from an unequivocal will. In the specific case of contractual termination, the employer who wishes to waive the clause must do so no later than the termination date set in the agreement.

Finally, concerning the non-solicitation clause, such a clause can be concluded between two companies through a commercial contract. These companies mutually prohibit each other from hiring their respective employees. Therefore, this clause is distinct from a non-compete clause and does not meet its conditions of validity. However, it must be proportionate to the legitimate interests to be protected given the purpose of the contract.

The IoM FSA does not regulate the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector. Post-termination restrictive covenants will be a matter of contract and will typically include non-compete, non-solicitation and non-dealing restrictions. These are subject to the same common law rules on interpretation and enforceability as in any other sector. Restraint of trade provisions are, in principle, contrary to public policy as a result of which it is for the employer to justify the length and scope of the restrictive covenant and show that it goes no further than necessary to protect its legitimate business interests. If a restraint is considered to be excessive, the courts will not generally rewrite or modify it to make it enforceable and, therefore, the whole of a defective covenant could fall away or be of no effect.

There are no particular rules that apply concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector in Switzerland. Rather, general post-contractual non-compete regulations come into play: the parties of an employment contract may agree on a non-compete clause, which must be included in the employment contract in writing to be valid. For the non-compete clause to be relevant, it must be sufficiently limited in terms of time, place and subject matter. Normally, the duration of a post-termination non-compete clause is no more than one year; however, the statutorily permissible duration is three years.

As a prerequisite for a contractual non-compete clause to be binding, access to sensitive data is required. The employee must either have access to customer data or manufacturing or business secrets. However, access alone is not enough. There must also be the possibility of harming the employer using this knowledge.

If a relationship between the customer and the employee or employer is personal (which is, for example, the case for lawyers or doctors), a post-termination non-compete clause is not applicable according to the Federal Supreme Court.

If there is an excessive non-compete clause, this can be restricted by a judge. In practice, most of the time, no restriction of the post-termination non-compete clause is imposed if the employer offers consideration in return for the agreement. The prohibition of competition may become invalid for two reasons. Firstly, the clause can become irrelevant if the employer has no more interest in maintaining the non-compete clause. Secondly, the clause is not effective if the employer has terminated the employment relationship. However, this does not apply if the employee has given the employer a reason to terminate the employment relationship.

Swiss employment law does not provide for any compensation for a post-termination non-compete clause.