Employment in Financial Services

Under French law, several mechanisms regulate the compensation of employees in the financial services sector to limit risk-taking.

Concerning guaranteed variable remuneration (welcome bonus, recruitment bonus, etc) for new staff, establishments are not allowed to guarantee this beyond the first year of employment; it is said to be "exceptional" and can only be granted if the financial base is sufficiently sound and solid.

In addition, European Directive 2013/36 EU, UCITS V, of 26 June 2013 introduced a "clawback" mechanism that the legislature has transposed into French law. Thus, article L.511-84 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that "the total amount of variable remuneration may, in whole or in part, be reduced or give rise to restitution when the person concerned has failed to comply with the rules laid down by the institution with regard to risk-taking, in particular because of his responsibility for actions that have led to significant losses for the institution or in the event of failure to comply with the obligations of good repute and competence".

In addition and following the above-mentioned Directive 2013/36/EU (article 94) concerning the deferral of remuneration, the payment of variable remuneration should be made in part immediately and in part on a deferred basis.

Institutions are encouraged to implement a deferral schedule, that properly aligns staff compensation with the institution's business, economic cycle, and risk profile, so that a sufficient portion of variable compensation can be adjusted to results through ex-post risk adjustments.

This schedule consists of the portion of variable compensation deferred, the length of the deferral period and the speed ofvesting of the deferred compensation.

In the event of poor or negative performance by the institutions, leading to a reduction in the total amount of variable compensation, the payment of variable compensation may be subject to specific arrangements implemented by the institutions, as referred to in Directive 2013/36/EU.

In addition, article L.511-84-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code specifies that the variable portion that may be reduced or even recovered as a penalty is excluded from the calculation of several indemnities in the event of dismissal, including the legal indemnity for dismissal.

Finally, following Law No. 2013-672 of 26 July 2013 on the separation and regulation of banking activities, the variable remuneration of managers and traders is capped, and cannot exceed the fixed part. In addition, a "say on pay" mechanism has been implemented (ie, the general meeting of shareholders must be consulted on the remuneration paid to executives and traders).

There are no prescribed rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees and any remuneration, bonuses or clawback will be a matter of contract between the financial services employee and the financial institution. Inevitably, this will reflect what is typical in the market for experienced, qualified, financial services personnel performing the role for which they are applying or are currently carrying out.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

First of all, various obligations discussed so far have the effect of forcing, if they were not already there, employees in the financial services sector to behave in an honourable manner and respect prudential rules.

In addition, Law 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016 on transparency, the fight against corruption and the modernisation of economic life states in article 17 that in certain large companies, managers must take all measures to prevent and detect the commission, in France or abroad, of acts of corruption or influence peddling.

This means setting up a code of conduct that will be integrated into the internal regulations, in compliance with the procedure for consulting employee representatives provided for in article L. 1321-4 of the French Labour Code.

This code of conduct involves the implementation of measures and procedures that will be monitored by the French Anti-Corruption Agency. In particular, the code of conduct must define and provide examples of the various types of behaviour to be prohibited as likely to constitute corruption or influence peddling. It must also establish an evaluation and control system, as well as a disciplinary system, enabling the company's employees to be sanctioned if there is a violation of the company's code of conduct.

In addition to this code of conduct, which is part of the internal regulations, almost all players in the financial services sector have put in place charters and policies to protect confidential information and regulate risky activities.

Yes, financial institutions are required to comply with the rules and standards of conduct as set out in the Rule Book (as a minimum).

Financial institutions must notify the IoM FSA of any departure or intended departure of an employee who undertakes a Controlled Function within ten business days. Furthermore, where a financial institution discovers an event which may lead to a final warning being given to, or other serious disciplinary action being taken against, any of its employees, the financial institution must inform the IoM FSA within ten business days. The notice must specify the event, and the name of the employee where the employee holds a Controlled Function or is a “key person”. Where the employee is not a “key person” and does not hold a Controlled Function role, the financial institution is not required to inform the IoM FSA of the name of the employee unless – following an investigation – the employee is given a final warning or other serious disciplinary action is taken (in which case, the financial institution will have to inform the IoM FSA of the employee’s name at that point).

Depending on the regulatory status of the employing entity and, as the case may be, on the exact activities of a financial service employee, a financial service employee needs to adhere to certain code of conduct rules (eg, regarding transparency and care, documentation and accountability).

Supervised companies in Switzerland are, in principle, required to set up an organisation that ensures the compliance with Swiss financial market laws and its statutory code of conduct rules. For this purpose, among others, companies are required to issue regulations that their employees must follow.

Under Swiss financial market laws, code of conduct rules are generally based on abstract statutory rules and concretized by recognised privately organised associations.

In particular, several professional organisations (eg, the Swiss Bankers Association or the Asset Management Association) and self-regulated organisations issue their own set of code of conduct rules that members are required to follow.