Employment in Financial Services

There is no list of financial services employees as such, but the NBB will assess, among others, the experience and the credibility of the person when granting the “fit and proper” authorisation.

This concerns anyone in an executive position (i.e. members of the legal administrative body, the effective management and independent controllers) at a financial institution (see question 2).

However, it should be noted that financial services institutions approved by the NBB are listed on its website. Moreover, banking and investment services intermediaries must be registered and file through an online application to the FSMA (www.fsma.be) documents attesting, inter alia, their knowledge, clean criminal record, and professional liability insurance.

There is no universal register of all financial services employees. Rather, different Swiss financial market laws provide for a registration requirement that may apply to individual financial service employees. Whether a particular financial market law, and, consequently, a registration requirement, applies to a financial services employee depends specifically on the regulatory status of the employing entity and the particular activity of that employee.

• Also, client advisers of Swiss or foreign financial service providers (eg, investment advisers) may be required to register with the adviser register, unless an exemption applies. Client advisers are the natural persons who perform financial services on behalf of a financial service provider or in their own capacity as financial service providers. Client advisers are entered in the register of advisers if they prove that i) they have sufficient knowledge of the code of conduct set out in the financial services regulations and the necessary expertise required to perform their activities, ii) their employee has taken out professional indemnity insurance or that equivalent collateral exists, and iii) their employee is affiliated with a recognized Swiss ombudsman in their capacity as a financial service provider (if such affiliation duty exists).

Furthermore, “non-tied” insurance intermediaries (ie, persons who offer or conclude insurance contracts on behalf of insurance companies) are required to register with FINMA’s register of insurance companies. To register, persons must inter alia prove that they have sufficient qualifications and hold professional indemnity insurance or provide an equivalent financial surety. “Tied” intermediaries will no longer be able to register voluntarily in the FINMA register (unless this is required by the respective country of operation for activities abroad).

Specific rules apply to personnel whose professional activities have a significant impact on the company's risk profile (article 92, 2. Directive 2013/36/EU; article 67, Act of 25 April 2014), including:

• all members of the legal administrative body and senior management;
• staff members with supervisory responsibility for control functions or business units;
• employees who received significant remuneration during the previous year (ie, 500,000 EUR or more and equal to or greater than the average remuneration of members of the legal administrative body and senior management) and the employee performs the professional activity in a critical business unit and the nature of the activity is such that it has a significant impact on the risk profile of the business unit concerned.

Variable remuneration is capped at 50% of the fixed remuneration or 50,000 EUR, without exceeding the fixed remuneration, whichever is higher (article 1, Annex II, Act of 25 April 2014). Moreover, it is forbidden to have a guaranteed variable remuneration (article 5). 40% of variable remuneration is delayed for four to five years, with a minimum of five years for members of the legal administrative body and senior management. When the variable remuneration is very high, the percentage of the delayed variable remuneration is 60% (article 7).

The total variable remuneration will be significantly reduced if the company generates a reduced or negative financial return. This applies to variable remuneration not yet earned, variable remuneration earned but not yet paid, and variable remuneration that has already been paid. It occurs through malus or clawback schemes, in particular when the person has participated in practices that have resulted in significant losses, has not respected the “fit and proper” duties or has set up a specific mechanism for tax fraud (article 8).

A termination indemnity is considered a variable remuneration, except for a legal indemnity in lieu of notice or a non-compete indemnity (based on the calculation provided by the Employment Contracts Act). Furthermore, a termination indemnity higher than 12 months, or 18 months for a motivated decision from the remuneration committee, can only be granted subject to the approval of the first ordinary general meeting following the termination (articles 12 and 12/1).

For companies that benefit from government intervention, there is in principle no variable remuneration, except for the person recruited after the public intervention to carry on the restructuring. Moreover, the termination indemnity is capped at nine months, unless the legal indemnity in lieu of notice (based on seniority) is higher (articles 16 and 17).

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.