Employment in Financial Services

Specific rules apply to personnel whose professional activities have a significant impact on the company's risk profile (article 92, 2. Directive 2013/36/EU; article 67, Act of 25 April 2014), including:

• all members of the legal administrative body and senior management;
• staff members with supervisory responsibility for control functions or business units;
• employees who received significant remuneration during the previous year (ie, 500,000 EUR or more and equal to or greater than the average remuneration of members of the legal administrative body and senior management) and the employee performs the professional activity in a critical business unit and the nature of the activity is such that it has a significant impact on the risk profile of the business unit concerned.

Variable remuneration is capped at 50% of the fixed remuneration or 50,000 EUR, without exceeding the fixed remuneration, whichever is higher (article 1, Annex II, Act of 25 April 2014). Moreover, it is forbidden to have a guaranteed variable remuneration (article 5). 40% of variable remuneration is delayed for four to five years, with a minimum of five years for members of the legal administrative body and senior management. When the variable remuneration is very high, the percentage of the delayed variable remuneration is 60% (article 7).

The total variable remuneration will be significantly reduced if the company generates a reduced or negative financial return. This applies to variable remuneration not yet earned, variable remuneration earned but not yet paid, and variable remuneration that has already been paid. It occurs through malus or clawback schemes, in particular when the person has participated in practices that have resulted in significant losses, has not respected the “fit and proper” duties or has set up a specific mechanism for tax fraud (article 8).

A termination indemnity is considered a variable remuneration, except for a legal indemnity in lieu of notice or a non-compete indemnity (based on the calculation provided by the Employment Contracts Act). Furthermore, a termination indemnity higher than 12 months, or 18 months for a motivated decision from the remuneration committee, can only be granted subject to the approval of the first ordinary general meeting following the termination (articles 12 and 12/1).

For companies that benefit from government intervention, there is in principle no variable remuneration, except for the person recruited after the public intervention to carry on the restructuring. Moreover, the termination indemnity is capped at nine months, unless the legal indemnity in lieu of notice (based on seniority) is higher (articles 16 and 17).

There are no prescribed rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees and any remuneration, bonuses or clawback will be a matter of contract between the financial services employee and the financial institution. Inevitably, this will reflect what is typical in the market for experienced, qualified, financial services personnel performing the role for which they are applying or are currently carrying out.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

Employees must not, both during and after the termination of the contract, obtain, use or unlawfully disclose a business secret he or she became aware of in the course of his or her professional activity, or disclose the secrecy of any matter of a personal or confidential nature of which he or she became aware in the course of his or her professional activity (article 17, 3°, a, Employment Contracts Act).

The company can include a NDA in the employment contract to underline what is considered confidential information. A penalty clause (with a lump sum to be paid) can be foreseen in case of a breach after the end of the employment contract, but not during the period of the employment relationship. This is because of the prohibition on restricting the rights of employees or increasing their obligations in comparison with what is foreseen by the Employment Contracts Act (article 6).

Yes, non-disclosure agreements are potentially lawful in the Isle of Man. A contract of employment may also contain confidentiality provisions for financial services employees. However, a non-disclosure agreement or confidentiality clause would not (and could not) prevent a financial services employee (or any employee) from making a protected disclosure, (ie, a disclosure made by an employee where they reasonably believe there is serious wrongdoing within the workplace (whistleblowing)).

A financial services employee may, furthermore, be subject to a legal requirement to disclose information in certain circumstances that might override an NDA. For example, an individual can be compelled to provide information by the IoM FSA during an interview, and such compulsion will generally override an employee’s duties of confidentiality. Alternatively, an individual can be subject to a requirement to disclose information in the context of legal proceedings (eg, by court order).

Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) are generally lawful in Switzerland. However, NDAs are not regulated by statutory law and therefore do not have to follow any particular statutory form or rule. Nevertheless, most NDAs often contain a similar basic structure.

The core clauses of an NDA concern:

• manufacturing and business secrets or the scope of further confidentiality;
• the purpose of use;
• the return and destruction of devices containing confidential information; and
• post-contractual confidentiality obligations.

As a general rule, it is recommended to use the written form.

To ensure possible enforcement of an NDA in the employment context, the requirements of a post-contractual non-compete obligation (see below) must be met.