Employment in Financial Services

Under Swiss civil law, there is no requirement to apply pre-screening measures. However, while not a statutory requirement under Swiss financial market laws per se, companies subject to these laws apply pre-screening measures to ensure that a prospective financial services employee meets the requirements set forth by these laws. In particular, regulated companies such as banks, securities firms, insurance companies, fund management companies, managers of collective investment schemes and asset managers are required to obtain authorisation from the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) relating to strategic and executive management and each change thereto.

As a general rule, the higher the responsibility or position of a person, the more requirements financial services employees may need to fulfil. Persons holding executive or overall management functions (eg, a member of the board or members of the senior management) are required to fulfil certain requirements set forth by the applicable Swiss financial market regulations. Such requirements may include providing current CVs showing relevant work experience and education as well as excerpts from the debt and criminal register. It may also include providing various declarations (eg, concerning pending and concluded proceedings, qualified participations and other mandates). Furthermore, financial services employees holding certain control functions (eg, compliance officer, risk officer and their deputies) may also be required to prove that they are suitable for the position by providing, for example, a current CV showing relevant work experience and education.

For employees subject to the SMR, anyone performing an SMF must be pre-approved by the relevant regulator before they can start their role. Generally, firms that wish to employ a senior manager must first carry out sufficient due diligence to satisfy themselves that the candidate is a fit and proper person to perform their proposed functions. In this regard, firms must consider the individual’s qualifications, training, competency and personal characteristics. The firm must also carry out a criminal records check. They may then apply to the relevant regulator for that candidate’s pre-approval. In the firm’s application, all matters relating to the candidate’s fitness and propriety must be disclosed. The firm must also enclose a statement of that individual’s proposed responsibilities and (depending on the firm) the latest version of the firm’s management responsibilities map.

For employees subject to the CR, before the appointment and annually thereafter, these employees must be certified by the employing SM&CR firm as being fit and proper. Certification does not involve pre-approval by the FCA or PRA.

Additionally, firms must comply with the regulatory reference rules for all candidates subject to either the SMR or CR before their employment. These rules require employing firms to request a regulatory reference from all previous employers covering the past six years of employment. Information must be shared between regulated firms using a particular template, which includes information relevant to assessing whether a candidate is fit and proper. Firms are also expected to retain records of disciplinary and fit and proper findings going back six years for their employees (or longer for findings of gross misconduct), and they must update regulatory references that they have previously given where new significant information comes to light that would impact the content of a previously given regulatory reference.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

The remuneration of financial services employees working at certain firms (such as banks, building societies, asset managers and investment firms) is heavily regulated. The relevant rules can be found in various FCA “Remuneration Codes” (each Code tailored to different firms) and also (for dual-regulated firms) in specific remuneration parts of the PRA Rulebook and directly applicable retained EU law.

The remuneration rules are complex and their application is dependent on each firm. The key principle of the rules, however, is that firms subject to them must ensure that their remuneration policies and practices are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.

Some elements of the rules apply to all staff, whereas others apply only to material risk-takers within a particular firm.

By way of a snapshot, the rules generally cover such matters as:

• the appropriate ratio between fixed pay and variable pay, to ensure that fixed pay is a sufficiently high proportion of total remuneration to allow for the possibility of paying no variable pay;
• the amount of any discretionary bonus pool, which should be based on profit, adjusted for current and future risks, and take into account the cost and quantity of the capital and liquidity required;
• performance-related bonuses, which should be assessed based on a variety of factors, including the performance of the individual, the relevant business unit and the overall results of the firm;
• restrictions on guaranteed variable pay and payments on termination of employment; and
• malus and clawback requirements.

There are no particular rules that apply concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector in Switzerland. Rather, general post-contractual non-compete regulations come into play: the parties of an employment contract may agree on a non-compete clause, which must be included in the employment contract in writing to be valid. For the non-compete clause to be relevant, it must be sufficiently limited in terms of time, place and subject matter. Normally, the duration of a post-termination non-compete clause is no more than one year; however, the statutorily permissible duration is three years.

As a prerequisite for a contractual non-compete clause to be binding, access to sensitive data is required. The employee must either have access to customer data or manufacturing or business secrets. However, access alone is not enough. There must also be the possibility of harming the employer using this knowledge.

If a relationship between the customer and the employee or employer is personal (which is, for example, the case for lawyers or doctors), a post-termination non-compete clause is not applicable according to the Federal Supreme Court.

If there is an excessive non-compete clause, this can be restricted by a judge. In practice, most of the time, no restriction of the post-termination non-compete clause is imposed if the employer offers consideration in return for the agreement. The prohibition of competition may become invalid for two reasons. Firstly, the clause can become irrelevant if the employer has no more interest in maintaining the non-compete clause. Secondly, the clause is not effective if the employer has terminated the employment relationship. However, this does not apply if the employee has given the employer a reason to terminate the employment relationship.

Swiss employment law does not provide for any compensation for a post-termination non-compete clause.

The SM&CR does not regulate the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector. It is fairly typical for financial services firms in the UK to include non-dealing, non-solicitation, non-compete and similar restrictive covenants in their employment contracts. These are subject to the same common law rules on interpretation and enforceability as in any other sector. The only caveat to this is that firms should ensure that such terms do not include any provision that might conflict with the regulatory duties of either the firm or the employee. This will be a rare occurrence in practice for most types of restrictive covenant, but could arise in respect of post-termination contractual obligations that are closely associated with restrictive covenants, namely those relating to confidentiality. As such, firms should ensure that confidentiality clauses in employment contracts or other agreements such as NDAs include appropriate carve-outs.