Employment in Financial Services

There are certain rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees, such as those in the banking, mutual fund or asset management, and insurance industries.

The central bank of India, the RBI, deals with the compensation policy for all private-sector banks and foreign banks operating in India by requiring them to formulate their own compensation policy and annually reviewing it. Banks are not allowed to employ or continue the employment of any person whose remuneration is excessive in the RBI’s opinion. For instance, the RBI lays down guidelines on the compensation of “Whole Time Directors (“WTD”) / Chief Executive Officers / Material Risk Takers and Control Function Staff”[1], elaborate guidelines encompassing the governance of compensation and its alignment with prudent risk-taking, policies for risk control and compliance staff, the identification of “material risk takers”, and disclosure and engagement by stakeholders. It even envisages deferred payments being subjected to malus or clawback arrangements if there was negative performance. For variable pay, it mandates banks to incorporate malus or clawback mechanisms and suggests they specify periods of malus or clawback application to cover at least deferral and retention periods.[2] It is pertinent to highlight that private sector and foreign banks in India must obtain regulatory approval[3] for the grant of remuneration to WTDs or CEOs.

The RBI also prescribes guidelines around compensation for key managerial personnel (KMP) and senior management in non-banking financial companies (NBFCs)[4]:

• NBFCs are mandated to form “Nomination and Remuneration Committees” (NRCs) as per Section 178 of the Companies Act, 2013, which will then be entrusted with framing, reviewing and implementing the compensation policy to be approved by the board of the company.
• The compensation must align with the risk related to the decision-making process. The compensation package can comprise both fixed and variable pay and may also be a mix of cash, equity or other forms, in line with projected risk factors.
• A bonus has no bearing on the performance of the individual. The bonus is guaranteed based on the fulfilment of certain criteria as may be specified in the compensation policy. A guaranteed bonus should neither be considered part of fixed pay nor variable pay and the same is not payable to KMP and senior management. However, a guaranteed bonus can be paid to new employees as part of a sign-on bonus whereby potential employees can be incentivised to join NBFCs.
• "Deferred compensation may be subject to malus/clawback arrangements."  The compensation policy concerning malus or clawback must mandatorily apply for the period equal to at least the deferred retention period. 

Despite the aforementioned guidelines being applicable from 1 April 2023, NBFCs must immediately begin aligning their internal procedures to comply with the mandatory guidelines above to assist the transition. Existing remuneration policies being followed by the NBFCs should be reviewed to make the necessary changes to be compliant with the above-mentioned policies.

When it comes to regulations on an “employee stock option plan” (ESOP) for financial services employees, regulators may impose industry-specific guidelines. For instance, as per the SEBI (Share Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021[5], the employee stock option scheme should be drafted in a manner that no such employee violates SEBI (Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 and SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to the Securities Market) Regulations, 1995. ESOPs issued to managerial staff and for non-cash consideration shall be treated as part of managerial remuneration. In another development, the RBI has directed that ESOPs should be at a fair value, shooting up costs and creating the cascading effect of replacing ESOPs with deferred bonus payments for senior managerial personnel.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

The remuneration of financial services employees working at certain firms (such as banks, building societies, asset managers and investment firms) is heavily regulated. The relevant rules can be found in various FCA “Remuneration Codes” (each Code tailored to different firms) and also (for dual-regulated firms) in specific remuneration parts of the PRA Rulebook and directly applicable retained EU law.

The remuneration rules are complex and their application is dependent on each firm. The key principle of the rules, however, is that firms subject to them must ensure that their remuneration policies and practices are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.

Some elements of the rules apply to all staff, whereas others apply only to material risk-takers within a particular firm.

By way of a snapshot, the rules generally cover such matters as:

• the appropriate ratio between fixed pay and variable pay, to ensure that fixed pay is a sufficiently high proportion of total remuneration to allow for the possibility of paying no variable pay;
• the amount of any discretionary bonus pool, which should be based on profit, adjusted for current and future risks, and take into account the cost and quantity of the capital and liquidity required;
• performance-related bonuses, which should be assessed based on a variety of factors, including the performance of the individual, the relevant business unit and the overall results of the firm;
• restrictions on guaranteed variable pay and payments on termination of employment; and
• malus and clawback requirements.

NDAs are governed by the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and are generally lawful in India.

Generally, post-contract restrictive covenants like non-compete clauses that restrain a person’s exercise of lawful trade, profession or business are declared void because of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act.

The enforceability of NDAs may be affected if they restrain an employee from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business. Accordingly, an NDA crafted to protect the “confidential information” of the former employer but not to impose the above-mentioned restraints on the employee is saved from any clash with Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act and is, therefore, enforceable in the courts of law in India. If NDAs prohibit an employee from disclosing commercial or trade secrets, then they cannot be held to be in restraint of trade. This was observed by the Bombay High Court in VFS Global Services Pvt Ltd v Mr Suprit Roy[1].

Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) are generally lawful in Switzerland. However, NDAs are not regulated by statutory law and therefore do not have to follow any particular statutory form or rule. Nevertheless, most NDAs often contain a similar basic structure.

The core clauses of an NDA concern:

• manufacturing and business secrets or the scope of further confidentiality;
• the purpose of use;
• the return and destruction of devices containing confidential information; and
• post-contractual confidentiality obligations.

As a general rule, it is recommended to use the written form.

To ensure possible enforcement of an NDA in the employment context, the requirements of a post-contractual non-compete obligation (see below) must be met.

NDAs (also known as confidentiality agreements) are potentially lawful and enforceable in the UK. It is common to include NDAs in employment contracts (to protect the confidential information of the employer during and after employment) and in settlement agreements (to reiterate existing confidentiality obligations and to keep the circumstances of the settlement confidential).

NDAs do not need to follow a particular form, but they must be reasonable in scope. Following #MeToo, there has been considerable government, parliamentary, and regulatory scrutiny of the use of NDAs and their reasonableness in different circumstances.

The following limitations on NDAs should be noted:

• By law, any NDA purporting to prevent an individual from making a “protected disclosure” as defined in the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ie, blowing the whistle about a matter) is void.

• The regulatory body for solicitors in England and Wales, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), has issued a detailed warning notice and guidance to practitioners setting out – in its view – inappropriate or improper uses of NDAs. Failure to comply with the SRA’s warning notice may lead to disciplinary action. The SRA lists the following as examples of improper use of NDAs:

• • using an NDA as a means of preventing, or seeking to impede or deter, a person from:
    • cooperating with a criminal investigation or prosecution;
    • reporting an offence to a law enforcement agency;
    • reporting misconduct, or a serious breach of the SRA’s regulatory requirements, to the SRA, or making an equivalent report to any other body responsible for supervising or regulating the matters in question; and
    • making a protected disclosure;
    • using an NDA to influence the substance of such a report, disclosure or cooperation;
    • using an NDA to prevent any disclosure required by law;
    • using an NDA to prevent proper disclosure about the agreement or circumstances surrounding the agreement to professional advisers, such as legal or tax advisors, or medical professionals and counsellors, who are bound by a duty of confidentiality;
    • including or proposing clauses known to be unenforceable; and
    • using warranties, indemnities and clawback clauses in a way that is designed to, or has the effect of, improperly preventing or inhibiting permitted reporting or disclosures being made (for example, asking a person to warrant that they are not aware of any reason why they would make a permitted disclosure, in circumstances where a breach of warranty would activate a clawback clause).
       
• The Law Society of England and Wales, a professional association representing solicitors in England and Wales, has issued similar guidance (including a practice note) on the use of NDAs in the context of the termination of employment relationships.
• Other non-regulatory guidance on the use of NDAs has also been issued, including by the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service and by the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission.

Care should be taken accordingly to ensure that the wording of any NDA complies with prevailing guidance, especially from the SRA.