Employment in Financial Services

Employees who are managers and executives or above generally have enhanced responsibilities, particularly regarding corporate governance.

MAS’ Guidelines on Individual Accountability and Conduct provide that senior managers (ie, those principally responsible for day-to-day management) should be clearly identified, fit and proper for their roles, and responsible for the actions of employees and the conduct of the business under their purview. As for material risk personnel (ie, individuals who have the authority to make decisions or conduct activities that can significantly impact the FI’s safety and soundness, or cause harm to a significant segment of the FI’s customers or other stakeholders), they should be fit and proper for their roles, and subject to effective risk governance, appropriate incentive structures, and standards of conduct.

Subsidiary legislation or other MAS guidelines specific to the FI’s sector also contain corporate governance regulations, prescribing responsibilities to the board of directors, nominating committees, or senior management.

MAS’ Guidelines on Risk Management Practices – Board and Senior Management further states that an FI’s board and senior management are responsible for governing risk within an institution. This includes setting up appropriate risk management systems, stress-testing programmes and business contingency plans.

Specifically, employees holding executive, overall management, oversight or control functions in regulated companies are responsible for ensuring that the companies’ organization ensures the continued compliance with applicable financial market laws. Swiss financial market laws do not have enhanced responsibilities for different employee categories. Instead, a person’s fitness and propriety are assessed within the context of the specific requirements and functions of a given company, the scope of activities at that company, and the complexity of that company.

Disclosure requirements may apply depending on the employee’s role. For example, with some exemptions, financial advisors are required to disclose to the client the remuneration that they receive or will receive for making any recommendations in respect of a particular investment product, or executing a purchase or sale contract relating to a designated investment product on their clients’ behalf.

MAS’ Guidelines on Corporate Governance (applicable to designated financial holding companies, banks, and some insurers) also requires the FI’s board of directors to have a formal and transparent procedure for developing policies on and fixing the remuneration of directors, executives, and key management personnel. A separate remuneration committee made up of non-executive directors must be established to make the relevant recommendations. MAS expects compliance with these guidelines in a manner commensurate with the size, nature of activities and risk profile of the FI. Diverging from the guidelines is acceptable to the extent that FIs explicitly state and explain how their practices are consistent with the policy intent of the relevant principle.

Companies listed on the Singapore stock exchange have similar requirements under MAS’ Code of Corporate Governance, and these also exist in subsidiary legislation applicable to the FI. As for all other non-exempt companies, director and employee remuneration will ordinarily have to be disclosed through publicly available financial statements, under applicable accounting standards.

Apart from the above, there are no strict limits on compensation or requirements to impose deferral, malus or clawback provisions. Employers may include such provisions in their contracts, but should be aware that the enforcement of such provisions may be subject to challenge.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

NDAs are generally lawful in Singapore, although the extent of their enforceability depends on their contents. For example, restrictive covenants can be subject to further scrutiny (see question 13). While not subject to any particular form or rules, employers should take particular care to specify the type of information protected under the NDA, so that employees have a clear understanding of the protected information – and to enhance the enforceability of the NDA.

Under Singapore common law, in addition to breach of contract, a party may also bring an action for breach of confidence. A plaintiff will have to show on the facts that the information is confidential and was imparted in circumstances giving rise to an obligation of confidence (including if confidential information has been accessed or acquired without a plaintiff’s knowledge or consent), which will then invoke the presumption of a breach of confidence. The burden will then fall on the defendant to rebut this presumption.

Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) are generally lawful in Switzerland. However, NDAs are not regulated by statutory law and therefore do not have to follow any particular statutory form or rule. Nevertheless, most NDAs often contain a similar basic structure.

The core clauses of an NDA concern:

• manufacturing and business secrets or the scope of further confidentiality;
• the purpose of use;
• the return and destruction of devices containing confidential information; and
• post-contractual confidentiality obligations.

As a general rule, it is recommended to use the written form.

To ensure possible enforcement of an NDA in the employment context, the requirements of a post-contractual non-compete obligation (see below) must be met.