Employment in Financial Services

Disclosure requirements may apply depending on the employee’s role. For example, with some exemptions, financial advisors are required to disclose to the client the remuneration that they receive or will receive for making any recommendations in respect of a particular investment product, or executing a purchase or sale contract relating to a designated investment product on their clients’ behalf.

MAS’ Guidelines on Corporate Governance (applicable to designated financial holding companies, banks, and some insurers) also requires the FI’s board of directors to have a formal and transparent procedure for developing policies on and fixing the remuneration of directors, executives, and key management personnel. A separate remuneration committee made up of non-executive directors must be established to make the relevant recommendations. MAS expects compliance with these guidelines in a manner commensurate with the size, nature of activities and risk profile of the FI. Diverging from the guidelines is acceptable to the extent that FIs explicitly state and explain how their practices are consistent with the policy intent of the relevant principle.

Companies listed on the Singapore stock exchange have similar requirements under MAS’ Code of Corporate Governance, and these also exist in subsidiary legislation applicable to the FI. As for all other non-exempt companies, director and employee remuneration will ordinarily have to be disclosed through publicly available financial statements, under applicable accounting standards.

Apart from the above, there are no strict limits on compensation or requirements to impose deferral, malus or clawback provisions. Employers may include such provisions in their contracts, but should be aware that the enforcement of such provisions may be subject to challenge.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

The remuneration of financial services employees working at certain firms (such as banks, building societies, asset managers and investment firms) is heavily regulated. The relevant rules can be found in various FCA “Remuneration Codes” (each Code tailored to different firms) and also (for dual-regulated firms) in specific remuneration parts of the PRA Rulebook and directly applicable retained EU law.

The remuneration rules are complex and their application is dependent on each firm. The key principle of the rules, however, is that firms subject to them must ensure that their remuneration policies and practices are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.

Some elements of the rules apply to all staff, whereas others apply only to material risk-takers within a particular firm.

By way of a snapshot, the rules generally cover such matters as:

• the appropriate ratio between fixed pay and variable pay, to ensure that fixed pay is a sufficiently high proportion of total remuneration to allow for the possibility of paying no variable pay;
• the amount of any discretionary bonus pool, which should be based on profit, adjusted for current and future risks, and take into account the cost and quantity of the capital and liquidity required;
• performance-related bonuses, which should be assessed based on a variety of factors, including the performance of the individual, the relevant business unit and the overall results of the firm;
• restrictions on guaranteed variable pay and payments on termination of employment; and
• malus and clawback requirements.

Depending on the employee concerned, the MAS may have to be notified of an employee ceasing to hold an office or to act as a representative (see questions 2, 4 and 11). Termination-related benefits and remuneration may also require disclosure (see question 7).

Apart from this, there are no industry-specific rules or protocols applicable to terminations. Singapore’s Employment Act and the Tripartite Guidelines on Wrongful Dismissal, of general application to all employers, also prescribe rules concerning notice periods, the timing of final payments, and circumstances in which a termination may be wrongful, among other things.

There are no specific rules or protocols that apply when terminating the employment of an employee in the financial services sector. However, because changes in the strategic and executive management of, in particular, regulated companies such as banks, insurance companies, securities firms, fund management companies, managers of collective assets or asset managers are subject to a prior authorization by FINMA, the timing of termination and re-hiring of particular persons should be considered.

The general rules on the termination of an employment relationship apply under Swiss law: any employment contract concluded for an indefinite period may be unilaterally terminated by both employer and employee, subject to the contractual or (if no contractual notice period was agreed) statutory notice periods for any reason (ordinary termination).

The termination notice needs to be physically received before the notice period can start, meaning the notice needs to be received by the employee before the end of a month so that the notice period can start on the first day of the next month. If notice is not received before the end of the month, the notice period would start the month following the receipt of the notice. A termination notice might be either delivered by mail or personally.

Swiss law does not provide for payment in lieu of a notice period. The only option in this regard is to either send the employee on garden leave or to agree within the termination agreement to terminate the employment relationship per an earlier termination date than the one provided for in the termination notice.

As a general rule, an employment contract may be terminated by either party for any reason. However, Swiss statutory law provides for protection from termination by notice for both employers and employees, distinguishing between abusive and untimely notices of termination.

Based on social policy concerns, the employer must observe certain waiting periods, during which a notice cannot validly be served (so-called untimely notice). Such waiting periods apply (art. 336c CO), for example, during compulsory military or civil defence service, full- or part-time absence from work due to illness or an accident, or during an employee’s pregnancy and 16 weeks following the birth of the child. Any notice given by the employer during these waiting periods is void. Any notice given before the respective period is effective, but once the special situation has occurred and for the period it lasts, the running of the applicable notice period is suspended and only continues after the end of the period in question.

In addition, Swiss civil law defines certain grounds based on which terminations are considered abusive (article 336 CO). Termination by the employer might be considered abusive (eg, if it is based on a personal characteristic of the other party (eg, gender, race, age), or if the other party exercises a right guaranteed by the Swiss Federal Constitution (eg, religion or membership in a political party) unless the exercise of this right violates an obligation of the contract of employment or is seriously prejudicial to the work climate). If the employer abusively terminates the employment contract, the employer has to pay damages to the employee and a penalty of up to six months' remuneration (article 336a CO). Nevertheless, an abusive termination remains valid.

Regarding settlement agreements, Swiss employment law allows the conclusion of such agreements, but there are strict limits on the parties’ freedom of contract. Termination agreements may not be concluded that circumvent statutory provisions on employee protection. According to Swiss case law, termination agreements are usually valid and enforceable if both parties make real concessions, and if the agreement is also favourable for the employee. To conclude a termination agreement initiated by the employer, the employee must also be granted a sufficient reflection period. No further formalities need to be observed when concluding termination agreements, although it is generally advisable to have them in writing.

Settlement agreements

The whistleblowing measures outlined above are complemented by mandatory requirements for SM&CR firms concerning settlement agreements, namely that any such agreement must include a term stating that it doesn’t prevent the individual from making a protected disclosure, and must not require the individual to warrant that they have not made a protected disclosure or that they do not know of any information which could lead to them doing so (a “protected disclosure” is a type of disclosure recognised in English employment law that gives the person making it legal protection from retaliatory detrimental treatment).

SM&CR firms entering into settlement agreements must also ensure that they are not drafted in a way that is incompatible with other relevant regulatory requirements. For example, there is a specific prohibition in the FCA Handbook on firms entering into any arrangements or agreements with any person that limit their ability to disclose information required by the regulatory reference rules (see question 2). As such, terms relating to confidentiality and the provision of employment references should allow the firm sufficient flexibility to comply with regulatory reference requirements, which could include a requirement to update such a reference. In addition, any obligations of confidentiality should include a carve-out to permit relevant regulatory disclosures and reports.

Handover procedures

The SM&CR includes requirements designed to ensure that adequate handovers take place between outgoing and incoming senior managers. Firms must take all reasonable steps to ensure that senior managers (and anyone who has management or supervisory responsibilities for them) have all the information and material that they could reasonably expect to have to perform their responsibilities effectively and under the requirements of the regulatory system. This applies when someone becomes a senior manager and when an existing senior manager takes on a new job or new responsibilities (or when their responsibilities or job are being changed).

Firms must have a handover policy in place to ensure compliance with these requirements. They must also make and maintain adequate records of steps taken to comply with them.

The information and material handed over should be practical and helpful, with an assessment of what issues should be prioritised, and judgement and opinion as well as facts, figures and records. It should also include details about unresolved or possible regulatory breaches and any unresolved concerns expressed by the FCA, the PRA or any other regulatory body.

The format and arrangements of a handover should allow for an orderly transition, which should include the outgoing senior manager contributing to the handover everything that it would be reasonable to expect them to know and consider relevant, including their opinions. This could be achieved by requiring outgoing senior managers to prepare a handover certificate, but the FCA recognises that this will not always be practical.

To ensure that these requirements are satisfied, it is good practice to include in senior managers’ employment contracts (and settlement agreements) specific obligations relating to handovers.

Reallocating senior managers’ responsibilities

In addition to ensuring that adequate handovers take place between outgoing and incoming senior managers, firms should also ensure on the departure of a senior manager that their responsibilities are reallocated and that this is recorded in a way that is compliant with relevant regulatory requirements. This may include temporary reallocation to one or more existing senior managers where the replacement does not take over immediately on the departure of the departing senior manager, as well as updating the firm’s management responsibilities map and statements of responsibilities.

Reporting requirements

When an individual ceases to perform an SMF, the firm must generally notify the relevant regulatory within seven business days.

SM&CR firms must notify the relevant regulators if certain types of disciplinary action are taken, which can include dismissal – see question 10.