Employment in Financial Services

All employees, including general managers and officers, must keep information and documents confidential and may only provide information to the competent authorities or authorised parties, with the prior express authorisation of the user or client.

Also, employees must:

• not stop internal committees from carrying out their functions;
• disclose to the financial entity all information regarding the use of illegal resources, or any act against goods, services, an individual’s life, or physical or emotional integrity, the use of toxic substances, or terrorist acts, so that the financial entity may provide the SHCP with a report on the subject; and
• in insurance or bonding Institutes, not offer discounts, reduce premiums or grant different benefits than those outlined in the corresponding policy.

General managers and officers must provide reports and information to the board of directors and the corresponding authorities periodically. The general manager must also provide precise data and reports to assist the board of directors in making prudent decisions.

General managers must develop and present to the board of directors, for its approval,  adequate policies for employment and the use of material and human resources, including restrictions on the use of goods, supervision and control mechanisms, and the application of resources to the company’s activities consistent with their business purposes.  

Insurance and bond companies will respond to the conduct of the general manager and officers, without prejudice to the civil and criminal liabilities that they may personally incur.

Also, if any conflict of interest exists or arises, general managers and officers must inform their employers immediately and suspend any activity within the scope of the contract that gives rise to the conflict until the matter is addressed.

Additionally, general managers and officers must verify the compliance of all individuals under their responsibility with all applicable legal provisions for financial services. These include: confidential obligations; the development of reports; informing their direct superior, officers, general manager or board of directors if there is a conflict of interest; informing the SCHP and Prosecutor’s Office if there is an act, operation or service using illegal resources, or an act that may harm the company, or the health or wellbeing of an individual or the general public.

Specifically, general managers in brokerage houses must:

• design and carry out a communications policy regarding identifying contingencies;
• implement and distribute the continuity business plan within the brokerage house and establish training programmes;
• inform the CNBV of contingencies in any of the systems and channels for clients, authorities and central securities counterparties;
• ensure that the continuity business plan is submitted for efficiency testing; and
• inform the CNBV in writing of the hiring or removal of the responsible party for internal audit functions.

Specifically, employees holding executive, overall management, oversight or control functions in regulated companies are responsible for ensuring that the companies’ organization ensures the continued compliance with applicable financial market laws. Swiss financial market laws do not have enhanced responsibilities for different employee categories. Instead, a person’s fitness and propriety are assessed within the context of the specific requirements and functions of a given company, the scope of activities at that company, and the complexity of that company.

Brokerage houses must implement a compensation system under the general provisions set forth by the CNBV. This system must include all compensation provided and must contain the responsibilities of the boards that implement the compensation schemes, ordinary and extraordinary compensation policies, and periodic reviews of payment policies. The board of directors must incorporate a special committee for compensation.

Under article 9 of the general provisions applicable to brokerage houses, account management fees may be paid to stock proxies provided that they comply entirely with the applicable laws in the exercise of their duties. Stock operators must not execute operations with the public or receive any remuneration or account management fees, except if, with the proxy’s authorisation, they execute orders of institutional investors in the brokerage house’s reception and allocation system.

Brokerage houses must not pay fees, commissions, and other remuneration of third parties that act as promoters, sellers, associates, independent commissioners, investment advisors or any similar roles. This also applies to proxies of the investor client without being proxies of the brokerage house, or those who have a conflict of interest to receive fees, commissions, or any other remuneration from the investor client.

If there is a critical event, such as a control measure, the CNBV may order the brokerage house to suspend the payment of extraordinary compensation and bonuses to the general manager and senior officers. This includes preventing the granting of new compensation until the matter is properly resolved. This should be included in employment contracts, to avoid labour-related disputes should the extraordinary measure of the CNBV is enacted.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.