Employment in Financial Services

There are no prescribed rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees and any remuneration, bonuses or clawback will be a matter of contract between the financial services employee and the financial institution. Inevitably, this will reflect what is typical in the market for experienced, qualified, financial services personnel performing the role for which they are applying or are currently carrying out.

Brokerage houses must implement a compensation system under the general provisions set forth by the CNBV. This system must include all compensation provided and must contain the responsibilities of the boards that implement the compensation schemes, ordinary and extraordinary compensation policies, and periodic reviews of payment policies. The board of directors must incorporate a special committee for compensation.

Under article 9 of the general provisions applicable to brokerage houses, account management fees may be paid to stock proxies provided that they comply entirely with the applicable laws in the exercise of their duties. Stock operators must not execute operations with the public or receive any remuneration or account management fees, except if, with the proxy’s authorisation, they execute orders of institutional investors in the brokerage house’s reception and allocation system.

Brokerage houses must not pay fees, commissions, and other remuneration of third parties that act as promoters, sellers, associates, independent commissioners, investment advisors or any similar roles. This also applies to proxies of the investor client without being proxies of the brokerage house, or those who have a conflict of interest to receive fees, commissions, or any other remuneration from the investor client.

If there is a critical event, such as a control measure, the CNBV may order the brokerage house to suspend the payment of extraordinary compensation and bonuses to the general manager and senior officers. This includes preventing the granting of new compensation until the matter is properly resolved. This should be included in employment contracts, to avoid labour-related disputes should the extraordinary measure of the CNBV is enacted.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

Yes, please see question 9.

Financial institutions in the Isle of Man are required to comply with various statutory requirements. Breaches of those statutory requirements impose an obligation on the relevant entity to self-report to the IoM FSA. While ordinarily, businesses will endeavour not to supply information about individuals within the business to the regulator as part of this reporting, from time to time this may be necessary to comply with their regulatory obligations. Where this is the case, usually the regulator will be asked to use their powers of compulsion to seek the information rather than such information being given voluntarily. This is particularly the case where the regulator may have formed concerns about an individual’s fitness and propriety and wishes to investigate this further.

Regulators from other jurisdictions may use certain reciprocal agreements and reciprocal enforcement legislation to seek information from the IoM FSA or more directly from a financial services business. Where such requests are made, this may include information about individual employees (ordinarily those exercising Controlled Functions). However, any mechanism for reciprocal enforcement or exchange of information is subject to scrutiny and such information would normally only be offered by an employer under compulsion.

Pursuant to the Federal Law for the Prevention and Identity of Transactions with Illegally Obtained Resources, all acts carried out by financial entities are considered a vulnerable activity; therefore, financial entities must:

• set forth measures and procedures to prevent and detect acts and operations;
• file reports to the SHCP regarding acts, operations and services carried out by clients and employees if they suspect illegal resources are involved; and
• keep for at least 10 years any information and documents related to the identification of clients and users.

Given the above, if any action, operation or service is identified as undertaken with illegal resources or there is a breach of any of the provisions outlined in the above law, employers must inform the SHCP and prosecutor.

Also, if officers and general managers no longer comply with the legal requirements to occupy their positions (eg, not having a satisfactory credit record, or no longer being in good standing), financial entities may inform the CNBV or CNSF, as applicable, so the authorities may disqualify or remove those individuals from their positions.

Furthermore, if there is a breach of the code of conduct, the regulatory comptroller must inform the board of directors and keep such information available to the CNBV at all times. The board of directors will be in charge of establishing disciplinary measures.

Finally, if employees breach psychological risk prevention obligations (see question 11), employers must inform the labour authorities to impose corresponding sanctions.

As a general principle, supervised companies are required to ensure that persons holding, in particular, executive, overall management, oversight or control functions fulfil the requirements of the “fit and proper” test. Consequently, such persons must be of good repute and can guarantee compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

If a person cannot guarantee that the regulatory requirements are fulfilled at all times (eg, because of a material breach of its duties) the employing entity and its audit companies may be required to immediately report to FINMA, respectively, any incident that is of significance.