Employment in Financial Services

In principle, working in the financial services sector does not require registration. However, some companies, such as banks, must be licensed.

The following natural persons who are not employees of a legal person must be registered in the Single Register of Insurance, Banking and Finance Intermediaries (article L.546-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code, amended by article 18 of order no. 2021-1735 of December 22, 2021 modernizing the framework for participative financing):

• intermediaries in banking and payment services as defined in article L. 519-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
• financial investment advisors as defined in article L. 541-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code;
• tied agents as defined in article L. 545-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code and intermediaries in participatory financing.

To be registered, these intermediaries must meet four professional conditions: professional liability insurance, good repute, professional capacity and financial guarantees, which are verified by the unique register of insurance, banking and financial intermediaries when they are registered.

In addition, the providers of participative financing services mentioned in article L. 547-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code must be approved by the Financial Markets Authority (FMA).

Under the FLL, all employees must be registered with the Social Security Mexican Institute (IMSS) to receive social security benefits.

Except for stock operators or employees that are granted proxies in brokerage houses, in financial entities employees are not required to be registered other than with the IMSS.

To obtain the authorisation of the CNBV to act as a stock operator or representative within a brokerage house, an individual must:

• pass the technical quality certification exams, and comply with the specific requirements outlined in the internal regulations of the stock market in which the individual intends to participate;
• prove before the regulatory body that he or she has a satisfactory credit record and is in good standing; and
• file before the regulatory body a writ of a brokerage house, credit institution, or the operating company of investment companies and retirement funds managers, establishing their wish to hire the individual as soon as he or she obtains an authorisation.

Within five days, the self-regulated body must file an application with the CNBV. They will then have 20 calendar days to issue the corresponding authorisation.

Stock operators and representatives, once authorised and provided with powers of attorney, must be registered before the Mexican Association of Stock Brokers (AMIB).

Brokerage houses must display, in a public place, a list of authorised proxies and stock operators, as well as on the website of the CNBV so this information may be verified.

Finally, financial entities must inform the CNBV, CNSF or CONSAR, as applicable, of the appointment and removal of general managers and officers within five calendar days for financial entities, or ten calendar days for controlling entities, brokerage houses, surety deposit institutions and compensation chambers. Also, a list of general managers and officers must be provided within the filing to operate as a financial entity.   

There is no universal register of all financial services employees. Rather, different Swiss financial market laws provide for a registration requirement that may apply to individual financial service employees. Whether a particular financial market law, and, consequently, a registration requirement, applies to a financial services employee depends specifically on the regulatory status of the employing entity and the particular activity of that employee.

• Also, client advisers of Swiss or foreign financial service providers (eg, investment advisers) may be required to register with the adviser register, unless an exemption applies. Client advisers are the natural persons who perform financial services on behalf of a financial service provider or in their own capacity as financial service providers. Client advisers are entered in the register of advisers if they prove that i) they have sufficient knowledge of the code of conduct set out in the financial services regulations and the necessary expertise required to perform their activities, ii) their employee has taken out professional indemnity insurance or that equivalent collateral exists, and iii) their employee is affiliated with a recognized Swiss ombudsman in their capacity as a financial service provider (if such affiliation duty exists).

Furthermore, “non-tied” insurance intermediaries (ie, persons who offer or conclude insurance contracts on behalf of insurance companies) are required to register with FINMA’s register of insurance companies. To register, persons must inter alia prove that they have sufficient qualifications and hold professional indemnity insurance or provide an equivalent financial surety. “Tied” intermediaries will no longer be able to register voluntarily in the FINMA register (unless this is required by the respective country of operation for activities abroad).

Under French law, several mechanisms regulate the compensation of employees in the financial services sector to limit risk-taking.

Concerning guaranteed variable remuneration (welcome bonus, recruitment bonus, etc) for new staff, establishments are not allowed to guarantee this beyond the first year of employment; it is said to be "exceptional" and can only be granted if the financial base is sufficiently sound and solid.

In addition, European Directive 2013/36 EU, UCITS V, of 26 June 2013 introduced a "clawback" mechanism that the legislature has transposed into French law. Thus, article L.511-84 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that "the total amount of variable remuneration may, in whole or in part, be reduced or give rise to restitution when the person concerned has failed to comply with the rules laid down by the institution with regard to risk-taking, in particular because of his responsibility for actions that have led to significant losses for the institution or in the event of failure to comply with the obligations of good repute and competence".

In addition and following the above-mentioned Directive 2013/36/EU (article 94) concerning the deferral of remuneration, the payment of variable remuneration should be made in part immediately and in part on a deferred basis.

Institutions are encouraged to implement a deferral schedule, that properly aligns staff compensation with the institution's business, economic cycle, and risk profile, so that a sufficient portion of variable compensation can be adjusted to results through ex-post risk adjustments.

This schedule consists of the portion of variable compensation deferred, the length of the deferral period and the speed ofvesting of the deferred compensation.

In the event of poor or negative performance by the institutions, leading to a reduction in the total amount of variable compensation, the payment of variable compensation may be subject to specific arrangements implemented by the institutions, as referred to in Directive 2013/36/EU.

In addition, article L.511-84-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code specifies that the variable portion that may be reduced or even recovered as a penalty is excluded from the calculation of several indemnities in the event of dismissal, including the legal indemnity for dismissal.

Finally, following Law No. 2013-672 of 26 July 2013 on the separation and regulation of banking activities, the variable remuneration of managers and traders is capped, and cannot exceed the fixed part. In addition, a "say on pay" mechanism has been implemented (ie, the general meeting of shareholders must be consulted on the remuneration paid to executives and traders).

Brokerage houses must implement a compensation system under the general provisions set forth by the CNBV. This system must include all compensation provided and must contain the responsibilities of the boards that implement the compensation schemes, ordinary and extraordinary compensation policies, and periodic reviews of payment policies. The board of directors must incorporate a special committee for compensation.

Under article 9 of the general provisions applicable to brokerage houses, account management fees may be paid to stock proxies provided that they comply entirely with the applicable laws in the exercise of their duties. Stock operators must not execute operations with the public or receive any remuneration or account management fees, except if, with the proxy’s authorisation, they execute orders of institutional investors in the brokerage house’s reception and allocation system.

Brokerage houses must not pay fees, commissions, and other remuneration of third parties that act as promoters, sellers, associates, independent commissioners, investment advisors or any similar roles. This also applies to proxies of the investor client without being proxies of the brokerage house, or those who have a conflict of interest to receive fees, commissions, or any other remuneration from the investor client.

If there is a critical event, such as a control measure, the CNBV may order the brokerage house to suspend the payment of extraordinary compensation and bonuses to the general manager and senior officers. This includes preventing the granting of new compensation until the matter is properly resolved. This should be included in employment contracts, to avoid labour-related disputes should the extraordinary measure of the CNBV is enacted.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.