Employment in Financial Services

Brokerage houses must implement a compensation system under the general provisions set forth by the CNBV. This system must include all compensation provided and must contain the responsibilities of the boards that implement the compensation schemes, ordinary and extraordinary compensation policies, and periodic reviews of payment policies. The board of directors must incorporate a special committee for compensation.

Under article 9 of the general provisions applicable to brokerage houses, account management fees may be paid to stock proxies provided that they comply entirely with the applicable laws in the exercise of their duties. Stock operators must not execute operations with the public or receive any remuneration or account management fees, except if, with the proxy’s authorisation, they execute orders of institutional investors in the brokerage house’s reception and allocation system.

Brokerage houses must not pay fees, commissions, and other remuneration of third parties that act as promoters, sellers, associates, independent commissioners, investment advisors or any similar roles. This also applies to proxies of the investor client without being proxies of the brokerage house, or those who have a conflict of interest to receive fees, commissions, or any other remuneration from the investor client.

If there is a critical event, such as a control measure, the CNBV may order the brokerage house to suspend the payment of extraordinary compensation and bonuses to the general manager and senior officers. This includes preventing the granting of new compensation until the matter is properly resolved. This should be included in employment contracts, to avoid labour-related disputes should the extraordinary measure of the CNBV is enacted.

Disclosure requirements may apply depending on the employee’s role. For example, with some exemptions, financial advisors are required to disclose to the client the remuneration that they receive or will receive for making any recommendations in respect of a particular investment product, or executing a purchase or sale contract relating to a designated investment product on their clients’ behalf.

MAS’ Guidelines on Corporate Governance (applicable to designated financial holding companies, banks, and some insurers) also requires the FI’s board of directors to have a formal and transparent procedure for developing policies on and fixing the remuneration of directors, executives, and key management personnel. A separate remuneration committee made up of non-executive directors must be established to make the relevant recommendations. MAS expects compliance with these guidelines in a manner commensurate with the size, nature of activities and risk profile of the FI. Diverging from the guidelines is acceptable to the extent that FIs explicitly state and explain how their practices are consistent with the policy intent of the relevant principle.

Companies listed on the Singapore stock exchange have similar requirements under MAS’ Code of Corporate Governance, and these also exist in subsidiary legislation applicable to the FI. As for all other non-exempt companies, director and employee remuneration will ordinarily have to be disclosed through publicly available financial statements, under applicable accounting standards.

Apart from the above, there are no strict limits on compensation or requirements to impose deferral, malus or clawback provisions. Employers may include such provisions in their contracts, but should be aware that the enforcement of such provisions may be subject to challenge.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

Non-disclosure provisions under Mexican law are applicable and enforceable. All information to which employees have access, given their position and services, regarding third parties and deemed sensitive or confidential (ie, non-public information) may not be disclosed at any time after the termination of employment or used for any other purposes.

The breach of non-disclosure obligations of confidential information and trade secrets may lead to economic sanctions or imprisonment. The disclosure of confidential information or using it to an employer’s detriment is an offence under criminal law. Also, employees that breach confidential obligations may have to pay damages to the affected party.

Pursuant to article 186 of the general provisions applicable to brokerage houses, internal policies must be in place to establish guidelines and procedures for the use, management, conservation and, as applicable, destruction of books, records, documents, and other information; and must guarantee the adequate use and control of documents containing the confidential information of clients. Also, these entities must establish strict controls to avoid the improper use of books, records, and documents in general.

According to the Law to Regulate Technological Finance Institutions, entities must include measures and policies to control operational risks within their filing for authorisation at the CNBV. They must also provide information security and confidentiality policies, with evidence of secure, trustable and precise technological support for their clients and with minimum standards of security to ensure the confidentiality, availability and integrity of information, as well as to prevent fraud and cyberattacks.

Additionally, financial entities must guarantee the security and integrity of the information, and implement security measures to preserve the integrity and confidentiality of the information generated, stored, or processed.

Lastly, under the Federal Law for the Prevention and Identity of Transactions with Illegally Obtained Resources, filing notices, information and documentation related to vulnerable activities to the SHCP does not qualify as a breach of confidentiality obligations.

NDAs are generally lawful in Singapore, although the extent of their enforceability depends on their contents. For example, restrictive covenants can be subject to further scrutiny (see question 13). While not subject to any particular form or rules, employers should take particular care to specify the type of information protected under the NDA, so that employees have a clear understanding of the protected information – and to enhance the enforceability of the NDA.

Under Singapore common law, in addition to breach of contract, a party may also bring an action for breach of confidence. A plaintiff will have to show on the facts that the information is confidential and was imparted in circumstances giving rise to an obligation of confidence (including if confidential information has been accessed or acquired without a plaintiff’s knowledge or consent), which will then invoke the presumption of a breach of confidence. The burden will then fall on the defendant to rebut this presumption.

Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) are generally lawful in Switzerland. However, NDAs are not regulated by statutory law and therefore do not have to follow any particular statutory form or rule. Nevertheless, most NDAs often contain a similar basic structure.

The core clauses of an NDA concern:

• manufacturing and business secrets or the scope of further confidentiality;
• the purpose of use;
• the return and destruction of devices containing confidential information; and
• post-contractual confidentiality obligations.

As a general rule, it is recommended to use the written form.

To ensure possible enforcement of an NDA in the employment context, the requirements of a post-contractual non-compete obligation (see below) must be met.