Employment in Financial Services

For employees with general positions, there are no pre-screening measures. Under article 1 of the Constitution and article 21 of the FLL, discrimination is prohibited. Furthermore, article 21 of the FLL establishes that distinctions will not be deemed discriminatory if certain qualifications are required for certain work. Specifically, if there is no legal ground or work-related justification to request criminal records for a determined position, conditioning the position on that information may be deemed discriminatory.

For example, financial entities must include a list of the expected members of the board of directors, general manager, and main officers, including their respective professional and academic backgrounds, in the filing to obtain authorisation of the CNBV (except insurance and bond institutions) to start operations. These positions require certain special requirements, and thus financial entities must verify – by prior appointment and thereafter, at least every year – that general managers and officers:

• have a standing reputation;
• have expertise in legal, financial and management matters;
• have a satisfactory credit record and credit eligibility;
• are residents in Mexico (for credit entities); and
• have no other legal impediment (see below).

All financial entities must guarantee that high-level employees are capable, experienced and not subject to any procedure involving conduct contrary to financial stability or compliance with business or financial business standards. General managers and officers in controlling entities and auxiliary credit organisations, and in exchange bureaus and brokerage houses, and general managers in insurance and bonding institutions must have at least five years’ experience at a high decision-making level that required financial and management expertise.

Also, these individuals must not have any of the following legal impediments:

• a pending dispute with the financial entity or any other financial entities in the group;
• a conviction for a wilful economic crime;
• a disqualification from owning a business, public service positions or the Mexican financial system;
• declared bankruptcy or insolvency;
• carried out regulation, inspection, and monitoring of the financial entity or any other financial entities in the group; or
• participated in the board of directors of the financial entities.

Additionally, for exchange bureaus and brokerage houses, such individuals must not have been an external auditor of the exchange bureau or related entity in the 12 months before their appointment.

Specifically, in credit organisations, general managers and officers must not:

• be a partner or have a position within entities or associations that render services to the entity or its related entities;
• be a client, provider, debtor, creditor, partner, member of the board of directors or employee of an entity that is a client or provider (whose services or sales represent more than 10% of the client’s services or sales), or a debtor or creditor (of which the debt is higher than 15% of the assets);
• be an employee of a foundation, association or civil society that receive important contributions from the entity (which represent more than 15% of the total contributions received by such entities in a fiscal year).
• be a general manager, officer, or employee of another entity that is part of the financial group;
• be a spouse or domestic partner of any individual mentioned above, or be in a cohabiting relationship with them; or
• carry out regulation duties of credit organisations and exchange bureaus.

Financial entities must inform the CNBV, CNSF, or CONSAR, as applicable, of general managers’ and officers’ appointments, resignations or removals, within five business days of such events. Meanwhile, controlling entities, brokerage houses, surety deposit institutions and compensation chambers must inform the CNBV, CNSF, or CONSAR within 10 days of the same.

There are also limits to employees participating in the board of directors of these companies. Only the general manager and officers two levels below may be members, and no other employees may occupy these positions.

According to the Insurance and Bonds Regulations, officers and employees of credit institutions, insurance institutions, bond institutions, brokerage houses, stock market specialists, auxiliary credit organisations, investment companies, operating companies of investment companies, exchange houses, financial commissioners, retirement fund managers, specialised investment companies of retirement funds, and controlling companies with 10% or more of representative shares of such companies will not be authorised to act as insurance or bond agents.

Pre-screening measures are only required if the FI employee is going to be involved in the provision of financial services (or other MAS-regulated activities).

Such employees need to pass a fit-and-proper assessment, referring to the MAS Guidelines on Fit and Proper Criteria. Criteria to be considered include the employee’s honesty, integrity and reputation; competence and capability; and financial soundness.

In considering the employee’s honesty, integrity and reputation, relevant factors include whether the employee has been the subject of proceedings or investigations (whether criminal or disciplinary) or has been dismissed or asked to resign. MAS’ Circular CMI 01/2011 also sets out MAS’ expectations on due diligence checks, declarations and documentation concerning employees who are expected to be representatives of specific FIs. Among other things, this entails conducting reference checks with the previous employers of the FI’s proposed employees.

In December 2023, MAS issued its response to a May 2021 consultation paper which sought to address issues arising from the recycling of “bad apples” through FIs. In doing so, the MAS noted it will proceed with its proposal to impose mandatory requirements to conduct and respond to reference checks. The anticipated reference check regime will apply to specific groups of employees, with the information to be addressed in reference checks standarised. The MAS will look to consult on the relevant draft notices in this respect in due course, and this will bear watching.

For more senior roles (eg, senior managers, material risk personnel, directors, committee members, chairpersons and key executives), FIs are expected to ensure that they are fit and proper for their roles. MAS’ prior approval may also have to be obtained or notices may have to be made, depending on the licence, registration and role sought. FIs in these sectors are expected to conduct more rigorous checks before seeking MAS’ approval or submitting a notice, with a greater emphasis on considering circumstances that may give rise to a conflict of interest.

Under Swiss civil law, there is no requirement to apply pre-screening measures. However, while not a statutory requirement under Swiss financial market laws per se, companies subject to these laws apply pre-screening measures to ensure that a prospective financial services employee meets the requirements set forth by these laws. In particular, regulated companies such as banks, securities firms, insurance companies, fund management companies, managers of collective investment schemes and asset managers are required to obtain authorisation from the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) relating to strategic and executive management and each change thereto.

As a general rule, the higher the responsibility or position of a person, the more requirements financial services employees may need to fulfil. Persons holding executive or overall management functions (eg, a member of the board or members of the senior management) are required to fulfil certain requirements set forth by the applicable Swiss financial market regulations. Such requirements may include providing current CVs showing relevant work experience and education as well as excerpts from the debt and criminal register. It may also include providing various declarations (eg, concerning pending and concluded proceedings, qualified participations and other mandates). Furthermore, financial services employees holding certain control functions (eg, compliance officer, risk officer and their deputies) may also be required to prove that they are suitable for the position by providing, for example, a current CV showing relevant work experience and education.

There are no particular rules or legal provisions concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants. Nevertheless, it is common practice to execute termination agreements with officers and general managers whereby non-disclosure, non-compete and non-solicitation provisions are set forth by the parties. The use of non-compete and non-solicitation provisions in termination agreements is only recommended for very specific employees and must be negotiated when the employment is terminated.

Plain non-compete and non-solicitation provisions binding employees after termination are not enforceable under Mexican law, because the Mexican Constitution grants individuals the right to perform any job, industry, commerce or work as long it is legal and not prohibited by a judicial or governmental decision.

Post-employment non-compete obligations, which are treated as an exception, must be agreed upon in connection to specific activities that may be deemed unfair competition, and may be enforced with economic compensation.

The period of enforceability must be proportional to:

• the number of years of employment;
• the level of information and importance of the position;
• the economic compensation; and
• the scope of the non-compete obligations.

Unfair competition and solicitation – either for business, or to induce other individuals to leave the company, while the employment contract between an individual and employer is in effect – may be considered misconduct. This misconduct is a cause of termination without notice for the company, and therefore it is feasible to enforce it.

The terms and conditions must be specifically addressed in writing, within the employment termination agreement, making express reference to the importance of the information, potential competition, activities that may be deemed unfair competition, intellectual property, and commercial advantages. The compensation paid is usually similar to or above the income of the employee while he or she was active with the company. Clawback and damages payments for breach of contract are standard practices.

Singapore law in relation to post-termination restrictive covenants is of general application and not specific to the financial services sector. Such restraints are prima facie void, but may be valid and enforceable if they are reasonable (both in the interests of the parties and the public), and if they go no further than what is necessary to protect a party’s legitimate proprietary interest.

The Singapore Courts have recognised that an employer has legitimate proprietary interests in its trade connections (commonly protected by restraints against the solicitation of clients or customers); the maintenance of a stable, trained workforce (commonly protected by restraints against the poaching of employees); and its confidential information and trade secrets (commonly protected by confidentiality restraints). This is not a closed list.

Non-competition clauses are however relatively more difficult to enforce as compared to other restrictive covenants, and they may not be enforceable at all under Singapore law as it presently stands if an employer’s legitimate proprietary interests are already covered by other restraints. Even then, it may still be possible for the employer to obtain an ex parte interim injunction for non-competition though.

Guidelines on restrictive covenants are also expected to be released in the second half of 2024, which will look to shape norms and provide employers and employees with guidance regarding the inclusion and enforcement of restrictive covenants in employment contracts. 

There are no particular rules that apply concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector in Switzerland. Rather, general post-contractual non-compete regulations come into play: the parties of an employment contract may agree on a non-compete clause, which must be included in the employment contract in writing to be valid. For the non-compete clause to be relevant, it must be sufficiently limited in terms of time, place and subject matter. Normally, the duration of a post-termination non-compete clause is no more than one year; however, the statutorily permissible duration is three years.

As a prerequisite for a contractual non-compete clause to be binding, access to sensitive data is required. The employee must either have access to customer data or manufacturing or business secrets. However, access alone is not enough. There must also be the possibility of harming the employer using this knowledge.

If a relationship between the customer and the employee or employer is personal (which is, for example, the case for lawyers or doctors), a post-termination non-compete clause is not applicable according to the Federal Supreme Court.

If there is an excessive non-compete clause, this can be restricted by a judge. In practice, most of the time, no restriction of the post-termination non-compete clause is imposed if the employer offers consideration in return for the agreement. The prohibition of competition may become invalid for two reasons. Firstly, the clause can become irrelevant if the employer has no more interest in maintaining the non-compete clause. Secondly, the clause is not effective if the employer has terminated the employment relationship. However, this does not apply if the employee has given the employer a reason to terminate the employment relationship.

Swiss employment law does not provide for any compensation for a post-termination non-compete clause.