Employment in Financial Services

There are prescriptive, sector-specific requirements, which apply to the remuneration of specified categories of employees or directors, and which apply in the asset management, investment services, banking, and insurance sectors.

Employers in these sectors are tasked with ensuring that the remuneration paid to material risk takers (individuals whose professional activities have a material impact on an RFSP's risk profile) or identified staff align with the RFSP risk profile.

There are detailed rules with technical guidance (emanating from EU law) specific to each sector, but at a high level they (to differing degrees) set out rules on; variable remuneration composition, ratios or other metrics to compare variable to fixed remuneration to ensure it is appropriate; malus requirements, which would allow the RFSP to cancel or reduce the employee's variable remuneration before it is paid out; and clawback provisions which allow RFSPs to recover variable remuneration after it has been awarded. It is important to ensure that employees' contracts of employment acknowledge that any variable remuneration will be subject to all regulatory restrictions and rules and may be clawed back in certain circumstances.

The CBI's 2014 Guidelines on Variable Remuneration Arrangements for Sales Staff also emphasise the importance of remuneration structures to have sufficient deterrents built into them (such as malus and clawback mechanisms) to avoid incentivising undesirable/risky behaviours from sales staff in the banking, insurance and investment services sectors.

Brokerage houses must implement a compensation system under the general provisions set forth by the CNBV. This system must include all compensation provided and must contain the responsibilities of the boards that implement the compensation schemes, ordinary and extraordinary compensation policies, and periodic reviews of payment policies. The board of directors must incorporate a special committee for compensation.

Under article 9 of the general provisions applicable to brokerage houses, account management fees may be paid to stock proxies provided that they comply entirely with the applicable laws in the exercise of their duties. Stock operators must not execute operations with the public or receive any remuneration or account management fees, except if, with the proxy’s authorisation, they execute orders of institutional investors in the brokerage house’s reception and allocation system.

Brokerage houses must not pay fees, commissions, and other remuneration of third parties that act as promoters, sellers, associates, independent commissioners, investment advisors or any similar roles. This also applies to proxies of the investor client without being proxies of the brokerage house, or those who have a conflict of interest to receive fees, commissions, or any other remuneration from the investor client.

If there is a critical event, such as a control measure, the CNBV may order the brokerage house to suspend the payment of extraordinary compensation and bonuses to the general manager and senior officers. This includes preventing the granting of new compensation until the matter is properly resolved. This should be included in employment contracts, to avoid labour-related disputes should the extraordinary measure of the CNBV is enacted.

Disclosure requirements may apply depending on the employee’s role. For example, with some exemptions, financial advisors are required to disclose to the client the remuneration that they receive or will receive for making any recommendations in respect of a particular investment product, or executing a purchase or sale contract relating to a designated investment product on their clients’ behalf.

MAS’ Guidelines on Corporate Governance (applicable to designated financial holding companies, banks, and some insurers) also requires the FI’s board of directors to have a formal and transparent procedure for developing policies on and fixing the remuneration of directors, executives, and key management personnel. A separate remuneration committee made up of non-executive directors must be established to make the relevant recommendations. MAS expects compliance with these guidelines in a manner commensurate with the size, nature of activities and risk profile of the FI. Diverging from the guidelines is acceptable to the extent that FIs explicitly state and explain how their practices are consistent with the policy intent of the relevant principle.

Companies listed on the Singapore stock exchange have similar requirements under MAS’ Code of Corporate Governance, and these also exist in subsidiary legislation applicable to the FI. As for all other non-exempt companies, director and employee remuneration will ordinarily have to be disclosed through publicly available financial statements, under applicable accounting standards.

Apart from the above, there are no strict limits on compensation or requirements to impose deferral, malus or clawback provisions. Employers may include such provisions in their contracts, but should be aware that the enforcement of such provisions may be subject to challenge.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

The CBI expects RFSPs to be open and transparent in their engagement, including concerning compliance with the F&P Standards and the Common Conduct Standards. While early versions of the IAF regulations and related guidance contained an obligation on a RFSP to report to the CBI if disciplinary action had been taken against an individual, the obligation was removed from the latest version of the draft legislation. The Guidance indicated that the CBI would expect that they would have already received relevant details as it provides that firms and persons performing PCF roles are required to report to the CBI where they suspect that a "prescribed contravention" may have occurred for the purposes of the CBI legislative framework and the CBI states that a breach of the Common Conduct Standards and/or Additional Conduct Standards is a "prescribed contravention" for these purposes.

Pursuant to the Federal Law for the Prevention and Identity of Transactions with Illegally Obtained Resources, all acts carried out by financial entities are considered a vulnerable activity; therefore, financial entities must:

• set forth measures and procedures to prevent and detect acts and operations;
• file reports to the SHCP regarding acts, operations and services carried out by clients and employees if they suspect illegal resources are involved; and
• keep for at least 10 years any information and documents related to the identification of clients and users.

Given the above, if any action, operation or service is identified as undertaken with illegal resources or there is a breach of any of the provisions outlined in the above law, employers must inform the SHCP and prosecutor.

Also, if officers and general managers no longer comply with the legal requirements to occupy their positions (eg, not having a satisfactory credit record, or no longer being in good standing), financial entities may inform the CNBV or CNSF, as applicable, so the authorities may disqualify or remove those individuals from their positions.

Furthermore, if there is a breach of the code of conduct, the regulatory comptroller must inform the board of directors and keep such information available to the CNBV at all times. The board of directors will be in charge of establishing disciplinary measures.

Finally, if employees breach psychological risk prevention obligations (see question 11), employers must inform the labour authorities to impose corresponding sanctions.

Forms need to be submitted to the MAS when an individual ceases to act as a representative in regulated activities or financial advisory services. Depending on the FI, the MAS may also have to be informed of appointments or changes of representatives, directors, chief executive officers, and other key officeholders (see questions 2 and 4).

MAS notices are also required for the reporting of misconduct for employees who are representatives of certain capital market service providers, financial advisers, and insurance broking staff. Examples of reportable misconduct include acts involving fraud, dishonesty or other offences of a similar nature, and non-compliance with regulatory requirements. Specific declaration forms and timelines may apply depending on the FI. An FI may also be required to submit updates on cases where investigations have not concluded or disciplinary action was not taken, or submit a declaration that there was no misconduct reported in a given calendar year.  

While not specific to financial services employees, the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 requires any person with knowledge, or reasonable grounds to suspect, that any property is being used in connection with criminal activity to file a Suspicious Transaction Report with the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office. MAS notices concerning the prevention of anti-money laundering and incidents of fraud emphasise this obligation.

As a general principle, supervised companies are required to ensure that persons holding, in particular, executive, overall management, oversight or control functions fulfil the requirements of the “fit and proper” test. Consequently, such persons must be of good repute and can guarantee compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

If a person cannot guarantee that the regulatory requirements are fulfilled at all times (eg, because of a material breach of its duties) the employing entity and its audit companies may be required to immediately report to FINMA, respectively, any incident that is of significance.