Employment in Financial Services

Taking on certain tasks requires prior proof of competence, which varies depending on the financial services sector and the role. As an example, investment services must notify BaFin of investment advisors, sales representatives, and compliance officers, who in each case must be knowledgeable and reliable, and whose expertise must be reviewed at least annually (section 87, WpHG and the corresponding Employee Notification Ordinance). Institutions must deliver proof of professional suitability (ie, sufficient theoretical and practical knowledge of the relevant business and management experience) and reliability for certain key employees, managing directors, and members of the supervisory or administrative board (sections 25c paragraph 1 and 25d paragraph 1 KWG, sections 20 and 21 WpIG).

Depending on the status of the employing entity and the position of the financial services employee, a special certification or, more generally, proof of relevant work experience and sufficient education is required.

As a general rule, persons holding executive, overall management, oversight or control functions (eg, a member of the board, CEO, compliance officer, risk officer or their deputies) in regulated companies such as banks, insurance companies, securities firms, fund management companies, managers of collective assets or asset managers are required to demonstrate to FINMA that they have sufficient relevant work experience and education. As proof, FINMA requests current CVs, diplomas, certifications and contact details of references. The scope and nature of the future business activity and the size and complexity of the company in question also need to be considered.

Furthermore, client advisers of so-called financial service providers (eg, investment advisers) must have sufficient expertise on the code of conduct and the necessary expertise required to perform their work. Client advisors often prove that these requirements have been met by successfully attending special courses. In addition, insurance intermediaries registered with FINMA’s insurance intermediary register have to prove that they have undergone sufficient education and have sufficient qualifications. For this purpose, FINMA has published a list of different Swiss and foreign educational qualifications deemed to be sufficient on its website.

Yes, there are specific sets of rules on remuneration in the financial services sector, varying in detail per sub-sector. Rules are particularly strict for material risk-takers of significant institutions in light of the increased risk profile of their activities for the entire organisation.

Variable and fixed remuneration must have an appropriate ratio to each other. For financial institutions, the ratio is appropriate if the variable remuneration both complies with an upper limit of 100% of the fixed remuneration (up to 200% maximum based on a shareholders’ resolution) and provides an effective behavioural incentive. Further, variable remuneration may need to be spread over deferral periods. Depending on the sector, remuneration may have to be made subject to malus, holdback or clawback provisions in case specific risks materialise or the employee is found guilty of misconduct. Further, certain remuneration elements must be granted in instruments instead of cash payments, with restrictions around this element again varying by sub-sector.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.