Employment in Financial Services

German law does not treat financial services employees differently from employees of other industries, in that an employment agreement does not necessarily have to be in writing to come into existence. It is, however, common (best) practice and highly recommended for risk mitigation and transparency reasons that parties enter into a written employment agreement. For some provisions to be valid, such as a post-contractual non-compete or a fixed-term agreement, a qualified electronic or wet-ink signature is mandatory.

Further, employers must also provide employees with a wet-ink signed certification document summarising the essential conditions of employment under the German Evidence Act. Failure to provide such a document does not render the employment contract invalid, but a breach of the documentation requirement constitutes an administrative offence that may trigger fines. The German government has proposed an Act to modify the wet-ink signature requirement and also allow for electronic signatures, but has not provided a clear timeline for it coming into force yet.

Remuneration is typically governed under the employment contract and references a firm’s remuneration policy, which must be put in place for regular staff as well as identified risk-takers, with a dedicated set of rules varying per industry sub-sector.

Finally, depending on the case, certain documentation may need to be filed with BaFin before an employee can take up their tasks (see question 2).

No special contractual documents are required when engaging employees within the financial services industry.

However, it is generally recommended to conclude a written employment contract with each employee. FINMA, for instance, requires a copy of employment contracts concluded with senior management of regulated entities.
In particular, the employment contract should reference the employer’s (regulatory) set of directions and the employee’s obligation to comply with said instructions. In addition, because regulated companies such as banks, securities firms, fund management companies, managers of collective assets or asset managers are required to obtain authorisation from FINMA before the engagement of key personnel, it may be sensible to include a condition precedent relating to FINMA’s acceptance of the relevant employee in the employment contract.

The mandatory, partially mandatory, and optional elements of an individual employment contract are outlined in article 319 et seq of the CO (in particular regarding remuneration, working time, vacation, and incapacity for work). Further regulations may apply based on collective bargaining agreements.

Yes, there are specific sets of rules on remuneration in the financial services sector, varying in detail per sub-sector. Rules are particularly strict for material risk-takers of significant institutions in light of the increased risk profile of their activities for the entire organisation.

Variable and fixed remuneration must have an appropriate ratio to each other. For financial institutions, the ratio is appropriate if the variable remuneration both complies with an upper limit of 100% of the fixed remuneration (up to 200% maximum based on a shareholders’ resolution) and provides an effective behavioural incentive. Further, variable remuneration may need to be spread over deferral periods. Depending on the sector, remuneration may have to be made subject to malus, holdback or clawback provisions in case specific risks materialise or the employee is found guilty of misconduct. Further, certain remuneration elements must be granted in instruments instead of cash payments, with restrictions around this element again varying by sub-sector.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

Post-contractual non-compete obligations will typically only be binding when a severance payment is agreed upon that amounts to at least 50% of the pro-rated annual remuneration that the employee received before the obligation comes into force). It is advisable to regularly review for which roles such arrangements are agreed upon as they can be costly, and a unilateral waiver does not automatically eliminate the obligation to pay compensation, only if sufficient advance notice is given.

In the financial services sector, the severance payment for non-competition covenants is considered variable remuneration and subject to the same regulatory compensation rules (for example, section 5 paragraph 6 sentence 1 IVV, section 6 paragraph 4 No. 2 Investment Firm Remuneration Ordinance). However, severance payments do not have to be factored into the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration according to section 25a paragraph 5 sentences 2 to 5 KWG if, subject to section 74 paragraph 2 of the German Commercial Code, the payments do not exceed the total fixed remuneration originally owed.

There are no particular rules that apply concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector in Switzerland. Rather, general post-contractual non-compete regulations come into play: the parties of an employment contract may agree on a non-compete clause, which must be included in the employment contract in writing to be valid. For the non-compete clause to be relevant, it must be sufficiently limited in terms of time, place and subject matter. Normally, the duration of a post-termination non-compete clause is no more than one year; however, the statutorily permissible duration is three years.

As a prerequisite for a contractual non-compete clause to be binding, access to sensitive data is required. The employee must either have access to customer data or manufacturing or business secrets. However, access alone is not enough. There must also be the possibility of harming the employer using this knowledge.

If a relationship between the customer and the employee or employer is personal (which is, for example, the case for lawyers or doctors), a post-termination non-compete clause is not applicable according to the Federal Supreme Court.

If there is an excessive non-compete clause, this can be restricted by a judge. In practice, most of the time, no restriction of the post-termination non-compete clause is imposed if the employer offers consideration in return for the agreement. The prohibition of competition may become invalid for two reasons. Firstly, the clause can become irrelevant if the employer has no more interest in maintaining the non-compete clause. Secondly, the clause is not effective if the employer has terminated the employment relationship. However, this does not apply if the employee has given the employer a reason to terminate the employment relationship.

Swiss employment law does not provide for any compensation for a post-termination non-compete clause.