Employment in Financial Services

Due to the unique activities of the financial sector, which involve confidential information, the handling of funds, possible conflicts of interest, etc, there is a special legal framework, specific to financial services employees, which is deployed at national and European levels.

Companies and employees in the sector are subject to private law. As such, they are bound by all the norms of French law, such as Law No. 2016-1691 dated 9 December 2016, on transparency, the fight against corruption and the modernisation of economic life; Ordinance No. 2017-1387 of 22 September 2017, on the predictability and securitisation of labour relations; Law No. 2022-401 of 21 March 2022, aimed at improving the protection of whistleblowers, or Law No. 2022-1598 of December 21, 2022 on emergency measures relating to the functioning of the labor market with a view to full employment. Most legal provisions specific to financial services employees are contained in the Monetary and Financial Code.

In addition, collective agreements govern the working conditions of financial services employees. The most common collective agreements in the financial services sector are:

• The national collective agreement of financial companies of 22 November 1968;
• The national collective agreement for financial market activities of 11 June 2010; and
• The national collective agreement of the bank of 10 January 2000.

Finally, two authorities supervise operators in the financial services sector: the Financial Markets Authority (FMA), which is an independent administrative authority that regulates and supervises financial services operators, through its General Regulations; and the French Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority (ACPR), which is part of the Banque de France and is responsible for supervising banks.

At a European level, several instruments provide a framework for the financial services sector, including:

• for investment funds (Annex II of Directive 2011/61/EU for alternative investment funds (AIF) and Articles 14a, 14b of Directive 2009/65/EC for UCITS) ;
• for investment firms (Directive 2019/2034/EU, on the prudential supervision of investment firms) ; and
• for markets in financial instruments (Directive 2014/65/EU).

Financial services industry employers and their employees are subject to a multi-layered legal framework, which varies depending on the business activity of the respective institution. In each case, it comprises a patchwork of overarching EU law, local law, and ordinances issued by the regulatory watchdog, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). Employees are particularly affected by specific remuneration principles targeted at avoiding excessive risk-taking.

Banks and financial services

These providers are subject to the German Banking Act (KWG), with a few exceptions (eg, certain provisions do not apply to some institutions due to the nature of their business (section 2 KWG)). The KWG provides, inter alia, a slightly reduced level of dismissal protection for certain banking employees and sets out rules for an appropriate ratio between variable and fixed annual remuneration for employees and managing directors. Bonuses may not exceed the fixed salary, unless the institution’s shareholders approve an increase of up to twice the fixed salary by qualified majority vote. Further details are set out in the Remuneration Ordinance for Financial Institutions (IVV) issued by BaFin. In addition, banks and financial service providers are under certain prerequisites subject to the EU Capital Requirements Regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 (CRR) as modified by Regulation (EU) No. 2019/876 of 20 May 2019).

Insurance providers

These are subject to the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35 (Solvency II Regulation), which applies directly and takes precedence over national law. The Insurance Regulation Act governs regulatory supervision and forms the basis for a BaFin-issued insurance compensation ordinance. Compared to banking’s IVV, this is much broader in scope and only applies when not overridden by rules set out in the Solvency II Regulation.

Investment funds

These are subject to the German Capital Investment Code (KAGB), which provides specific rules on remuneration for employees, as well as Annex II of Directive 2011/61/EU for alternative investment funds and articles 14a, 14b of Directive 2009/65/EC for undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities. There is no BaFin ordinance (comparable to IVV for banks) for this sector yet, although BaFin could be authorised to issue one. Section 37 paragraph 1 KAGB provides that investment funds should establish a remuneration system for certain employees, such as managers, that is consistent with and conducive to a sound and effective risk management system, that does not create incentives to take inappropriate risks, and does not prevent the investment fund from acting dutifully in the best interests of the investment assets.  

Investment firms

Finally, these are subject to a different regulatory regime depending on their size and impact. Larger investment firms are subject to the risk and remuneration regime for banks, while medium-sized investment firms (since June 2021) are subject to the new German Securities Act (WpIG). The Act implements the Investment Firm Directive (Directive (EU) 2019/2034) and is complemented by the Investment Firm Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2019/2033). Commission Delegated Regulations specify the standards to identify risk-takers, and Guidance by the European Securities and Markets Authority further detail the requirements for sound remuneration policies. In January, 2024, a new remuneration regime – the Investment Firm Remuneration Ordinance (WpI-VergV) – was introduced by BaFin after a multi-year consultation phase. Quite similar to the regime for banks and financial services, but with a few subtle differences, these rules must now be applied to the remuneration of medium-sized investment firms and especially their risk takers. Small investment firms are only subject to a low level of regulation. Further regulatory rules are set out, inter alia, in the German Securities Trading Act (WpHG) and the Financial Investment Mediation Ordinance, setting out behavioural standards for employees interacting with customers.

Employment law in Switzerland is based mainly on the following sources, set out in order of priority:

• the Federal Constitution;
• Cantonal Constitutions;
• public law, particularly the Federal Act on Work in Industry, Crafts and Commerce (the Labour Act) and five ordinances issued under this Act regulating work, and health and safety conditions;
• civil law, particularly the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO);
• collective bargaining agreements, if applicable;
• individual employment agreements; and
• usage, custom, doctrine, and case law.

Depending on the regulatory status of the employer and the specific activities of financial services employees, respectively, Swiss financial market laws may also apply. They are, in particular, the Federal banking, financial institutions and insurance supervision regulations.

Under French law, several mechanisms regulate the compensation of employees in the financial services sector to limit risk-taking.

Concerning guaranteed variable remuneration (welcome bonus, recruitment bonus, etc) for new staff, establishments are not allowed to guarantee this beyond the first year of employment; it is said to be "exceptional" and can only be granted if the financial base is sufficiently sound and solid.

In addition, European Directive 2013/36 EU, UCITS V, of 26 June 2013 introduced a "clawback" mechanism that the legislature has transposed into French law. Thus, article L.511-84 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that "the total amount of variable remuneration may, in whole or in part, be reduced or give rise to restitution when the person concerned has failed to comply with the rules laid down by the institution with regard to risk-taking, in particular because of his responsibility for actions that have led to significant losses for the institution or in the event of failure to comply with the obligations of good repute and competence".

In addition and following the above-mentioned Directive 2013/36/EU (article 94) concerning the deferral of remuneration, the payment of variable remuneration should be made in part immediately and in part on a deferred basis.

Institutions are encouraged to implement a deferral schedule, that properly aligns staff compensation with the institution's business, economic cycle, and risk profile, so that a sufficient portion of variable compensation can be adjusted to results through ex-post risk adjustments.

This schedule consists of the portion of variable compensation deferred, the length of the deferral period and the speed ofvesting of the deferred compensation.

In the event of poor or negative performance by the institutions, leading to a reduction in the total amount of variable compensation, the payment of variable compensation may be subject to specific arrangements implemented by the institutions, as referred to in Directive 2013/36/EU.

In addition, article L.511-84-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code specifies that the variable portion that may be reduced or even recovered as a penalty is excluded from the calculation of several indemnities in the event of dismissal, including the legal indemnity for dismissal.

Finally, following Law No. 2013-672 of 26 July 2013 on the separation and regulation of banking activities, the variable remuneration of managers and traders is capped, and cannot exceed the fixed part. In addition, a "say on pay" mechanism has been implemented (ie, the general meeting of shareholders must be consulted on the remuneration paid to executives and traders).

Yes, there are specific sets of rules on remuneration in the financial services sector, varying in detail per sub-sector. Rules are particularly strict for material risk-takers of significant institutions in light of the increased risk profile of their activities for the entire organisation.

Variable and fixed remuneration must have an appropriate ratio to each other. For financial institutions, the ratio is appropriate if the variable remuneration both complies with an upper limit of 100% of the fixed remuneration (up to 200% maximum based on a shareholders’ resolution) and provides an effective behavioural incentive. Further, variable remuneration may need to be spread over deferral periods. Depending on the sector, remuneration may have to be made subject to malus, holdback or clawback provisions in case specific risks materialise or the employee is found guilty of misconduct. Further, certain remuneration elements must be granted in instruments instead of cash payments, with restrictions around this element again varying by sub-sector.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.