Employment in Financial Services

The activities of certain categories of employees in the financial services sector benefit from greater supervision, due to the risky nature of their activity. These include employees who have business dealings with individuals and employees who may have exposure to the financial markets.

Thus, Article L.533-10 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that portfolio management companies and investment service providers must, on the one hand, put in place rules and procedures to ensure compliance with the provisions applicable to them. On the other hand, they must put in place rules and procedures defining the conditions and limits under which their employees may carry out personal transactions on their behalf.

They must still take all reasonable steps to prevent conflicts of interest that could affect their clients. In practice, these employees may be referred to as "sensitive personnel".

In addition, Law No. 2013-672 of 26 July 2013, on the separation and regulation of banking activities introduced several provisions constraining employees who may expose their company to the financial markets. These employees must comply with strict obligations in their activity to limit risk-taking.

Specifically, employees holding executive, overall management, oversight or control functions in regulated companies are responsible for ensuring that the companies’ organization ensures the continued compliance with applicable financial market laws. Swiss financial market laws do not have enhanced responsibilities for different employee categories. Instead, a person’s fitness and propriety are assessed within the context of the specific requirements and functions of a given company, the scope of activities at that company, and the complexity of that company.

While there are certain responsibilities for financial employees, such as being able to pass applicable certifications (see question 4) or registering with certain entities (see question 6), the American regulatory system does not include statutory delineations that create enhanced responsibilities for certain categories of employees.

Three specific clauses are potentially relevant to employees in the financial services sector.

Firstly, regarding the confidentiality clause, employees in the financial services sector are bound to respect professional and banking secrecy.

More specifically, article 25 of Section III of Chapter 4 of Title II of Book 1 of the national collective agreement for financial companies of 22 November 1968, provides that all staff members are bound by professional secrecy within the company and towards third parties. Employees may not knowingly pass on to another company information specific to their employer or previous employer.

Article 24 of Chapter 3 of Title III of the national collective bargaining agreement for bank employees of 10 January 2000 codifies the absolute respect of professional secrecy.

Article 44 of Chapter 2 of Title IV of the national collective bargaining agreement for the financial markets of 11 June 2010 states that the employee must comply specifically with the rules of conduct regarding professional secrecy, both within the company and concerning third parties.

Confidentiality clauses can also be concluded between the employee and his or her employer, to reinforce the obligation of confidentiality.

In principle, a confidentiality clause allows for the protection of certain information exchanged during the contract and can be enforced after the termination of the employment contract if it is not perpetual. In this case, it is quite conceivable to contractualise such an obligation for employees in the financial services sector because of their functions, which by their very nature require discretion.

The law already states that anyone who uses or discloses confidential information obtained in the course of negotiations without authorisation is liable. Case law has addressed the issue of confidentiality clauses by ruling that an employee not executing this clause after his or her departure makes him or her liable for the resulting damage, without the employer having to prove gross negligence. The clause may be accompanied by a pecuniary sanction, which may be altered by the judge if it is lenient or excessive.

This clause in no way imposes a non-compete obligation and, therefore, does not entitle the employee to financial compensation.

In practice, it is complex to ensure compliance with this clause; however, the more specific the clause, the more effective it is.

Secondly, a non-compete clause allows an employer to limit an employee's professional activity at the end of an employment contract to prevent that employee from working for a competing company.

Despite the specificity of the activities of the financial sector, it seems that the common law of noncompetition clauses applies.

Thus, such a clause may be provided for by a collective agreement, in which case it is a conventional non-compete obligation. To be enforceable, the employee must have been informed of the existence of the applicable collective agreement. In this case, article 35 of Chapter I of Title IV of the national collective bargaining agreement for financial markets of 11 June 2010 provides for a non-compete obligation.

The non-compete clause is, in the majority of cases, contractual (ie, present in the employee’s employment contract). To be valid, this clause must meet various cumulative conditions to be compatible with the principle of freedom to work.

It must be essential to the protection of the legitimate interests of the company, limited in time and space, take into account the specificities of the employee's job, and include an obligation for the employer to pay the employee meaningful financial compensation. All these conditions are cumulative, and the employer cannot unilaterally extend the scope of the clause, otherwise it is null and void. Given the specificity of the activity of companies in the financial services sector, the condition of protection of the legitimate interests of the company would be met. However, taking into account the specificities of the employee's job may undermine such a clause if it is proven that his or her training and experience would prevent him or her from finding a job. The company's interest in imposing a noncompete clause must therefore be demonstrated.

The judge may restrict the application of the non-compete clause by limiting its effect in time, space or other terms when it does not allow the employee to engage in an activity consistent with his or her training and experience. However, the scope of application of the clause cannot be reduced by the judge if only the nullity of the clause has been invoked by the employee. If the non-compete clause is not enforced, the employer may take summary proceedings against the former employee who does not respect it, and also against the employee's new employer if they were hired with full knowledge of the facts, or if they continue to be employed after learning of the clause.

The employer may waive the clause if this is explicit and results from an unequivocal will. In the specific case of contractual termination, the employer who wishes to waive the clause must do so no later than the termination date set in the agreement.

Finally, concerning the non-solicitation clause, such a clause can be concluded between two companies through a commercial contract. These companies mutually prohibit each other from hiring their respective employees. Therefore, this clause is distinct from a non-compete clause and does not meet its conditions of validity. However, it must be proportionate to the legitimate interests to be protected given the purpose of the contract.

There are no particular rules that apply concerning the use of post-termination restrictive covenants for employees in the financial services sector in Switzerland. Rather, general post-contractual non-compete regulations come into play: the parties of an employment contract may agree on a non-compete clause, which must be included in the employment contract in writing to be valid. For the non-compete clause to be relevant, it must be sufficiently limited in terms of time, place and subject matter. Normally, the duration of a post-termination non-compete clause is no more than one year; however, the statutorily permissible duration is three years.

As a prerequisite for a contractual non-compete clause to be binding, access to sensitive data is required. The employee must either have access to customer data or manufacturing or business secrets. However, access alone is not enough. There must also be the possibility of harming the employer using this knowledge.

If a relationship between the customer and the employee or employer is personal (which is, for example, the case for lawyers or doctors), a post-termination non-compete clause is not applicable according to the Federal Supreme Court.

If there is an excessive non-compete clause, this can be restricted by a judge. In practice, most of the time, no restriction of the post-termination non-compete clause is imposed if the employer offers consideration in return for the agreement. The prohibition of competition may become invalid for two reasons. Firstly, the clause can become irrelevant if the employer has no more interest in maintaining the non-compete clause. Secondly, the clause is not effective if the employer has terminated the employment relationship. However, this does not apply if the employee has given the employer a reason to terminate the employment relationship.

Swiss employment law does not provide for any compensation for a post-termination non-compete clause.

The enforceability of restrictive covenants varies greatly depending on applicable state law. Many states impose specific requirements or limitations on enforceable covenants.

FINRA-regulated firms must comply with additional regulations:

• FINRA rules prohibit interference with a customer’s choice to follow a former representative during a change in employment where there is no existing dispute with the customer about the account. The FINRA-registered agent must help transfer a customer’s account in the event of such a customer request. Note that this only explicitly affects requests by customers and not solicitation by a representative. A non-solicit provision might be upheld whereas a non-compete might not.

• Broker-dealer firms that are signatories to the Protocol for Broker Recruiting are subject to additional requirements. Under this protocol, a departing employee may be permitted to take certain information regarding clients they serviced while at the firm to a new employer and use that information to solicit clients. Non-signatories are not bound to this protocol and can sue departing brokers for violating the terms of otherwise enforceable covenants.

Non-competes and so-called garden leave provisions are regularly included in termination documents. The enforceability of these covenants vary based on jurisdiction, with courts evaluating provisions based on duration and geographic scope.

New York

New York law disfavours non-compete agreements as a general rule. However, such agreements may be enforceable if the restrictions are reasonable and are intended to protect a legitimate interest. A court can enforce a non-compete only if the covenant:

• is no greater than required to protect an employer’s legitimate interests;
• does not impose undue hardship on the employee;
• does not cause injury to the public; or
• is reasonable in duration and geographic scope.

California

California law does not allow post-employment non-compete or non-solicit agreements except agreements involving the sale or dissolution of a business. California law protects employer confidential information and prohibits current or former employees from using employer confidential information in the solicitation of employees.