Employment in Financial Services

The law does not require specific procedures or measures before hiring. However, depending on the activities the employee performs, specific certification may be necessary.

There are no particular pre-screening measures specified by the financial regulators in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, financial institutions would generally conduct background checks on prospective employees (especially those taking on senior positions) to ensure they comply with the “fit and proper” requirements of the financial regulators.

There is no particular form of regulator-specified reference to be provided by previous employers in the financial services industry. Nevertheless, the SFC has specified disclosure obligations for licensed corporations in respect of outgoing employees who were subject to internal investigations (see question 10).

RFSPs must satisfy themselves that all CF and PCF candidates or employees comply with the F&P Standards. Pre-employment due diligence must be performed, including asking the candidate to certify they will comply with the F&P Standards and notify the RFSP immediately of any change in circumstance that may mean they no longer comply. Employers must continue to ensure that in scope employees comply with the F&P Standards and must complete an annual declaration to this effect. This means that due diligence must continue throughout the employment relationship and not just at the recruitment stage.

Candidates for PCF roles must complete an online individual questionnaire, which is submitted to the CBI in advance of appointment to the role through the Central Bank portal. The CBI must grant its approval for the PCF appointment before a candidate can take up the role. Any PCF offer of employment must be conditional on that approval being obtained. The CBI may request applicants attend an interview as part of the approval process.

Employers should take all reasonable steps to secure references from previous employers in order to due diligence the candidate's compliance with the F&P Standards and their suitability for the role. However, an employer is not obliged to issue a reference in respect of a former employee which means that a prospective employer may not be able to secure a reference from a previous employer.  The CBI does not oblige employers to either issue or obtain a reference as part of screening checks, however employers must make good efforts to do so.

There are material obstacles from a data privacy and practical perspective to employers conducting criminal background checks in relation to prospective employees. Data relating to criminal convictions is special category data under the GDPR. Employers would need to satisfy both Article 6 and Article 9 requirements under the GDPR to justify the processing of this data. In terms of Article 9, this means employers would need to show reasons of substantial public interest or that they are carrying out their legal obligations in processing the data.  In terms of Article 6 the employer will need to show that the processing is necessary to comply with a legal obligation to which the employer is subject or the processing is necessary for the employer's legitimate interests for example to ensure the suitability and honesty of its employees and to protect its reputation. Employers are also prevented from asking candidates about "spent convictions" which are usually minor criminal offences dating back over seven years.

Pre-employment medical checks must also have a clear legal basis justifying the processing of an employee's medical and health information.

Under Swiss civil law, there is no requirement to apply pre-screening measures. However, while not a statutory requirement under Swiss financial market laws per se, companies subject to these laws apply pre-screening measures to ensure that a prospective financial services employee meets the requirements set forth by these laws. In particular, regulated companies such as banks, securities firms, insurance companies, fund management companies, managers of collective investment schemes and asset managers are required to obtain authorisation from the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) relating to strategic and executive management and each change thereto.

As a general rule, the higher the responsibility or position of a person, the more requirements financial services employees may need to fulfil. Persons holding executive or overall management functions (eg, a member of the board or members of the senior management) are required to fulfil certain requirements set forth by the applicable Swiss financial market regulations. Such requirements may include providing current CVs showing relevant work experience and education as well as excerpts from the debt and criminal register. It may also include providing various declarations (eg, concerning pending and concluded proceedings, qualified participations and other mandates). Furthermore, financial services employees holding certain control functions (eg, compliance officer, risk officer and their deputies) may also be required to prove that they are suitable for the position by providing, for example, a current CV showing relevant work experience and education.

The Collective Labour Agreement establishes several rules for employees in the sector.

There is a determination, through collective negotiation, of:

• percentage of salary increase;
• minimum wage for employees who begin their activities in the sector;
• minimum wage for employees after 90 days’ tenure;
• additional pay for length of service;
• additional overtime;
• night additional pay;
• additional pay for unhealthy or dangerous work;
• function bonus;
• cash bonus;
• gratuity for check clearing;
• meal assistance;
• food assistance;
• daycare and nanny assistance;
• funeral assistance;
• transportation vouchers; and
• assistance with night-time travel.

There are no specific mandatory rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees in Hong Kong.

The HKMA has issued a Supervisory Policy Manual CG-5 “Guideline on a Sound Remuneration System”. This focuses on providing a broad idea and introducing basic principles of how remuneration policies should be designed and implemented in the authorised institution, to encourage employee behaviour that supports the risk management framework, corporate values and long-term financial soundness of the authorised institution.

Under the Guideline, the elements of a sound remuneration system are as follows:

Governance

• Remuneration policy should be in line with objectives, business strategies and the long-term goals of the authorised institution.
• The remuneration arrangement for employees whose activities could have a material impact on the authorised institution’s risk profile and financial soundness should support, but not undermine, the overall risk management approach.
• The Board of an authorised institution is ultimately responsible for overseeing the formulation and implementation of the remuneration policy.
• The establishment of a Board remuneration committee would assist the Board in discharging its responsibility for the design and operation of the authorised institution’s remuneration system.
• Risk control personnel should have appropriate authority and involvement in the process of design and implementation of the authorised institution’s remuneration policy.

Structure of remuneration

• Balance of fixed and variable remuneration should be determined with regard to the seniority, role, responsibilities and activities of their employees and the need to promote behaviour among employees that support the authorised institution’s risk-management framework and long-term financial soundness.
• Variable remuneration should be paid in such a manner as to align an employee’s incentive awards with long-term value creation and the time horizons of risk.
• Guaranteed minimum bonus to senior management or key personnel should be subject to the approval of the Board (or the Board’s remuneration committee with the necessary delegated authority).

Measurement of performance for variable remuneration

• The award of variable remuneration should depend on the fulfilment of certain pre-determined and assessable performance criteria, which include both financial and non-financial factors.
• Size and allocation of variable remuneration should take into account the current and potential risks associated with the activities of employees, as well as the performance (overall performance of the relevant business units and the authorised institution as a whole as well as the contribution of individual employees to such performance).
• Judgement and common sense may be required during the process to arrive at a fair and appropriate remuneration decision. The rationale for the exercise of judgment and the outcomes should be recorded in writing.

Alignment of remuneration pay-outs to the time horizon of risks

• Deferment of variable remuneration is appropriate when the risks taken by the employee in question are harder to measure or will be realised over a longer timeframe.
• The award of deferred remuneration should be subject to a minimum vesting period and pre-defined vesting conditions in respect of future performance.
• Authorised institutions should seek undertakings from employees not to engage in personal hedging strategies or remuneration and liability-related insurance to hedge their exposures in respect of the unvested portion of their deferred remuneration.

Remuneration disclosure

• Authorised institutions should make remuneration disclosures at least annually. The disclosure should include the qualitative and quantitative information that the HKMA has set out in its annual remuneration disclosure.

There are prescriptive, sector-specific requirements, which apply to the remuneration of specified categories of employees or directors, and which apply in the asset management, investment services, banking, and insurance sectors.

Employers in these sectors are tasked with ensuring that the remuneration paid to material risk takers (individuals whose professional activities have a material impact on an RFSP's risk profile) or identified staff align with the RFSP risk profile.

There are detailed rules with technical guidance (emanating from EU law) specific to each sector, but at a high level they (to differing degrees) set out rules on; variable remuneration composition, ratios or other metrics to compare variable to fixed remuneration to ensure it is appropriate; malus requirements, which would allow the RFSP to cancel or reduce the employee's variable remuneration before it is paid out; and clawback provisions which allow RFSPs to recover variable remuneration after it has been awarded. It is important to ensure that employees' contracts of employment acknowledge that any variable remuneration will be subject to all regulatory restrictions and rules and may be clawed back in certain circumstances.

The CBI's 2014 Guidelines on Variable Remuneration Arrangements for Sales Staff also emphasise the importance of remuneration structures to have sufficient deterrents built into them (such as malus and clawback mechanisms) to avoid incentivising undesirable/risky behaviours from sales staff in the banking, insurance and investment services sectors.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.