Employment in Financial Services

Specific rules apply to personnel whose professional activities have a significant impact on the company's risk profile (article 92, 2. Directive 2013/36/EU; article 67, Act of 25 April 2014), including:

• all members of the legal administrative body and senior management;
• staff members with supervisory responsibility for control functions or business units;
• employees who received significant remuneration during the previous year (ie, 500,000 EUR or more and equal to or greater than the average remuneration of members of the legal administrative body and senior management) and the employee performs the professional activity in a critical business unit and the nature of the activity is such that it has a significant impact on the risk profile of the business unit concerned.

Variable remuneration is capped at 50% of the fixed remuneration or 50,000 EUR, without exceeding the fixed remuneration, whichever is higher (article 1, Annex II, Act of 25 April 2014). Moreover, it is forbidden to have a guaranteed variable remuneration (article 5). 40% of variable remuneration is delayed for four to five years, with a minimum of five years for members of the legal administrative body and senior management. When the variable remuneration is very high, the percentage of the delayed variable remuneration is 60% (article 7).

The total variable remuneration will be significantly reduced if the company generates a reduced or negative financial return. This applies to variable remuneration not yet earned, variable remuneration earned but not yet paid, and variable remuneration that has already been paid. It occurs through malus or clawback schemes, in particular when the person has participated in practices that have resulted in significant losses, has not respected the “fit and proper” duties or has set up a specific mechanism for tax fraud (article 8).

A termination indemnity is considered a variable remuneration, except for a legal indemnity in lieu of notice or a non-compete indemnity (based on the calculation provided by the Employment Contracts Act). Furthermore, a termination indemnity higher than 12 months, or 18 months for a motivated decision from the remuneration committee, can only be granted subject to the approval of the first ordinary general meeting following the termination (articles 12 and 12/1).

For companies that benefit from government intervention, there is in principle no variable remuneration, except for the person recruited after the public intervention to carry on the restructuring. Moreover, the termination indemnity is capped at nine months, unless the legal indemnity in lieu of notice (based on seniority) is higher (articles 16 and 17).

The Collective Labour Agreement establishes several rules for employees in the sector.

There is a determination, through collective negotiation, of:

• percentage of salary increase;
• minimum wage for employees who begin their activities in the sector;
• minimum wage for employees after 90 days’ tenure;
• additional pay for length of service;
• additional overtime;
• night additional pay;
• additional pay for unhealthy or dangerous work;
• function bonus;
• cash bonus;
• gratuity for check clearing;
• meal assistance;
• food assistance;
• daycare and nanny assistance;
• funeral assistance;
• transportation vouchers; and
• assistance with night-time travel.

Under French law, several mechanisms regulate the compensation of employees in the financial services sector to limit risk-taking.

Concerning guaranteed variable remuneration (welcome bonus, recruitment bonus, etc) for new staff, establishments are not allowed to guarantee this beyond the first year of employment; it is said to be "exceptional" and can only be granted if the financial base is sufficiently sound and solid.

In addition, European Directive 2013/36 EU, UCITS V, of 26 June 2013 introduced a "clawback" mechanism that the legislature has transposed into French law. Thus, article L.511-84 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that "the total amount of variable remuneration may, in whole or in part, be reduced or give rise to restitution when the person concerned has failed to comply with the rules laid down by the institution with regard to risk-taking, in particular because of his responsibility for actions that have led to significant losses for the institution or in the event of failure to comply with the obligations of good repute and competence".

In addition and following the above-mentioned Directive 2013/36/EU (article 94) concerning the deferral of remuneration, the payment of variable remuneration should be made in part immediately and in part on a deferred basis.

Institutions are encouraged to implement a deferral schedule, that properly aligns staff compensation with the institution's business, economic cycle, and risk profile, so that a sufficient portion of variable compensation can be adjusted to results through ex-post risk adjustments.

This schedule consists of the portion of variable compensation deferred, the length of the deferral period and the speed ofvesting of the deferred compensation.

In the event of poor or negative performance by the institutions, leading to a reduction in the total amount of variable compensation, the payment of variable compensation may be subject to specific arrangements implemented by the institutions, as referred to in Directive 2013/36/EU.

In addition, article L.511-84-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code specifies that the variable portion that may be reduced or even recovered as a penalty is excluded from the calculation of several indemnities in the event of dismissal, including the legal indemnity for dismissal.

Finally, following Law No. 2013-672 of 26 July 2013 on the separation and regulation of banking activities, the variable remuneration of managers and traders is capped, and cannot exceed the fixed part. In addition, a "say on pay" mechanism has been implemented (ie, the general meeting of shareholders must be consulted on the remuneration paid to executives and traders).

Yes, there are specific sets of rules on remuneration in the financial services sector, varying in detail per sub-sector. Rules are particularly strict for material risk-takers of significant institutions in light of the increased risk profile of their activities for the entire organisation.

Variable and fixed remuneration must have an appropriate ratio to each other. For financial institutions, the ratio is appropriate if the variable remuneration both complies with an upper limit of 100% of the fixed remuneration (up to 200% maximum based on a shareholders’ resolution) and provides an effective behavioural incentive. Further, variable remuneration may need to be spread over deferral periods. Depending on the sector, remuneration may have to be made subject to malus, holdback or clawback provisions in case specific risks materialise or the employee is found guilty of misconduct. Further, certain remuneration elements must be granted in instruments instead of cash payments, with restrictions around this element again varying by sub-sector.

There are no specific mandatory rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees in Hong Kong.

The HKMA has issued a Supervisory Policy Manual CG-5 “Guideline on a Sound Remuneration System”. This focuses on providing a broad idea and introducing basic principles of how remuneration policies should be designed and implemented in the authorised institution, to encourage employee behaviour that supports the risk management framework, corporate values and long-term financial soundness of the authorised institution.

Under the Guideline, the elements of a sound remuneration system are as follows:

Governance

• Remuneration policy should be in line with objectives, business strategies and the long-term goals of the authorised institution.
• The remuneration arrangement for employees whose activities could have a material impact on the authorised institution’s risk profile and financial soundness should support, but not undermine, the overall risk management approach.
• The Board of an authorised institution is ultimately responsible for overseeing the formulation and implementation of the remuneration policy.
• The establishment of a Board remuneration committee would assist the Board in discharging its responsibility for the design and operation of the authorised institution’s remuneration system.
• Risk control personnel should have appropriate authority and involvement in the process of design and implementation of the authorised institution’s remuneration policy.

Structure of remuneration

• Balance of fixed and variable remuneration should be determined with regard to the seniority, role, responsibilities and activities of their employees and the need to promote behaviour among employees that support the authorised institution’s risk-management framework and long-term financial soundness.
• Variable remuneration should be paid in such a manner as to align an employee’s incentive awards with long-term value creation and the time horizons of risk.
• Guaranteed minimum bonus to senior management or key personnel should be subject to the approval of the Board (or the Board’s remuneration committee with the necessary delegated authority).

Measurement of performance for variable remuneration

• The award of variable remuneration should depend on the fulfilment of certain pre-determined and assessable performance criteria, which include both financial and non-financial factors.
• Size and allocation of variable remuneration should take into account the current and potential risks associated with the activities of employees, as well as the performance (overall performance of the relevant business units and the authorised institution as a whole as well as the contribution of individual employees to such performance).
• Judgement and common sense may be required during the process to arrive at a fair and appropriate remuneration decision. The rationale for the exercise of judgment and the outcomes should be recorded in writing.

Alignment of remuneration pay-outs to the time horizon of risks

• Deferment of variable remuneration is appropriate when the risks taken by the employee in question are harder to measure or will be realised over a longer timeframe.
• The award of deferred remuneration should be subject to a minimum vesting period and pre-defined vesting conditions in respect of future performance.
• Authorised institutions should seek undertakings from employees not to engage in personal hedging strategies or remuneration and liability-related insurance to hedge their exposures in respect of the unvested portion of their deferred remuneration.

Remuneration disclosure

• Authorised institutions should make remuneration disclosures at least annually. The disclosure should include the qualitative and quantitative information that the HKMA has set out in its annual remuneration disclosure.

There are certain rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees, such as those in the banking, mutual fund or asset management, and insurance industries.

The central bank of India, the RBI, deals with the compensation policy for all private-sector banks and foreign banks operating in India by requiring them to formulate their own compensation policy and annually reviewing it. Banks are not allowed to employ or continue the employment of any person whose remuneration is excessive in the RBI’s opinion. For instance, the RBI lays down guidelines on the compensation of “Whole Time Directors (“WTD”) / Chief Executive Officers / Material Risk Takers and Control Function Staff”[1], elaborate guidelines encompassing the governance of compensation and its alignment with prudent risk-taking, policies for risk control and compliance staff, the identification of “material risk takers”, and disclosure and engagement by stakeholders. It even envisages deferred payments being subjected to malus or clawback arrangements if there was negative performance. For variable pay, it mandates banks to incorporate malus or clawback mechanisms and suggests they specify periods of malus or clawback application to cover at least deferral and retention periods.[2] It is pertinent to highlight that private sector and foreign banks in India must obtain regulatory approval[3] for the grant of remuneration to WTDs or CEOs.

The RBI also prescribes guidelines around compensation for key managerial personnel (KMP) and senior management in non-banking financial companies (NBFCs)[4]:

• NBFCs are mandated to form “Nomination and Remuneration Committees” (NRCs) as per Section 178 of the Companies Act, 2013, which will then be entrusted with framing, reviewing and implementing the compensation policy to be approved by the board of the company.
• The compensation must align with the risk related to the decision-making process. The compensation package can comprise both fixed and variable pay and may also be a mix of cash, equity or other forms, in line with projected risk factors.
• A bonus has no bearing on the performance of the individual. The bonus is guaranteed based on the fulfilment of certain criteria as may be specified in the compensation policy. A guaranteed bonus should neither be considered part of fixed pay nor variable pay and the same is not payable to KMP and senior management. However, a guaranteed bonus can be paid to new employees as part of a sign-on bonus whereby potential employees can be incentivised to join NBFCs.
• "Deferred compensation may be subject to malus/clawback arrangements."  The compensation policy concerning malus or clawback must mandatorily apply for the period equal to at least the deferred retention period. 

Despite the aforementioned guidelines being applicable from 1 April 2023, NBFCs must immediately begin aligning their internal procedures to comply with the mandatory guidelines above to assist the transition. Existing remuneration policies being followed by the NBFCs should be reviewed to make the necessary changes to be compliant with the above-mentioned policies.

When it comes to regulations on an “employee stock option plan” (ESOP) for financial services employees, regulators may impose industry-specific guidelines. For instance, as per the SEBI (Share Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021[5], the employee stock option scheme should be drafted in a manner that no such employee violates SEBI (Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 and SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to the Securities Market) Regulations, 1995. ESOPs issued to managerial staff and for non-cash consideration shall be treated as part of managerial remuneration. In another development, the RBI has directed that ESOPs should be at a fair value, shooting up costs and creating the cascading effect of replacing ESOPs with deferred bonus payments for senior managerial personnel.

There are prescriptive, sector-specific requirements, which apply to the remuneration of specified categories of employees or directors, and which apply in the asset management, investment services, banking, and insurance sectors.

Employers in these sectors are tasked with ensuring that the remuneration paid to material risk takers (individuals whose professional activities have a material impact on an RFSP's risk profile) or identified staff align with the RFSP risk profile.

There are detailed rules with technical guidance (emanating from EU law) specific to each sector, but at a high level they (to differing degrees) set out rules on; variable remuneration composition, ratios or other metrics to compare variable to fixed remuneration to ensure it is appropriate; malus requirements, which would allow the RFSP to cancel or reduce the employee's variable remuneration before it is paid out; and clawback provisions which allow RFSPs to recover variable remuneration after it has been awarded. It is important to ensure that employees' contracts of employment acknowledge that any variable remuneration will be subject to all regulatory restrictions and rules and may be clawed back in certain circumstances.

The CBI's 2014 Guidelines on Variable Remuneration Arrangements for Sales Staff also emphasise the importance of remuneration structures to have sufficient deterrents built into them (such as malus and clawback mechanisms) to avoid incentivising undesirable/risky behaviours from sales staff in the banking, insurance and investment services sectors.

There are no prescribed rules relating to compensation payable to financial services employees and any remuneration, bonuses or clawback will be a matter of contract between the financial services employee and the financial institution. Inevitably, this will reflect what is typical in the market for experienced, qualified, financial services personnel performing the role for which they are applying or are currently carrying out.

Brokerage houses must implement a compensation system under the general provisions set forth by the CNBV. This system must include all compensation provided and must contain the responsibilities of the boards that implement the compensation schemes, ordinary and extraordinary compensation policies, and periodic reviews of payment policies. The board of directors must incorporate a special committee for compensation.

Under article 9 of the general provisions applicable to brokerage houses, account management fees may be paid to stock proxies provided that they comply entirely with the applicable laws in the exercise of their duties. Stock operators must not execute operations with the public or receive any remuneration or account management fees, except if, with the proxy’s authorisation, they execute orders of institutional investors in the brokerage house’s reception and allocation system.

Brokerage houses must not pay fees, commissions, and other remuneration of third parties that act as promoters, sellers, associates, independent commissioners, investment advisors or any similar roles. This also applies to proxies of the investor client without being proxies of the brokerage house, or those who have a conflict of interest to receive fees, commissions, or any other remuneration from the investor client.

If there is a critical event, such as a control measure, the CNBV may order the brokerage house to suspend the payment of extraordinary compensation and bonuses to the general manager and senior officers. This includes preventing the granting of new compensation until the matter is properly resolved. This should be included in employment contracts, to avoid labour-related disputes should the extraordinary measure of the CNBV is enacted.

Remuneration policy

Under Dutch law, financial services companies must implement an internal remuneration policy. Financial services companies must explain in the management report the relationship between the remuneration policy and the social function of the company.

Variable remuneration

The variable remuneration that a financial services company awards to an employee amounts to a maximum of 20% of that person's fixed annual remuneration. There are a (very) limited number of exceptions to this maximum.

Five-year statutory retention period for shares and other financial instruments

Financial services employees whose fixed remuneration consists of shares or related instruments may only sell them after five years.

Adjustment or recovery of bonuses (claw-back)

Adjustment or recovery of bonuses is mandatory if a financial services employee has failed to meet appropriate standards of competence and proper conduct or has been responsible for conduct that led to a significant deterioration in the company's position.

Severance payments

Paying out severance payments by financial services companies is not allowed if the employee leaves voluntarily or if there are seriously culpable acts or omissions in the performance of the function. Severance payments for directors (or other policymakers) may not exceed more than 100 per cent of their fixed annual salary.

Disclosure requirements may apply depending on the employee’s role. For example, with some exemptions, financial advisors are required to disclose to the client the remuneration that they receive or will receive for making any recommendations in respect of a particular investment product, or executing a purchase or sale contract relating to a designated investment product on their clients’ behalf.

MAS’ Guidelines on Corporate Governance (applicable to designated financial holding companies, banks, and some insurers) also requires the FI’s board of directors to have a formal and transparent procedure for developing policies on and fixing the remuneration of directors, executives, and key management personnel. A separate remuneration committee made up of non-executive directors must be established to make the relevant recommendations. MAS expects compliance with these guidelines in a manner commensurate with the size, nature of activities and risk profile of the FI. Diverging from the guidelines is acceptable to the extent that FIs explicitly state and explain how their practices are consistent with the policy intent of the relevant principle.

Companies listed on the Singapore stock exchange have similar requirements under MAS’ Code of Corporate Governance, and these also exist in subsidiary legislation applicable to the FI. As for all other non-exempt companies, director and employee remuneration will ordinarily have to be disclosed through publicly available financial statements, under applicable accounting standards.

Apart from the above, there are no strict limits on compensation or requirements to impose deferral, malus or clawback provisions. Employers may include such provisions in their contracts, but should be aware that the enforcement of such provisions may be subject to challenge.

Swiss civil law provides for special rules that govern the compensation of current and former members of inter alia the board and executive committee (Ordinance against Excessive Compensation) of Swiss companies limited by shares that are listed on a Swiss or foreign stock exchange. In addition, there are disclosure provisions listed companies need to follow concerning remuneration under stock exchange regulations.

In addition to the above, FINMA has formulated ten principles regarding remuneration that banks, securities firms, financial groups and conglomerates, insurance companies, insurance groups and conglomerates are required to implement. The principles serve as minimum standards for the design, implementation and disclosure of remuneration schemes.

These schemes should not incentivise to take inappropriate risks and thereby potentially damage the stability of financial institutions.

One of the focal points of the principles is variable remuneration that depends on business performance and risk. In particular, all variable remuneration must have been earned by the company over the long term. Consequently, remuneration is dependent on performance, taking into account the sustainability of such performance as well as the risks. That said, FINMA’s principles do not limit the amount of variable remuneration. However, FINMA aims to prevent the granting of high remuneration based on large risks and the generation of short-term, unsustainable earnings. Furthermore, persons who have significant responsibility relating to the risk or receive a high total remuneration, must receive a significant part of the variable remuneration on a deferred basis and consequently, in a way that is linked to the current risk. Under the FINMA principles, "clawback" and "malus" arrangements are permitted.

Both the DFSA General Rulebook and FSRA General Rulebook contain Best Practice Guidance for remuneration structure and strategies of authorised entities. In particular, the guidance identifies that the governing body of an authorised entity ought to consider the risk to which the firm could be exposed to as a result of the conduct or behaviour of its employees, and to consider the ratio and balance between fixed and variable remuneration components, the nature of the duties and functions performed by the relevant employees, the assessment criteria against which performance based components of remuneration are to be awarded, and the integrity and objectivity of any performance assessment against that criteria.

The remuneration of financial services employees working at certain firms (such as banks, building societies, asset managers and investment firms) is heavily regulated. The relevant rules can be found in various FCA “Remuneration Codes” (each Code tailored to different firms) and also (for dual-regulated firms) in specific remuneration parts of the PRA Rulebook and directly applicable retained EU law.

The remuneration rules are complex and their application is dependent on each firm. The key principle of the rules, however, is that firms subject to them must ensure that their remuneration policies and practices are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.

Some elements of the rules apply to all staff, whereas others apply only to material risk-takers within a particular firm.

By way of a snapshot, the rules generally cover such matters as:

• the appropriate ratio between fixed pay and variable pay, to ensure that fixed pay is a sufficiently high proportion of total remuneration to allow for the possibility of paying no variable pay;
• the amount of any discretionary bonus pool, which should be based on profit, adjusted for current and future risks, and take into account the cost and quantity of the capital and liquidity required;
• performance-related bonuses, which should be assessed based on a variety of factors, including the performance of the individual, the relevant business unit and the overall results of the firm;
• restrictions on guaranteed variable pay and payments on termination of employment; and
• malus and clawback requirements.

Overtime

Financial services employees in the United States are commonly classified as administrative employees exempt from both minimum wage and overtime laws. To qualify for this administrative exception under the Fair Labor Standard Acts (FLSA) and often, applicable state law, an employee must:

• be compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate at least equal to the minimum required threshold (at the time of writing set at $684 a week or $35,568 annually); and
• have a primary duty:
  • that is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers; and
  • includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment on significant matters.

Examples of employees qualifying for the administrative exemption are those whose duties include:

• collecting and analysing information regarding the customer’s income, assets, investments or debts;
• determining which financial products best meet a customer’s needs;
• advising customers regarding the pros and cons of various financial products; and
• marketing, servicing, or promoting financial products.

An employee whose sole duty is selling financial products does not qualify for the administrative exemption. United States courts are split on whether financial advisors are exempt.

Many states have a higher minimum annual salary threshold for the administrative exemption, including California ($1,240 a week, as of 1 January 2023) and New York ($1,125 a week for New York City and Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester counties and $990 a week for the remainder of the state. The remainder of the State increased to $1,064.25 a week on 31 December 2022).

California has an administrative exemption test, which also requires the employee to customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgement, in addition to being primarily engaged in administrative duties. Employees that do not qualify as non-exempt under one of the exemptions must receive overtime pay under California law.

FLSA also exempts “highly compensated” employees. To qualify for this exemption, an employee must earn at least $107,432 in total annual compensation (not including discretionary bonuses), must perform office or non-manual work as part of their primary duty, and must customarily perform one or more exempt duties of an administrative, executive, or professional employee.

Bonuses

Discretionary bonuses can be for any amount and can be determined on quantitative factors (eg, employer profits) or subjective factors (eg, known performance indicators, performance, merit) and employers may condition an employee’s eligibility to receive a bonus on their active employment at the time when bonuses are paid.

Guaranteed bonuses are typically non-discretionary and set at a fixed number or percentage (eg, a percentage of the employee’s annual base salary or the employer’s profits). A guaranteed bonus (unlike a discretionary one) creates a contractual obligation and will be considered wages. Once a payment is considered a “wage,” employers generally cannot withhold, recover or claw back the bonus from an employee.

California requires non-discretionary bonuses to be included in a non-exempt employee’s regular rate for overtime calculation.

Certain compensation plans include “forgivable loans,” conditioning an employee’s obligation to repay on their continued employment with the new employer for a time. If the employee leaves or is fired for certain reasons before the full loan amount is forgiven, the unforgiven share, with interest, can become due and payable.

California generally prohibits employers from deducting any outstanding loan balances from an employee’s final paycheck without express permission in contemporaneous writing signed by the employee, both at the time the loan or advance was given and at separation.

Similarly, New York has extremely nuanced rules related to permissible deductions for employee benefits, which are limited (eg, authorised deductions and deductions for the benefit of the employee).

If a new element occurs that can influence one or more of the five criteria assessing the suitability of a person for the “fit and proper” authorisation (see question 2), the financial institution must file the adequate form with the NBB.

Notification to the NBB is also required in the event of termination or reappointment.

From a labour perspective, there are no circumstances in which notifications relating to the employee or their conduct must be made to local or international regulators.

Considering that the National Financial System is extremely regulated, there may be cases in which a mistake by an employee results in a duty to report to the authorities (information security breach, prevention of money laundering, and prevention of terrorist financing, among others, which could not be exhaustively included in this questionnaire).

There is no general code defined by law or regulation.

Each company can adopt its standard of behaviour, as a rule.

Some activities require specific protocols for the prevention of money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism:

• the capture, intermediation, and investment of financial resources from third parties in national or foreign currency;

• the purchase and sale of foreign currency or gold as a financial asset or exchange instrument; and

• the custody, issuance, distribution, settlement, negotiation, intermediation, or securities administration.

Within the scope of the system for preventing and combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism, it is up to institutions and their employees to adequately comply with Central Bank regulations; promote the effectiveness of the apparatus to combat and prevent money laundering; carry out risk management with the implementation of effective policies, procedures, and controls; and help the Brazilian state to locate which financial operations are suspicious so that they can be investigated.

In principle, the relationship between companies and employees in the financial services sector is private. As such, companies do not have to communicate confidential information about their employees to third parties, as this would constitute an infringement of their fundamental freedoms. However, in certain cases, employers must alert the competent authorities in the event of behaviour or "suspicions" of behaviour by one of their employees that is contrary to the law.

Thus, the Monetary and Financial Code provides that companies in the financial services sector, referred to in article L.561-2 of the code (the list of which was updated by Ordinance no. 2023-1139 of December 6, 2023 on credit managers and credit buyers to include "Credit managers"), must report to the national financial intelligence unit (Tracfin) all sums or transactions that they suspect to be the result of an offence punishable by a prison sentence of more than one year, or related to the financing of terrorism or tax evasion. This declaration may be made in respect of any employee of one of these companies.

In addition, when facts likely to constitute violations of the anticorruption code of conduct or to qualify as corruption or influence peddling are brought to the attention of the company and its managers, an internal investigation must be conducted (article 17 of Law No. 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016 on transparency). If the investigation confirms the suspicions, the employer must, on the one hand, sanction the employee, but also inform the prosecuting authority of the facts.

In smaller companies, the employer will also be able to report to the prosecution authorities any behaviour that could lead to criminal sanctions.

Yes. Under section 87 WpHG, investment firms must notify BaFin of any changes regarding employees providing investment advice, sales representation, and compliance advice. This includes, for example, personal data or a change of the responsible sales representative, but also the termination of the activity. Changes must be communicated to BaFin within one month.

Further, investment firms must notify BaFin as soon as a substantial customer complaint is made against one or more employees based on his or her activities in connection with investment advice. This applies, for example, to allegations of incorrect investment advice. The notification to BaFin must be submitted within six weeks of receipt of the complaint. Details on the content of the notification are governed by section 8 paragraph 4 of the Securities Trading Act Employee Notification Ordinance.

There are further notification obligations if there are doubts about an employee‘s reliability under the relevant statutory rules. For example, in their initial declaration of reliability under section 24 paragraph 1 No. 1 KWG and section 5b Ordinance on Notifications and Submission of Documents under the KWG, future managing directors and persons acting as sole representatives of credit institutions and financial services institutions must immediately report to BaFin in writing any subsequent changes that may be relevant to their reliability. This applies to all facts that were also relevant for the initial reliability assessment (eg, because an employee was convicted of certain financial crimes). In addition, BaFin must also receive notifications of preliminary proceedings, indictments and convictions of certain financial sector employees according to the Order on Notifications in Criminal Matters.

SFC – Self-reporting obligation

An SFC-licensed intermediary is subject to the self-reporting obligation under paragraph 12.5 of the “Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures Commission”. A licensed or registered person should report to the SFC immediately upon the occurrence of any material breach, infringement or non-compliance with any laws, rules regulations, and codes administered or issued by the SFC, exchange or clearing house of which it is a member or participant of, and the requirement of any regulatory authority applicable to that intermediary. This encompasses both actual and suspected breaches, infringements or non-compliance. In the report, the particulars of the actual or suspected breach, infringement or non-compliance, and relevant information and documents must be included to fulfil the obligation.

The same is to be reported by the registered institutions to the HKMA. The HKMA also requires authorised institutions to submit an incident report on the same day of discovering the incident.

SFC - Internal investigation disclosure obligation

In addition, a licensed corporation is required to provide the SFC with information about whether a licensed individual who ceases to be accredited to it (outgoing employee) was under any investigation commenced by the licensed corporation within six months preceding his or her cessation of accreditation. If the internal investigation commences after the notification of cessation of accreditation, the licensed corporation should also notify the SFC as soon as practicable. In addition, even if a firm has completed its investigation and made no negative findings against an outgoing employee, the firm will still be required to notify the SFC of the investigation.

The SFC expects licensed corporations to proactively disclose information about all investigative actions and the following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of investigations involving an outgoing employee that a licensed corporation should disclose to the SFC:

• investigations about a suspected breach or breach of applicable laws, rules and regulations;
• investigations about a suspected breach or breach of the licensed corporation's internal policies or procedures;
• investigations about misconduct that are likely to give rise to concerns about the fitness and properness of the outgoing employee;
• investigations about any matter that may have an adverse market or client impact; and
• investigations about any matter potentially involving fraud, dishonesty and misfeasance.

HKMA – Reporting incidents to HKMA

According to the “Incident Response and Management Procedures” published by the HKMA, once an authorised institution has become aware that a significant incident has occurred, the authorised institution concerned should notify the HKMA immediately and provide it with whatever information is available at the time. An authorised institution should not wait until it has rectified the problem before reporting the incident to the HKMA.

According to the Supervisory Policy Manual SB-1 “Supervision of Regulated Activities of SFC-Registered Authorized Institutions”, to be in line with the reporting requirements imposed by the SFC on licensed representatives, authorised institutions will be required to notify the HKMA in writing within seven business days upon knowledge of the occurrence of certain information (including any subsequent changes) of the relevant individuals. The required information is on whether or not the person is or has been:

• convicted of or charged with any criminal offence (other than a minor offence) in Hong Kong or elsewhere;
• subject to any disciplinary action, or investigation by a regulatory body or criminal investigatory body (as the case may be) in Hong Kong or elsewhere;
• subject to, or involved in the management of a corporation or business that has been or is subject to, any investigation by a criminal investigatory body or any regulatory body in Hong Kong or elsewhere concerning offences involving fraud or dishonesty;
• engaged in any judicial or other proceedings, whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere, that is material or relevant to the fitness and propriety of the individual; or
• bankrupt or aware of the existence of any matters that might render him insolvent or lead to the appointment of a receiver of his property under the Bankruptcy Ordinance.

HKMA – Guidance Note on Cooperation with HKMA Investigations

Under the “Guidance Note on Cooperation with the HKMA in Investigations and Enforcement Proceedings”, the HKMA encourages and recognises the cooperation of authorised institutions, banks and their staff in investigations and enforcement proceedings. Under this Guidance Note, cooperation includes early and voluntary reporting of any suspected breach or misconduct, taking a proactive approach to assist the HKMA’s investigation, and making timely arrangements to provide evidence and information.

IA – Self-reporting obligation

Under “the Code of Conduct for Licensed Insurance Agents/Brokers”, there is a self-reporting obligation by licensed insurance agencies or brokerages to the IA. A licensed insurance agency or brokerage is required to have proper controls and procedures to ensure the following incidents are reported to the IA as soon as is reasonably practicable:

• a disciplinary action taken by the HKMA, the SFC or the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority;
• a criminal conviction (other than a minor offence) by any court in Hong Kong or elsewhere;
• any material breaches of requirements under the IO or any rules, regulations, codes or guidelines administered or issued by the IA; and
• any material incidents which happen to the agency or brokerage.

The RBI requires banks to conduct an annual review of fraud committed and provide a note of the total number to the board of directors or the local advisory board. These reports are not to be sent to the RBI but are to be preserved for verification by the RBI’s inspecting officers[1]. Necessary disclosures may also need to be made to SEBI under some of its regulations.

Publicly listed financial services companies may be required to make necessary disclosures, including to the stock exchanges and their auditors, in case of workplace fraud.

The CBI expects RFSPs to be open and transparent in their engagement, including concerning compliance with the F&P Standards and the Common Conduct Standards. While early versions of the IAF regulations and related guidance contained an obligation on a RFSP to report to the CBI if disciplinary action had been taken against an individual, the obligation was removed from the latest version of the draft legislation. The Guidance indicated that the CBI would expect that they would have already received relevant details as it provides that firms and persons performing PCF roles are required to report to the CBI where they suspect that a "prescribed contravention" may have occurred for the purposes of the CBI legislative framework and the CBI states that a breach of the Common Conduct Standards and/or Additional Conduct Standards is a "prescribed contravention" for these purposes.

Yes, please see question 9.

Financial institutions in the Isle of Man are required to comply with various statutory requirements. Breaches of those statutory requirements impose an obligation on the relevant entity to self-report to the IoM FSA. While ordinarily, businesses will endeavour not to supply information about individuals within the business to the regulator as part of this reporting, from time to time this may be necessary to comply with their regulatory obligations. Where this is the case, usually the regulator will be asked to use their powers of compulsion to seek the information rather than such information being given voluntarily. This is particularly the case where the regulator may have formed concerns about an individual’s fitness and propriety and wishes to investigate this further.

Regulators from other jurisdictions may use certain reciprocal agreements and reciprocal enforcement legislation to seek information from the IoM FSA or more directly from a financial services business. Where such requests are made, this may include information about individual employees (ordinarily those exercising Controlled Functions). However, any mechanism for reciprocal enforcement or exchange of information is subject to scrutiny and such information would normally only be offered by an employer under compulsion.

Pursuant to the Federal Law for the Prevention and Identity of Transactions with Illegally Obtained Resources, all acts carried out by financial entities are considered a vulnerable activity; therefore, financial entities must:

• set forth measures and procedures to prevent and detect acts and operations;
• file reports to the SHCP regarding acts, operations and services carried out by clients and employees if they suspect illegal resources are involved; and
• keep for at least 10 years any information and documents related to the identification of clients and users.

Given the above, if any action, operation or service is identified as undertaken with illegal resources or there is a breach of any of the provisions outlined in the above law, employers must inform the SHCP and prosecutor.

Also, if officers and general managers no longer comply with the legal requirements to occupy their positions (eg, not having a satisfactory credit record, or no longer being in good standing), financial entities may inform the CNBV or CNSF, as applicable, so the authorities may disqualify or remove those individuals from their positions.

Furthermore, if there is a breach of the code of conduct, the regulatory comptroller must inform the board of directors and keep such information available to the CNBV at all times. The board of directors will be in charge of establishing disciplinary measures.

Finally, if employees breach psychological risk prevention obligations (see question 11), employers must inform the labour authorities to impose corresponding sanctions.

Financial services companies must report to local regulators any behaviour or event that poses a serious threat to the ethical conduct of the business of the company or may affect the reliability of policymakers, sound and controlled business operations and continuity.

Furthermore, there are several local disciplinary authorities where reports can be made about financial services employees who fail to comply with Dutch law, guidelines and rules of conduct.

Forms need to be submitted to the MAS when an individual ceases to act as a representative in regulated activities or financial advisory services. Depending on the FI, the MAS may also have to be informed of appointments or changes of representatives, directors, chief executive officers, and other key officeholders (see questions 2 and 4).

MAS notices are also required for the reporting of misconduct for employees who are representatives of certain capital market service providers, financial advisers, and insurance broking staff. Examples of reportable misconduct include acts involving fraud, dishonesty or other offences of a similar nature, and non-compliance with regulatory requirements. Specific declaration forms and timelines may apply depending on the FI. An FI may also be required to submit updates on cases where investigations have not concluded or disciplinary action was not taken, or submit a declaration that there was no misconduct reported in a given calendar year.  

While not specific to financial services employees, the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 requires any person with knowledge, or reasonable grounds to suspect, that any property is being used in connection with criminal activity to file a Suspicious Transaction Report with the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office. MAS notices concerning the prevention of anti-money laundering and incidents of fraud emphasise this obligation.

As a general principle, supervised companies are required to ensure that persons holding, in particular, executive, overall management, oversight or control functions fulfil the requirements of the “fit and proper” test. Consequently, such persons must be of good repute and can guarantee compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

If a person cannot guarantee that the regulatory requirements are fulfilled at all times (eg, because of a material breach of its duties) the employing entity and its audit companies may be required to immediately report to FINMA, respectively, any incident that is of significance.

Both the DFSA General Rulebook and FSRA General Rulebook provide that where an authorised firm requests the withdrawal of an authorised individual, they must provide to the regulator details of any circumstances in which they consider the individual is no longer fit and proper.  Where the individual is to be dismissed or has requested to resign, the firm must provide to the regulator a statement of the reason, or reasons, for the dismissal or resignation.

In addition, the DFSA and FSRA General Rulebooks contain broad obligations on any authorised firm to report to the regulator if it becomes aware of a range of occurrences, including any matter which could have a significant adverse effect on the authorised firm’s reputation, or a matter in relation the authorised firm which could result in serious adverse financial consequences to the financial system or to other firms, or a significant breach of a rule by the authorised firm or its employees.

Yes. There are multiple potential reporting obligations with various timing imperatives. We include below a snapshot of some of the key obligations:

• under FCA Principle 11, firms have a general duty to inform the FCA of matters about which it would reasonably expect notice;
• a firm must notify the FCA immediately it becomes aware, or has information which reasonably suggests, that a matter which could have a significant adverse impact on the firm’s reputation has occurred, may have occurred or may occur in the foreseeable future;
• a firm must notify the FCA immediately it becomes aware, or has information which reasonably suggests, that a significant breach of a rule (including a significant breach of a Conduct Rule) has occurred, may have occurred or may occur in the foreseeable future; and
• a firm must also notify the FCA if it takes disciplinary action against an individual for a breach of the Conduct Rules. Where the relevant individual is a senior manager, the notification must be made within seven business days. Where the relevant individual is certified staff, the notification must be made in the firm’s annual reporting.

FINRA members must report to FINRA within 30 calendar days after the firm has concluded, or reasonably should have concluded, that an associated person of the firm or the firm itself has violated any securities, insurance, commodities, financial or investment-related laws, rules, regulations or standards of conduct of any domestic or foreign regulatory body or self-regulatory organisation.

While there is no requirement to report misconduct to regulators, the SEC routinely gives credit to organisations that voluntarily choose to self-report, which can lead to reduced fines, non-prosecution agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, waivers of disqualification following regulatory or criminal actions, or more organisation-friendly language in settlement documents. However, such disclosed information may later be discoverable by private plaintiffs.

The SEC has issued guidance that a failure to self-report significant misconduct can lead to more severe penalties.